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Abstract
I start from the fundamental principles of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with-
out probability, and interpret them using the notion of coexistence: a quantum state
can be read, not uniquely, as a coexistence of other quantum states, which are pair-
wise orthogonal. In this formalism, I prove that a conscious observer is necessarily a
physical object that can memorize local events by setting one of its parts in an ex-
actly specified constant quantum state (hypotheses H1, H2 and H3). Then I define the
probability of a future event as the proportion of initial observers, all identical, who
will actually experience that event. It then becomes possible to establish the usual re-
sults of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, I detail the link between probabilities and
relative frequencies. Additionally, I study the biological feasibility of this modelling of
observer’s mind.
The second part of this paper completes the neuronal description of the mind functions,
based on current neuroscientific knowledge. It provides a model that is compatible with
the assumptions of the first part and consistent with our daily conscious experience.
In particular, it develops a model of self-consciousness based on an explicit use of the
random component of neuron behaviour; according to the first part, that random is
in fact the coexistence of a multiplicity of possibilities. So, when the mind measures
the random part of certain neurons in the brain, he goes himself within each of these
possibilities. The mind has a decision-making component that is active in this situation,
appearing then as the cause of the choice of this possibility among all the others. This
models the self-consciousness which then ensures the unity of our conscious experience
by equating this experience with “what the ego is conscious about”.
The conclusion details the points that remain to be developed.
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Introduction :
This introduction is informal. It presents without technicality the ideas that are more
rigorously developed in this article.
I make the assumption that our universe is exactly governed by non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics. So we explore what this theory tells about our universe and ourselves.
Paragraphs I.1.1 and I.1.2 reveal the lack of an acceptable definition of probabilities,
even though they are used by most interpretations of quantum mechanics. The notion
of probability is however too complex to be a primitive notion, not defined from other
concepts. Therefore, I start only from non-relativistic quantum mechanics deprived of
any use of probabilities.
Paragraphs I.1.3 to I.1.7 develop an interpretation of this mechanics based on the
primitive notions of existence, coexistence, presence and time1. Quantum mechanics
imposes strong constraints on its own interpretation. This helps to clarify and better
understand these primitive concepts.
The experimental observation of interference phenomena leads us to accept that one
object can live at the same time in several states. Its quantum state can then be read
as a coexistence of this object in several states. This a priori baroque idea is in fact
consistent with our daily experience. Indeed, we only make imprecise measurements
on the objects which surround us. We can therefore conceive that each object is in
fact in a state of coexistence, each state within the coexistence being compatible with
our observations. For example, the water molecules contained in this bottle that I
observe do not conform to a precise dynamic of vertiginous complexity where each
water molecule vibrates and turns and collides with other molecules along inextricable
trajectories. No, this bottle of water is in a state of indeterminate coexistence of all
the possibilities of determined states that are compatible with my observations.
Within a coexistence, experimental results indicate that the different states do not
have the same presence, except in a particular case of coexistence that I call uniform.
It is only for this kind of coexistence that it makes sense to count the different states.
I prove that a non-uniform coexistence of states can be reduced to a uniform coex-
istence, in which each initial state is multiplied into several similar states. For each
state present in the non-uniform coexistence, the proportion of states thus multiplied
relative to all states follows a variant of the Born rule.
However, to actually prove the Born rule, we must first define probabilities. They
appear when an observer measures a state of coexistence and thus enters that coex-
istence. He does not select one of the possibilities present in coexistence because he
enters them all, but in each possibility his consciousness is modified differently by his
observation, so that his consciousness, in each coexisting state, experiments only one
of these possibilities. This is Everett’s original approach [T.D.1, pages 150-151].
What is new in this article is the precise modelling of consciousness and the fact that
it allows a natural definition of probabilities.
1Time is a notion whose general relativity highlights all the complexity. However, in order to avoid
the use of quantum gravity, I am forced here to consider time as a primitive notion.
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Chapter I.2 deals with modelling the consciousness of an observer. It is the state of a
physical object that I call the observer’s mind.
According to the interpretation of quantum mechanics without probability developed in
I.1, every system of the universe exists intrinsically in a state given by its wave function
and it collects information from its environment by entanglement during interactions.
As Bergson explains, this kind of “immediate consciousness” is only unconsciousness
if it retains nothing of its past, if it constantly forgets itself. The mind of a conscious
observer is therefore necessarily a physical object of the universe in interaction with
its environment that can preserve for some time the memory of its past conscious
experiences, that is to say a part of his quantum state itself. It is therefore necessarily
a physical object that can store a local event by placing one of its parts in an exactly
defined and constant quantum state.
We can thus model the observer’s mind by a collection of elementary components,
which I call c-bits (“c” for “conscious”), whose quantum state during a waking period
can only take two values, necessarily mutually orthogonal. Each c-bit is a degree of
freedom of a system of a few particles. In I.4, I develop the possibility that a c-bit is
the spin of a set of 4 spin 1
2
particles or atoms. Each c-bit is housed in the heart of
a protein, called c-protein, itself located in a neuron, called a c-neuron. The c-protein
protects the integrity of the c-bit and controls its evolution according to the activity
of the c-neuron.
A local event to the individual translates into a certain pattern of neuronal activity
in the brain. That involves certain c-neurons whose c-bits have their state modified
accordingly, thus memorizing the local event. The set of conscious quantum states of
the mind is a finite pairwise orthogonal set of states.
When a conscious observer measures the state of an object, chapter I.3 defines the
probability that he will obtain a certain result: before the measurement, the object
is in a state of coexistence of different possible results. During the measurement, the
measuring device and then the observer himself are taken into this coexistence. It can
be reduced to a uniform coexistence which is interpreted as follows: the observer’s
mind before the measurement is in a given state mind, which can be equated with a
multitude of observers in the same state mind, then at the end of the measurement,
among this multitude, some of these observers have experienced the ith result, which
they memorize by setting their mind in the state mindi. The probability of the ith
result is then just the number of observers aware of that result divided by the total
number of initial observers. All observers with the same conscious experience mindi
can be grouped into a single observer, but according to a coexistence which is no longer
uniform. It is a natural definition of probabilities. Its precise statement requires the
previous modelling of the observer’s consciousness.
The remainder of I.3 establishes the classical results of probabilistic quantum mechan-
ics. It explains the Young’s double-slit experiment and the phenomenon of decoherence.
It also studies the relationship between probability and relative frequency for experi-
ments that can be repeated many times.
At a metaphysical level, according to each mind, there is the mind itself and the rest
of the universe. According to each mind, the whole universe is a coexistence within
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which each universe is characterized by the state mind of the mind and where the rest
of the universe is itself in a state of coexistence, that of all states that are compatible
with the state mind. Such an interpretation of the universe in terms of coexistence is
not unique. This explains why our own consciousness does not forbid the consciousness
of others. We perceive from others only the coexistence of their states of mind which
are in coherence with our own current state of mind. Each mind is a particular and
egocentric way of reading the universe.
The first part studies probabilities by using an initial modelling of the observer’s con-
sciousness. The second part reverses the roles. It seeks to develop the modelling of
consciousness and in particular self-consciousness by using the definition of probabili-
ties.
Chapter II.1 recalls the simplified operation of a neuron: it receives several electrical
signals at its synapses and when their sum exceeds a certain threshold, it emits an
action potential along its axon, which is connected to synapses of other neurons.
Some neurons, called sensory, interact with the external environment and translate this
interaction into electrical signals. For example, the retina is covered with light-sensitive
neurons.
Chapter II.2 sets out what is known about how the information collected by sensory
neurons flows through the brain. It has for each sense a hierarchical system of neural
maps that can recognize patterns of the environment. The more one progresses in the
hierarchy, the more complex the patterns are, like the presence of a smile on a face,
and the more invariant they are, for example in relation to the size and orientation of
the same smile.
Chapter II.3 focuses on neural architecture downstream of the upper sensory maps. A
Hopfield network is a neuron network that behaves like a content-addressable memory;
it can learn certain activity patterns, so that when presented with any activity pat-
tern, it converges to the nearest learned pattern. We assume that, for each sense, the
upper maps are connected to Hopfield networks that learn their most common activity
patterns. Thus, at the perception of a partially hidden glass of water, the upper visual
maps are set in a specific activity configuration which is transmitted to a Hopfield
network which then can reconstitute the whole glass if it is part of its learned con-
figurations. I label these Hopfield networks as imaginary maps because they augment
reality.
BAMs (Bidirectional Associative Memory) consist of two layers of neurons. They can
learn to associate an activity configuration of one layer with an activity configuration
of the other layer.
We assume that the imaginary maps of the different senses are linked by BAMs. That
allows for example to associate the configuration corresponding to seeing a glass with
the hearing of the word “glass”.
In short, sensations are shaped in high-level sensory maps. Thanks to the BAMs, they
are augmented with the imagination of other sensations.
We assume that these sensory and imaginary maps are made of c-neurons that encode
in their c-bits these real or imagined sensations into conscious perceptions; the con-
sciousness of the mind is the state of all c-bits. This decorrelation between neuronal
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electrical activity and conscious perception helps to explain the phenomenon of delayed
consciousness highlighted by Libet experiments.
However, the brain is not a passive organ merely analyzing sensory information. Chap-
ter II.4 focuses on the motor component of the brain. The motor neurons in the spinal
cord can control the contractions of our muscles to make movements. They are them-
selves controlled by a motor map housed in the brain. We assume that it is connected
by BAMs to the various imaginary maps. Then the imagination of a sensation can in-
duce a suitable movement. Conversely, the activation of the motor map can induce the
imagination of the associated movement before the sensation of the movement actually
performed.
In paragraph II.1.3, I assume that some neurons, that I call q-neurons, have a random
behavior; under certain conditions, they are set in a state of coexistence, where active
states and rest states coexist. This coexistence is entangled with the environment.
In Chapter II.6, we use these q-neurons to develop decision-making mechanisms. A
typical decision-making algorithm is to imagine different possible decisions, to retain
some optimal solutions and then to choose randomly among these the actual decision.
These algorithms are triggered by the brain through the activation of neurons, which
I label as decisional. They act on q-neurons that introduce a little randomness in the
imagined movements, which are then possibly realized.
When a decisional neuron is activated, it leads to the creation of a coexistence of states
in certain q-neurons, thus a coexistence of different possibilities of movement, real or
only imagined. When these movements are perceived by sensory and imaginary maps,
they are actually measured by the mind. The mind itself then enters the different
states of the coexistence.
In chapter II.7, I suppose that decisional neurons are c-neurons. The mind then has
a decisional component. The conscious chronology of decision making leads the mind
to perceive a decision making at the very moment when the imagination of the result
of the decision appears in the mind, just before the sensations produced by its actual
realization, in case of actual choice.
For the mind, therefore, it is not a random behaviour, but a decision making, and the
perception of the decisional c-bits is related to the decision made. For the mind, the
decisional c-bits encode the characteristics of the cause that made the decision, that
is, of the ego.
The ego has a real existence for the mind, just as sensory perceptions do. However,
the ego does not exist in itself, as the cause of a decision, because no decision is made.
All possibilities coexist. This makes the ego inaccessible to the brain’s own analytical
abilities. This aspect of the human condition is not negative because it is partially in
conformity with Buddhist wisdom.
As a cause, during the construction of the mind, the ego acquires a more and more
central place, to the point that the content of the mind becomes “what the ego is
conscious about”. This is how self-consciousness ensures the unity of our conscious
experience.
Moreover, the perception of an ego that is the cause of decisions imposes a sense of
responsibility. This is probably a selective advantage.
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Reading Advice
Based on your knowledge and interests, the table on the next page shows how to read
this article without losing time. I define eight reader profiles:
• L1 = reader studying the different interpretations of quantum mechanics.
• L2 = Reader interested by a natural definition of probabilities within the frame-
work of quantum mechanics, for which he seeks a coherent interpretation.
• L3 = Reader interested in a scientific definition of consciousness.
• L4 = Reader seeking to link consciousness and molecular biology.
• L5 = Reader seeking to connect consciousness and the notion of spin.
• L6 = Reader interested in a neuroscientific construction of consciousness.
• L7 = Reader interested in artificial intelligence and decision making algorithms.
• L8 = Philosopher.
Each reader can just read the paragraphs checked in his column. When a cell contains
the words “FPk” or/and “IPk”, the reader may just read “FPk” or/and “IPk” in the
relevant paragraph. More complex indications are provided by numbers that refer to
the bottom of the table.
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L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8
I.1.1 × × × × × × × ×
I.1.2 ×
I.1.3 × FP11, IP1 FP11, IP1 FP11, IP1 FP11, IP1 FP11, IP1 FP11, IP1 ×
I.1.4 × IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2
I.1.5 FP2 × FP2 FP2 FP2 FP2 FP2 FP2
I.1.6 FP3, IP3 × FP32, IP3 FP32, IP3 FP32, IP3 FP32, IP3 FP32, IP3 FP32, IP3
I.7.1 × × × × × × × ×
I.7.2 3 × 3 3 3 3 3 3
I.7.3 ×
I.7.4 4 × 4 4 4 4 4 4
I.7.5 5 × 5 5 5 5 5 5
I.2.1 ×
I.2.2 - I.2.4 × × × × × × × ×
I.2.5 ×
I.2.6 × × × × × × × ×
I.2.7 × ×
I.3.1 × × × × × × × ×
I.3.2 - I.3.6 ×
I.4 ×
II.1.1 × × × ×
II.1.2 - II.3.5 × × ×
II.3.6 × × ×
II.4 - II.7.2 × × ×
II.7.3 ×
II.7.4 × ×
II.7.5 ×
1. You can limit yourself to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
2. If the notion of tensor product is not mastered, you can just admit
- that x⊗ y is linear with respect to x and with respect to y, that is to say
(αx + βx′)⊗ y = αx⊗ y + βx′ ⊗ y and x⊗ (αy + βy′) = αx⊗ y + βx ⊗ y′,
- that the Hermitian product of x⊗ y and x′ ⊗ y′ is 〈x|x′〉.〈y|y′〉.
3. Just read this paragraph from IP4 included.
4. It is enough to read this paragraph until “a poorly specified existence”.
5. Just read the beginning of this paragraph until “called the presence of obji in the
coexistence” then just read IP5 and IP6.
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Part I
The Observer and Quantum
Mechanics
1 Formalism and Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics
1.1 The Problem of Probabilities
1.1.1 Quantum Mechanics and Probabilities
Almost a century after its birth, quantum mechanics keeps a part of mystery. Its
mathematical formalism is well established and the results it produces are in perfect
agreement with experimental data. However the exact link between this formalism
and the reality of the world in which we live remains poorly understood. We know
that quantum mechanics is a very good model, but we do not know precisely what it
models. It surely expresses something about the very nature of our universe, however
that something is currently beyond our comprehension. A coherent and understandable
interpretation of quantum mechanics is lacking.
Let us take the example of the Stern-Gerlach experiment [J.D.C pg 57]; silver atoms are
passed through an inhomogeneous magnetic field in the laboratory vertical direction.
Each atom is then deflected up or down and both events occur with the probability
1
2
. We know that this deflection depends only on the spin of the atoms, though if
we impose them a same initial spin state in a horizontal direction, then they are still
deflected up or down in an equiprobable manner [J.D.C pg 65].
More generally, quantum mechanics predictions always have a probabilistic nature, of
the form “given that an object is in a certain initial state, if it is allowed to interact
with a specific (measuring) device, then a particular result will be observed with a
certain probability”.
In this context, a coherent and understandable interpretation of quantum mechanics
must be accompanied by a coherent and understandable interpretation of the notion
of probability.
1.1.2 The Frequentist Interpretation
So, what do we mean by the phrase “the silver atom is deflected up with a probability
1
2
”, or more generally “a certain object satisfies a given property with a probability p”,
where p ∈ [0.1]?
The frequentist approach claims that in an experiment with a clearly defined protocol,
the object obj satisfies the property P with a probability p if and only if, when one
repeats this experience N times with N large, then most often the property is satisfied
K times with K close to pN .
This frequentist approach does not stand up to scrutiny [A.H], [D.W.2, pg 123-132].
Firstly, apart from the fact that some experiments are not reproducible, it is never
possible to repeat an experiment in exactly the same manner. Certain parameters are
necessarily modified and this is a first imprecision source. In addition, the terms “N
large”, “most often” and “close to” are explicitly imprecise. Indeed, for N given, K
is most often close to, but different from pN , and this all the more frequently as N
is large. Thus, since p is distinct from K
N
, the latter fraction is not a definition of the
probability p. To substitute these approximations with accuracies, we would have to
repeat the experiment an infinite number of times, which is impossible here below.
Lastly, such an interpretation provides no phenomenological explanation. When using
a balanced die, before the roll, the probability of a “3” appearing is 1
6
, then after the
roll, this probability becomes 0 or 1 depending on the result. What happened? The
frequentist approach does not answer this question.
In short, frequentism does not currently have a strictly admissible enunciation. Fur-
thermore, even if one does exist, it would not have the interpretative strength expected.
Kolmogorov’s axioms, which provide the mathematical definition of probability, do
not better answer the previous question. Moreover as Hajek [A.H, pg 211] points
out, the notion of mass also satisfies these axioms (by requiring the total mass to be
equal to unity), therefore these axioms circumscribe the notion of probability without
characterizing it.
1.1.3 Bayesian Interpretation
If frequentist approaches are disqualified, to my knowledge, there are only the subjec-
tive approaches left, which consist in deriving the notion of probability from that of
information acquired by an observer. Saying that the object obj will verify the prop-
erty P with a probability p means that the observer making this prediction has more
or less accurate information about obj and P . When p = 1 ou p = 0, he is certain of
the result, his information is complete. In other cases, his information only allows him
to quantify his belief in a probabilistic form. This evolves over time according to the
knowledge newly obtained by the observer as determined by Bayes formulas (this is
why this approach is often called Bayesian). In particular, if the observer has statistical
information about similar objects and properties, he can adjust p according to relative
frequencies.
To derive from this concept an observer independent notion of probability [D.W.1,
pg 132-144], one agrees that the objective probability of an event occurrence is the
subjective probability for a rational observer who knows all about the dynamics and
initial conditions of the object.
Such an approach therefore places the observer at the heart of the interpretation, an
observer who can acquire information, deduce beliefs, an observer capable of rationality.
In short, to rigorously interpret probabilities, it is first necessary to model the observer
and his consciousness. This last problem seems unreachable, firstly because it involves
the higher brain functions and thus the inextricable complexity of our about 100 billion
neurons, and secondly because we do not know how to translate neuronal activities in
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conscious properties, because we do not have the slightest draft of a model of our
conscious perceptions.
It is a dead end in which all interpretations of quantum mechanics are stuck.
1.2 The Measurement Problem
1.2.1 Presentation of the Problem
These interpretations are distinguished by their explanations of the measurement prob-
lem [A.N, pg 22-24], which I briefly recall by simplifying to the extreme and limiting
myself to Stern-Gerlach experiment, with a silver atom whose spin is oriented in a
horizontal direction; its state, also called its wave function, is denoted by ↑〉x.
According to the quantum mechanical formalism, we have ↑〉x = 1√
2
(
↑〉z+ ↓〉z
)
, where
↑〉z (resp. ↓〉z) means a spin oriented in the upward vertical direction (resp. downward).
Hence ↑〉x also means a superposition of a spin ↑〉z and a spin ↓〉z, a superposition which
each theory interprets differently.
The system made up of the spin and the rest of the laboratory has as wave function[ 1√
2
(
↑〉z+ ↓〉z
)
, laboini
]
, where laboini is the state of the lab at the start of the ex-
periment. Then the atom passes through the magnetic field and a measuring device
records its trajectory deflection; the quantum mechanical formalism, without proba-
bility, asserts that the system is then in the state
1√
2
(
[↑〉z, laboup] + [↓〉z, labodown]
)
,
where laboup (resp. labodown) is the state of the laboratory when an upward deflection
(resp. downward) is observed. Nevertheless such a superposed state is never observed;
in practice, the experienced state is either [↑〉z, laboup] or [↓〉z, labodown], equiprobably.
We say that the superposition
1√
2
(
[↑〉z, laboup] + [↓〉z, labodown]
)
collapsed into one of
two wave functions [↑〉z, laboup] or [↓〉z, labodown].
1.2.2 Current Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
Several theories explain this collapse using the notion of probability, but without defin-
ing it:
• The Copenhagen interpretation assumes that the device measuring the trajec-
tory deflection is macroscopic and as such is subject to classical mechanics and
not quantum mechanics. It cannot therefore be in a superposed state unlike
microscopic objects. As in the end our experience of the microscopic world sys-
tematically uses macroscopic objects, no interpretation of these superposed states
is necessary.
• According to de Broglie-Bohm theory, the wave function does not model an object
in our real universe, it is only a wave that guides that real object. The latter is
never in superposition of states. However, probabilities are used in this theory
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because we do not know the object initial position, we only have the probability
distribution of the object presence in such or such place [C.C].
• The GRW theory modifies the quantum mechanical formalism by adding a term
of spontaneous and probabilistic collapse of the wave function at the microscopic
level [R.F].
• According to Shan Gao [S.G.2], when the state of an object is a superposition of
two states state1 and state2, it means that the real state of the object alternates
between these two states, switching at each instant from the state1 to the state2
discontinuously and immediately. His model uses the probability that at time t
the object is in one of the two states.
These theories may provide a solution to the measurement problem, however they
leave the problem of defining probabilities entirely unsolved. This is still the case with
transactional interpretation [JG.C, paragraph 3.8] and the theory of consistent histories
[RB.G].
The situation is perhaps even more serious. Indeed, as Andreas Albrecht and Daniel
Philips [A.A.1] suggest, who notably take the example of coin toss, it is very plausible
that the probabilistic nature of any phenomenon in the real world has its origin in the
collapse of a wave function. Under these conditions, any theory that uses the notion
of probability to explain the collapse phenomenon is marred by circularity.
The only interpretations that define probability at the same time claim that after the
Stern-Gerlach experiment, the wave function is indeed equal to
1√
2
(
[↑〉z, laboup] + [↓〉z, labodown]
)
, whereas an observer in the lab only perceives one
of the two terms:
• According to the Everett interpretation [D.W.2], when passing through the mag-
netic field, each term of the sum ↑〉x = 1√
2
(
↑〉z+ ↓〉z
)
acts differently on the
laboratory and even on the universe as a whole, so that the universe itself is
then in the superposed state
1√
2
(
[↑〉z, univup] + [↓〉z, univdown]
)
. This state de-
scribes a coexistence of two different universes. Thus, measuring the spin of the
atom in the vertical direction induces the emergence of two universes. As such
measurements occur at every moment and in every place of the universe, that
Everett interpretation describes a universe from which emerge at every moment
a multitude of new universes from which other universes emerge, according to a
poorly understood emergence process [D.W.2, page 58]. In this context, David
Wallace proposes to define probabilities based on rational betting decisions, but
this leads him into mathematical complications whose consistency is not certain
[A.M]. The Everett interpretation, however, is gaining more and more physicists
to the point of sometimes being considered as the new dogma.
• According to the existential interpretation [W.Z.2], each of the two terms of the
sum
1√
2
(
[↑〉z, laboup] + [↓〉z, labodown]
)
contains an observer (at least) aware of
14
the outcome of the experiment. It is the same initial observer who differs in
each term by his consciousness, which contains the outcome of the experiment.
The collapse of the wave function is thus an illusion perceived by the observer’s
consciousness. The notion of observer ignorance allows Zureck [W.Z.1] [W.Z.2] to
define probabilities and establish the Born rule. However, the use of a conscious
observer who is not part of the physical model used lacks rigour [W.Z.2, page 17].
1.2.3 Breaking the Dead End
I propose here to get out of this dead end by actually including a model of consciousness
in quantum mechanics. Strongly inspired by the two previous interpretations, I will
then define the notion of probability and establish the Born rule.
The price to pay is the acceptance of physical assumptions about the structure of
human’s consciousness. I will put forward some arguments to justify them but in the
future these assumptions should be checked through appropriate experiments.
In a second part, I will use these assumptions to build a theory of human consciousness
and higher cognitive functions compatible with current neuroscience data.
1.3 Ontology of the Wave Function
I restate the non-relativistic quantum mechanical formalism and at the same time
provide a coherent interpretation.
First Formal Principle (FP1): In quantum mechanics, modeling an object denoted
by obj consists of giving a complex vector space Hobj . It is further assumed that Hobj
is a separable Hilbert space; if it is finite-dimensional, it only means that it is given
with a Hermitian product denoted by 〈. | .〉. If it is infinite-dimensional, then Hobj
must be complete according to the norm induced by 〈. | .〉 and contain a countable
dense set.
The possible states of obj, also called the wave functions of obj, are all unit vectors
of Hobj , that is, vectors of norm 1. By default, such a state will be denoted by obj.
Physicists do not agree on the interpretation that should be given to the wave func-
tion even though it constitutes the basis of the quantum mechanical formalism; some
consider it epistemic when others consider it ontological, as I will detail.
In general, the wave function obj of the object obj is not directly accessible to the
observer. The latter, by making measurements on this object, acquires only partial in-
formation concerning obj, and most often each measurement modifies obj by collapsing
the wave function. Such elusiveness, among other arguments, led some physicists to
grant obj only a status of subjective information and observer partial knowledge about
the object. This is the epistemic interpretation, which was defended since the birth of
quantum mechanics by the Copenhagen school as well as by Einstein [A.E] and which
still has many defenders, such as Fuchs [C.A.F, page 9] and Spekkens [R.W.S]. More
references can be found in [M.S.L, page 72] and [M.F.P., page 1].
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However, a majority of scientists believe that wave function directly models object as
it exists in the real world, independently of any observer. Here are some arguments in
favour of this ontological interpretation.
• The results of the Young’s double-slit experiment [J.D.C Ch 4], [R.R, pages 4-9]
are very difficult to explain without conceiving the wave function of the particle
as a very real entity that splits into two waves each passing through a slit and
then interferes onto the screen. Other intuitive arguments can be found in [M.S.L,
pages 78-81].
• During the nineties, the concept of protective measures was developed. It is a
way to access to the value of a parameter of the obj vector by modifying obj
by as little as you want. Several protective measures thus make it possible to
determine the wave function completely without disturbing it. It then becomes
much less elusive. This is a strong indication in favour of its ontological character
[S.G.1], [L.V], but it remains controversial [J.C],[M.S.2] and debated [S.G.3].
• In 2011, Pusey, Barett and Rudolph [M.F.P] proved a theorem stating that if
the wave function is only informative about real objects and if two real objects
prepared independently of each other have independent properties, then quantum
mechanics is contradicted. This new argument for an ontological wave function
is detailed and improved in [M.S.L] but challenged in [O.C].
If the wave function is epistemic, then its subjectivity returns us to the previous dead
end. So, unless we conclude this article here, we must admit the ontology of the wave
function:
First Interpretative Principle (IP1): The wave function obj of an object obj
mathematically models the state of the object as it exists in the real world. It reflects
the existence of obj and characterizes its state: two different real states have different
wave functions.
Conversely, if obj1 and obj2 are two linearly independent unit vectors of Hobj , these are
two wave functions associated with different real states of obj.
When there is a phase θ ∈ R, different from 0 modulo 2π, such that obj1 = eiθobj2,
these two wave functions are still associated with real states of obj a priori different,
however, we will see at IP3 how and when we can equate these two real states.
1.4 Universality of Quantum Mechanics
According to the Copenhagen interpretation, quantum mechanics should be reserved
for the microscopic world and macroscopic objects should conform to classical physics.
Such a limitation would prevent the observation of purely quantum phenomena for
objects whose size exceeds a certain microscopic length L. In particular, interference
patterns would not appear in the Young’s experiment with a particle size greater than
L.
However, the evolution of experimental techniques has made it possible to highlight
such interference for larger and larger objects [M.S.1, pages 258-270 and 282]. In 2013,
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Sandra Eibenberger and her collaborators did it with macromolecules of more than 800
atoms [S.E]. In 2010 [R.W], [A.D.O] A.D.O’Connell and his team made it with a metal
vibrating blade 0.06 millimeters long.
These experiments require L to be greater than macroscopic values.
Moreover quantum mechanics explains very well [M.S.1] how interaction with the en-
vironment destroys interference. This phenomenon called decoherence is all the more
difficult to avoid if the object handled is large. In this context, classical mechanics ap-
pears only as an approximated theory of quantum mechanics for macroscopic objects.
If we refuse any approximation though, as we must on the ontological level, it is still
quantum mechanics which applies, even on the macroscopic scale.
Second Interpretative Principle (IP2): Quantum mechanics is universal. It ap-
plies to everything, not just microscopic objects.
It applies in particular to the universe as a whole, which is therefore itself characterized
by its wave function, as Hugh Everett proposed as early as 1957 [E.H., page 9].
1.5 Schro¨dinger Equation
Second Formal Principle (FP2): Suppose the object obj exists in the real universe
between the moments t0 and t
2. Let obj be its state at the moment t0 and Ut0→t(obj)
its state at the moment t. Then Ut0→t is a linear function
3.
For any obj ∈ Hobj such that ‖obj‖ = 1, we have ‖Ut0→t(obj)‖ = 1 = ‖obj‖, so Ut0→t
is a unitary operator of Hobj: its adjoint U∗t0→t is equal to its inverse U−1t0→t.
If one derives with respect to t the relationship obj(t) = Ut0→t(obj(t0)), one gets
i~
∂[obj(t)]
∂t
= i~
∂Ut0→t
∂t
U−1t0→t(obj(t)). This is the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂[obj(t)]
∂t
= Ĥ(t)[obj(t)],
where the Hamiltonian Ĥ(t) = i~
∂Ut0→t
∂t
U−1t0→t is a Hermitian operator. Indeed,
[Ĥ(t)]∗ = −i~Ut0→t
∂U−1t0→t
∂t
= Ĥ(t) because
∂[Ut0→tU
−1
t0→t]
∂t
= 0.
We say that obj is completely isolated when its dynamics does not depend on the rest
of the universe, that is, when it evolves as if it were the entire universe. Such isolation
in the strict sense is concretely illusory, nevertheless it separates the intrinsic evolution
of the object from its interaction with the environment.
In this case, Ĥ does not depend on time because physical laws are immutable and the
Schro¨dinger equation is solved as obj(t) = e−
i
~
tĤobj(0). So Ut0→t = e
− i
~
(t−t0)Ĥ .
2This assumption is not always true. We will see examples of objects that exist at the moment t0
whose existence is no longer ensured at later moments.
3It implies that the state obj of obj at the moment t0 is variable. The theory is not only about
the universe as it exists, it must also apply to the universe as it could exist.
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1.6 Tensor Product
Third Formal Principle (FP3): Two objects of the universe, obj1 and obj2, are
said to be disjoint when it is possible, at least in theory, to act on one without modifying
the other. The Hilbert space of the union of these two objects is the tensor product
Hobj1 ⊗Hobj2 . As a consequence, the union is denoted by obj1 ⊗ obj2.
More generally, if (objk)1≤k≤n is a collection of n disjoint objects of the universe, their
union is denoted obj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ objn. So Hobj1⊗···⊗objn = Hobj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hobjn.
Third Interpretative Principle (IP3): If obj1 ⊗ obj2 is formally in the state
obj1 ⊗ obj2, the associated interpretation is that the object obj1 is in the state obj1
and that at the same time the object obj2 is in the state obj2.
As for every θ ∈ R, obj1 ⊗ obj2 = [eiθobj1] ⊗ [e−iθobj2], it is equivalent to saying that
the object obj1 is in the state eiθobj1 and that at the same time the object obj2 is in
the state e−iθobj2. Thus, in this situation, the phases of the states obj1 and obj2 are
not uniquely defined.
The state obj1 ⊗ obj2 is said to be separable. Any state of Hobj1 ⊗ Hobj2 is a linear
combination of separable states, which is generally not itself separable; such a state is
written αobj1a ⊗ obj2a + βobj1b ⊗ obj2b . It is said to be entangled.
A qubit is an object such that dim(Hqubit) = 2.
Quantum computing performs calculations with sets of qubits. Consider n qubits
qb1, . . . ,qbn, where n ≥ 2, whose set is E =
⊗
1≤i≤n
qbi.
When they are isolated, let U be the unitary operator ofHE that describes the dynamics
of E for a given duration τ . Thus, for any state E(t) of E at a moment t, we have
E(t+ τ) = U(E(t)).
Suppose we also know how to act on E to swap states of qb1 and qb2. Let us denote by
T this operation. In these conditions, Deutsch, Barenco and Ekert [D.D] have proved
that, with few exceptions, U is a universal quantum gate, that is to say that any unitary
operator of HE can be approached with arbitrary precision by successive applications
of U and T in a well chosen order.
We can then control the dynamics of E so that the final state is, with arbitrary preci-
sion, the image of the initial state by any unitary operator of HE.
The proof [D.D pages 3-5 and 9] adapts to the more general case where HE is finite-
dimensional and where E decomposes into a tensor product of several parts of which
we know how to swap two of them without modifying their states.
This makes plausible the following statement, which we admit:
for any object obj that we encounter in this article, it is possible to control its dynamics
so that the final state is, with arbitrary precision, the image of the initial state by any
unitary operator of Hobj .
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1.7 Coexistence
1.7.1 Linearity and Coexistence
Let us fix an initial moment t0 ∈ R.
We choose from Hobj two possible states of obj, denoted by obj1(t0) and obj2(t0).
We fix α, β ∈ C \ {0} such that ‖αobj1(t0) + βobj2(t0)‖ = 1; according to FP1, we can
assume that at the moment t0, obj is in the state obj(t0) = αobj1(t0) + βobj2(t0).
Let t be such that t > t0. Let obj1(t) = Ut0→t(obj1(t0)): it would be the state of obj
at the moment t if we had chosen obj1(t0) as the state of obj at the moment t0.
Similarly, let obj2(t) = Ut0→t(obj2(t0)): it would be the state of obj at the moment t if
obj2(t0) had been selected as the state of obj at the moment t0.
Based on the linearity of Ut0→t, the state of obj at the moment t is
obj(t) = Ut0→t(obj(t0)) = αUt0→t(obj1(t0)) + βUt0→t(obj2(t0)) = αobj1(t) + βobj2(t).
Thus obj(t) is obtained directly from obj(t0) by applying Ut0→t, while we can also obtain
obj(t) by reading obj(t0) as the superposed state αobj1(t0) + βobj2(t0) built from the
states obj1(t0) and obj2(t0); one evaluates the future of the latter, independent of each
other, by applying Ut0→t to them, and one obtains obj1(t) and obj2(t). Then the state
obj(t) is also the superposition αobj1(t) + βobj2(t).
The linearity principle FP2 is therefore compatible with dynamically interpreting
t 7−→ αobj1(t) + βobj2(t) as the simultaneous coexistence of t 7−→ obj1(t) and
t 7−→ obj2(t), so that the object obj is at all times t “in the state obj1(t) and at the
same time in the state obj2(t)”. If it is true at the moment t0, it stays true indefinitely,
with the same coefficients α and β.
More generally, if (obji)1≤i≤k is a family of k possible states of obj and if (αi)1≤i≤k
is a family of non-zero complex numbers such that ‖
k∑
i=1
αiobji‖ = 1, we can consider
interpreting the sum obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji as a coexistence state of states (obji)1≤i≤k.
1.7.2 Orthogonality and Coexistence
The purpose of this paragraph is to show that such an interpretation is acceptable if
and only if the family (obji)1≤i≤k is orthonormal.
A first argument consists in asserting that the reality of such coexistence is acquired
if and only if it concerns states obji whose existence can be detected by a well chosen
device, denoted by dev. It can verify the existence of the object obj in the state obji
if and only if, starting from an initial state dev0 independent of i, after an interaction
phase with obj, the state of dev gets a value devi such that devi 6= devj when i 6= j.
This last condition means that the device can distinguish obji from objj , so it can verify
that obj is in the state obji. After the interaction, we require that the state of obj
is still equal to the initial state obji : the device must be able to analyze the state of
obj without modifying its reality. It thus testifies to a reality not only past but also
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present. The device must be theoretically constructible but its actual existence is not
necessary.
We thus are in the usual conditions of a “repeatable measurement” in quantum mechan-
ics [P.M, page 27]. If we denote by U the unitary operator of Hdev⊗obj that performs
this interaction, then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, U(obji ⊗ dev0) = obji ⊗ devi.
Theorem: The previous situation is possible if and only if the family (obji)1≤i≤k is
orthonormal.
Proof: Let us assume firstly that the previous situation is possible.
Let i, j be in {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j.
Then 〈obji | objj〉 = 〈obji | objj〉.〈dev0 | dev0〉 = 〈obji ⊗ dev0 | objj ⊗ dev0〉.
As U is unitary it preserves the Hermitian product. Thus,
〈obji | objj〉 = 〈U(obji ⊗ dev0) | U(objj ⊗ dev0)〉 = 〈obji ⊗ devi | objj ⊗ devj〉,
so 〈obji | objj〉(1− 〈devi | devj〉) = 0.
Suppose 〈devi | devj〉 =1. Then |〈devi | devj〉| = ‖devi‖‖devj‖, so according to the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, there is λ ∈ C such that devi = λdevj .
Then4 1 = 〈devi | devj〉 = λ, so devi = devj . This is false,
so 〈devi | devj〉 6= 1 and 〈obji | objj〉 = 0.
To establish the converse, assume that (obji)1≤i≤k is orthonormal.
The families (obji⊗ dev0)1≤i≤k and (obji⊗ devi)1≤i≤k being both orthonormal, there is
a unitary operator U which transforms the first into the second. This completes the
proof according to the end of paragraph 1.6.
We can provide a more constructive proof; for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let pi be the orthog-
onal projection onto the line whose direction vector is obji and let λi be a real, such
that λi 6= λj when i 6= j.
Let Ĥobj =
k∑
i=1
λipi. It is a Hermitian operator on Hobj.
Let Ĥ = Ĥobj ⊗ Ĥdev where Ĥdev is a Hermitian operator on Hdev.
It is a usual form of interaction Hamiltonian [M.S.1, page 78]. We admit we know how
to build a device such that the interaction Hamiltonian between obj and dev is given
by Ĥ .
Before interaction, we start from the state objj ⊗ dev0. Then, after an interaction of a
duration T, we are in the state 5 E = e−
iT
~
Ĥobj⊗Ĥdev(objj ⊗ dev0).
So, E =
+∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(−iT
~
)nĤobj
n
(objj)⊗ Ĥdev
n
(dev0).
The family (obji)1≤i≤k is orthonormal, so when i 6= i′, pipi′ = 0.
Thus Ĥobj
n
(objj) =
k∑
i=1
λni pi(objj) = λ
n
j objj .
This implies that E = objj ⊗ devj
4In this paper, it is agreed that the Hermitian product 〈x|y〉 is linear as a function of y and
semilinear as a function of x.
5In this article, i refers to both an integer and a complex number such as i2 = −1, as long as the
context allows to remove this ambiguity.
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where devj =
+∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(−iT
~
)nλnj Ĥdev
n
(dev0) = e−
iT
~
λjĤdev(dev0). Q.E.D.
Under these conditions, when obj is in the state obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji, according to the
linearity principle, interaction with dev can be summarized in the form
obj ⊗ dev0 −→
k∑
i=1
αiobji ⊗ devi.
Regardless of any interpretation of the wave function collapse and the notion of prob-
ability, everyone agrees that under these conditions, the experimenter observes all the
states obji ⊗ devi, with a relative frequency of about |αi|2. We can say under these
conditions that the device dev can indeed detect the presence of the states (obji)1≤i≤k
when obj is in the state
k∑
i=1
αiobji. We have therefore shown that, if the reality of a
coexistence is equivalent to its detectability, then the interpretation of obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji
as a coexistence of the states obji is valid if and only if the family (obji)1≤i≤k is or-
thonormal.
A second argument consists in accepting to interpret obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji as a coexistence
of the states obji only if they have a certain independence from each other, that is if
it is possible to modify the phase of one without modifying that of the others. For
example in the Mach-Zender interferometer [P.M, page 71], when a photon meets the
first semireflecting mirror, its wave function has the form pho =
1√
2
(pho1 + pho2),
where pho1 (resp. pho2) represents the photon state if it is (resp. is not) reflected by
the mirror. A translucent material that slows down the photon can be placed on the
path corresponding to the reflection. The photon wave function becomes
pho =
1√
2
(eiδpho1 + pho2). The same could be done in the Young experiment by
placing the translucent material in front of one of the two slits.
More generally, depending on whether the phase of obj1 is changed or not, there are
two dynamics defined by two unitary operators V and V ′ such that for every i ≥2,
V (obji) = V
′(obji) and V (obj1) = e
iδV ′(obj1), with δ different from 0 modulo 2π.
Let U = V −1V ′. Then by preserving the Hermitian product, for any i ≥ 2,
〈obji|obj1〉 = 〈U(obji)|U(obj1)〉 = e−iδ〈obji|obj1〉, so obji and obj1 are orthogonal.
Fourth Interpretative Principle (IP4): For an object obj in the universe, let
(obji)1≤i≤k be a family of states of Hobj and (αi)1≤i≤k a family of non-zero complex
numbers. Then the equality obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji is interpreted as a coexistence of the
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states obji if and only if (obji)1≤i≤k is orthonormal and if
k∑
i=1
|αi|2 = 1.
When Hobj has a finite dimension equal to n, by completing (obji)1≤i≤k in an orthonor-
mal basis of Hobj , the previous relationship is the decomposition of obj in the basis
(obji)1≤i≤n.
Thus IP4, which is already an idea that is difficult to accept, hides another equally
eccentric idea, equally unacceptable if it was not dictated by quantum formalism and
by the impossibility of finding another simple and coherent interpretation. Indeed, if
(obji)1≤i≤n and (obj
′
i)1≤i≤n are two orthonormal basis of Hobj ,
writing obj =
n∑
i=1
αiobji =
n∑
i=1
α′iobj
′
i models a coexistence of certain states obji and
meanwhile of certain states obj′i. We must admit that the object is in a state of a
simultaneous coexistence of the states obji, and that this first reading of the state of
obj does not prevent other readings: it is also in the state of a simultaneous coexistence
of the states obj′i. These two readings are two consistent ways to read the state of
existence of obj.
For example, the following relationships can be interpreted in this way with respect to
the spin of an electron: ↑〉z = 1√
2
(↑〉x+ ↓〉x) = 1√
2
(↑〉y+ ↓〉y) [J.H, page 99].
1.7.3 Interference and Interaction
Let (obji)1≤i≤k be an orthonormal family of Hobj and (αi)1≤i≤k a family of non-zero
complex numbers such that
k∑
i=1
|αi|2 = 1. Suppose obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji. We have seen
that a device that can detect the states obji provides only one outcome among them in
each trial. It is therefore tempting to argue that when obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji, the object is
in one of the k states obji, without anyone knowing exactly which one. However, the
Young’s double-slit experiment in particular disqualifies such an interpretation; if at
each trial the particle passed only through one of the two slits, the set of the particle
positions on the screen after multiple trials would not reveal an interference pattern. I
will explain this theory on page 55 and we will see that more generally, we can observe
the presence of interference between the k terms obj1, . . . objk.
Thus, the linearity on the formal side and the presence of interference on the exper-
imental side, lead us to accept the idea that a given object can coexist at the same
time in several states, constituting an orthonormal family. The story t 7−→ obj(t) =
k∑
i=1
αiobji(t) of the object obj can be read as the coexistence of k stories t 7−→ obji(t).
The linearity principle ensures that the different states that coexist do not interact
with each other. Indeed, if we use the notations of paragraph 1.7.1, the evolution of
obj1, which corresponds to t 7−→ Ut0 7−→t(obj1(t0)) is absolutely not influenced by the
evolution of obj2, given by t 7−→ Ut0 7−→t(obj2(t0)).
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Interferences are experimental evidence of the coexistence of several terms, so it is
useless to make them disappear to interpret these terms as several realities which
coexist without interacting between them. This is though what is done in the modern
version of the Everett interpretation [D.W.2, page 84-85] using decoherence. Is it due
to confusion between the notions of interference and interaction?
The interaction between obj1 and obj2, though, corresponds to a very different situation,
of which we already gave an example page 20, during the constructive part of the proof;
obj1 and obj2 are then states of two different objects obj and obj’, they interact when
the Hamiltonian of obj⊗ obj’ is decomposed into the form
Ĥ = Ĥobj ⊗ IdHobj′ + IdHobj ⊗ Ĥobj′ + Ĥint, with [M.S page 78] Ĥint of the form
Ĥint =
∑
α
Eα ⊗ E ′α, where Eα (resp : E ′α) is a linear operator of Hobj (resp. Hobj′)
different from identity. Ĥobj and Ĥobj′ describe the intrinsic dynamics of obj and obj’.
When Ĥint 6= 0, if obj⊗ obj’ starts from the initial state obj0⊗ obj′0, the final state of
obj ⊗ obj’ is usually an entangled state
k∑
i=1
αiobji ⊗ obj′i, where obji may depend on
obj′0 and obj
′
i may depend on obj0. When that happens, we say that there is interaction
between obj and obj’.
So an interaction involves two different objects in the real world, whereas an inter-
ference involves only one object, which coexists in several states. The coexistence
t 7−→
k∑
i=1
αiobji(t) tells k stories that run parallel with the same object in each story,
in different states though, and not a single story with several objects likely to interact
between them. The k stories are independent of each other, what happens in one has
no impact on what happens in the other.
1.7.4 Entangled States
Consider two objects obj1 and obj2 being in the entangled state E =
k∑
i=1
αiobj
1
i ⊗obj2i .
We assume that the family (obj1i ⊗obj2i )1≤i≤k is orthonormal and always that the αi are
non-zero, with
k∑
i=1
|αi|2 = 1. Then E is interpreted as the coexistence for obj1 ⊗ obj2
of k states statei = obj
1
i ⊗ obj2i , where the statei corresponds to the fact that obj1 is
in the state eiθiobj1i and that obj
2 is in the state e−iθiobj2i , θi being any real number.
We are thus in the presence of a coexistence of situations in which the state of obj1 is
conditioned by that of obj2, and vice versa.
In this situation, the object obj1 ⊗ obj2 exists in the superposed state E, whereas
neither obj1, nor obj2 exists, because they cannot be associated with a single state.
One can generalize and interpret in the same way any relationship of the form
E =
k∑
i=1
αi
p⊗
j=1
objji .
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So when a set of parts exists in an entangled state, its parts do not exist! However the
whole exists in a state of coexistence of several separable states, in each of which the
part objj does exist in a perfectly defined state. So we must relativize the non-existence
of objj which only means that we cannot attribute a single state to it. Indeed, if an
object exists in the universe, it must possess a state. The contrapositive implies non-
existence. However, in the case of an entangled state, this non-existence corresponds
rather to a poorly specified existence.
In the EPR experiment [P.M, pages 100-102], obj1 and obj2 are the spin vectors of
two spin 1
2
particles. Let us prepare obj1 ⊗ obj2 in the entangled state
E =
1√
2
(↑〉z⊗ ↓〉z− ↓〉z⊗ ↑〉z). It is a singlet state, which is invariant by rotation, so
the previous equality is valid for any direction Oz.
Then we move the two particles away from each other by a distance d.
The interaction of the first particle with a device that can measure its spin in the Oz
direction is given by
E ⊗ dev0 −→ 1√
2
(devup⊗ ↑〉z⊗ ↓〉z − devdown⊗ ↓〉z⊗ ↑〉z) = H.
Even if we do not have a valid explanation for it for the moment, we know that after
this measurement, the experimenter located in the neighbourhood of the first particle
observe that its spin in the Oz direction is ↑〉z about one-half the time. Then in this
case, he can affirm that the spin state of the second particle is ↓〉z, meaning he has
instantly information about an object located at a distance d from him, as large as one
wants.
Would this information have travelled faster than light, which is inconsistent with the
special theory of relativity?
In factH represents a coexistence of two stories. If we include the observer in the device,
we just described the first story, in which obj1 is in the state ↑〉z and obj2 in the state
↓〉z. There is no information transmission, because for each story, the information is
already present in each of the two particles. This information was already present in
the state E. Measuring the spin of the first particle includes the experimenter into
each of the two stories (what remains to be explained). So we do not contradict the
special theory of relativity, but we must accept the non-local nature of the entangled
state E of obj1 ⊗ obj2, in the sense that its description as a coexistence, whatever
the direction Oz chosen, involves two particles distant from d. The violation of Bell’s
inequalities shows that it is impossible to interpret E by attributing to obj1 (and to
obj2) the status of an existing object, whose outcomes of measurements would only be
stochastic. More generally, the state E =
k∑
i=1
αi
p⊗
j=1
objji is a priori non-local.
1.7.5 Uniform Coexistences
The interpretation of obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji in terms of coexistence does not for the moment
involve the coefficients αi. However, when α1 = 0 with αi 6= 0 for every i ≥ 2, it is
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only a coexistence of obj2, . . . , objk, and as soon as α1 is not zero, however small is its
modulus, we are in the presence of obj1, . . . , objk. Moreover in this case, a device that
can detect the states obj1, . . . , objk provides obji as a result with a relative frequency
close to |αi|2. This is the indication that in the coexistence obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji, each state
obji exists in a way that depends on αi. This way of existing is called the presence of
obji in the coexistence.
The quantum mechanical formalism largely imposes its own interpretation, however
we must not forget that, as a last resort, any interpretation is based on primitive
notions that reflect the reality of the universe in which we live and for which quantum
mechanics does not provide a definition. This is the case with the notions of coexistence
and presence.
Nevertheless, I justify below that when all the coefficients αi are equal, each obji has
the same presence in the coexistence, which I then call a uniform coexistence. When
the coexistence is non-uniform, I show below that the quantity |αi|2 corresponds to the
proportion of the number of states obji present in the coexistence, once reduced to a
uniform coexistence.
Let us start by showing that the presence of obji in the coexistence
obj =
k∑
j=1
αjobjj depends neither on the other coefficients αj , nor on the vector obji.
⋄ We can write obj = αiobji+β
∑
j 6=i
αj
β
objj whatever the complex number β such that
|αi|2 + |β|2 = 1. As obj′ =
∑
j 6=i
αj
β
objj is a unit vector of Hobj , it is a state of obj.
obj = αiobji + βobj
′, so obj is both a coexistence of obj1, . . . , objk according to the
coefficients α1, . . . , αk and a coexistence of obji and obj
′ according to the coefficients
αi and β. For these two readings of the state obj, the way the state obji is present in
this coexistence is the same. It therefore does not depend on αj when j 6= i.
⋄ Let obj′i be a unit vector of Hobj . When j 6= i, we suppose that obj′i and objj are
orthogonal. There exists a unitary operator U such that U(obji) = obj
′
i and for all
j 6= i, U(objj) = objj . We admitted at the end of paragraph 1.6 that we can control
the dynamics of obj so that between two moments t0 and t1 well chosen, we have
6
obj(t1) = U(obj(t0)).
If obj(t0) = αiobji +
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj , then obj(t1) = αiobj
′
i +
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj .
obj(t0) and obj(t1) both represent, at different times, the same coexistence of states
subjected to a particular dynamic; for any t ∈ [t0, t1], we can write
obj(t) = αiobji(t) +
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj(t), where for all k, objk(t) = Ut0→t(objk). The linearity
principle ensures that each scenario t 7−→ obji(t) coexists with the other scenarios
without interaction. So the presence of obji in obj = αiobji +
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj and that
6To ensure an exact equality, we have sometimes to let t1 tend to +∞.
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of obj′i in αiobj
′
i +
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj correspond to the presence of obji(t) in the coexistence
obj(t), for t = t0 and t = t1. This shows that the presence of obji in the coexistence
αiobji+
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj is equal to the presence of obj
′
i in the coexistence αiobj
′
i+
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj ,
so it does not depend on obji.
So the presence of obji in the coexistence
∑
j
αjobjj depends only on αi.
In particular, when for all i, j, αi = αj , each obji is present in the coexistence in the
same way, each obji has the same presence.
Let i and j be in {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j. There exists a unitary operator U such as
U(obji) = objj , U(objj) = obji and for any h other than i and j, U(objh) = objh.
Again, we can control the dynamics of obj so that between two moments t0 and t1
well chosen, obj(t0) = obj and obj(t1) = U(obj).
If obj = α
k∑
i=1
obji, we have U(obj) = obj. Thus the coexistence of obj1, . . . , objk,
according to equal coefficients α1, . . . , αk, is not modified if the states obji and objj are
swapped. Such symmetry is an additional argument to justify that in this case the
different states obji have the same presence.
Fifth Interpretative Principle (IP5):
Let (obji)1≤i≤k be an orthonormal family of k possible states of the same object obj.
Then the state
1√
k
k∑
i=1
obji is called the uniform coexistence state of these k states. It
is a coexistence in which each state obji exists in the same way as the other.
⋄ Let us assume now that obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji and that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, |αi|2 is
a non-zero rational number. There are then S, q1, . . . , qk ∈ N∗ and θ1, . . . , θk ∈ R such
that for all i, αi =
√
qi
S
eiθi . So obj =
1√
S
k∑
i=1
√
qie
iθiobji.
Let env be an object disjoint from obj such that the dimension of Henv is as large as
necessary; that is the only reason why env is called an environment.
We assume that the system made up of the object and the environment is in the state
obj ⊗ env, that is to say that the superposition obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji is not entangled with
the environment, at the moment considered. It also means obj and env do not interact.
For every i, there is an orthonormal family (envi,j)1≤j≤qi of vectors in Henv such that
env =
e−iθi√
qi
qi∑
j=1
envi,j
7.
7Indeed, if (ej)1≤j≤qi is an orthonormal family of Henv, let e =
e−iθi√
qi
qi∑
j=1
ej . There is a unitary
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So8 obj ⊗ env = 1√
S
k∑
i=1
obji ⊗√qieiθienv = 1√
S
k∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
obji ⊗ envi,j .
Let us fix (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) such that i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , k}, 1 ≤ j1 ≤ qi1 and 1 ≤ j2 ≤ qi2 .
Suppose (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2). Then i1 6= i2 in which case obji1⊥obji2 , or i1 = i2 and
j1 6= j2, in which case envi1,j1 = envi2,j1⊥envi2,j2. So the family (obji ⊗ envi,j) 1≤i≤k
1≤j≤qi
is
orthonormal.
According to IP5, obj ⊗ env is therefore a coexistence of the states obji ⊗ envi,j where
each of these states has the same presence, which gives meaning to counting them; if
we fix i0, among the S states obji ⊗ envi,j , qi0 are exactly such that obj is in the state
obji0 . Thus obj ⊗ env is a uniform coexistence in which the proportion of states where
the object is in the state obji is equal to
qi
S
= |αi|2. This is true regardless of the choice
of env, so we can say that in the coexistence
k∑
i=1
αiobji, out of a total of S states,
the state obji appears S|αi|2 times, using an environment to distinguish between them
the different occurrences of obji. As we can replace S and qi with hS and hqi, for any
h ∈ N∗, the total number of states inside the coexistence obj when reduced to a uniform
coexistence is not precisely defined. However the quotient of the number of occurrences
of the state obji by the total number of occurrences of objj for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} remains
constant, equal to |αi|2. Thus, we can say that in the coexistence
k∑
i=1
αiobji, |αi|2 is
the proportion of states equal to obji among all available states.
⋄ Let i be in {1, . . . , k} and assume that |αi|2 is a rational number still denoted by qi
S
,
without assuming though that |αj|2 is rational when j 6= i. Let us rewrite obj in the
form obj = αiobji + βobj
′,where obj′ =
∑
j 6=i
αj
β
objj is a unit vector. So |β|2 = S − qi
S
,
and based on the previous point with k = 2, obj ⊗ env is a uniform coexistence of qi
states for which obj is in the state obji and of S − qi states for which obj is in the
state obj′ which is a coexistence of the other states objj for j 6= i. Thus, here again,
the proportion of the states obji in the coexistence obj is equal to
qi
S
= |αi|2.
⋄ Let i be again in {1, . . . , k} and now assume that |αi|2 is an irrational number. Let
us consider an additional object, denoted by int, through which we are going to return
to rational numbers. We only assume that the dimension of Hint is larger than 2 and
that int does not interact with obj or env.
Let β1 be a complex number such that |β1| < 1 and |β1αi|2 is a non-zero rational
number. Let β2 be a second complex number such that |β1|2 + |β2|2 = 1. We can split
the state of int into the form int = β1int1+β2int2, where (int1, int2) is an orthonormal
family of Hint. So obj ⊗ int = β1αi.obji ⊗ int1 + γ.vect, where γ is a complex number
operartor U such that env = U(e), so env =
e−iθi√
qi
qi∑
j=1
U(ej).
8This argument is borrowed from Zurek [W.Z.1, page 7], [W.Z.3].
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such that |αiβ1|2 + |γ|2 = 1 and where vect = 1
γ
(β2αiobji ⊗ int2 +
∑
j 6=i
αjobjj ⊗ int) is
a unit vector.
There are p, q in N \ {0} such that |β1αi|2 = p
q
, so obj ⊗ int ⊗ env is a uniform
coexistence containing p states, out of a total of q states, for which obj is in the
state obji and int is in the state int1. We can therefore claim that the proportion
of states for which obj is equal to obji is greater than
p
q
, for all complex number β1
such that |β1| < 1 and |β1αi|2 = p
q
, so this proportion, denoted by pi, is greater than
sup
β1∈C such that |β1|<1
and |β1αi|
2∈Q
|β1αi|2 = |αi|2.
The expression
k∑
i=1
pi represents the proportion of the states obj1, . . . , objk in the co-
existence obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji, so it equals 1. Thus
k∑
i=1
(pi − |αi|2) = 0 and for all i,
pi − |αi|2 ≥ 0. Necessarily, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, pi = |αi|2.
Sixth Interpretative Principle (IP6):
For an object obj in the universe, let (obji)1≤i≤k be an orthonormal family of states of
Hobj and (αi)1≤i≤k a family of non-zero complex numbers.
Then the equality obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji is interpreted as a uniform coexistence where each
state obji is present according to a certain number of occurrences, whose proportion is
|αi|2, based on the total number of occurrences of obj1, . . . , objk.
Some comments :
⋄ This total number is necessarily infinite when |αi|2 is an irrational number. However,
in that case, we have a finite total number of occurrences if we accept to equate |αi|2
with a rational number of the form β1|αi|2 where β1 is close to, but less than 1, and if we
simply estimate the proportion of occurrences of the state obji⊗ int1 in the coexistence
obj ⊗ (β1int1 + β2int2).
⋄ We are closer to the Born rule. All the same, we still have to explain how measuring
with a suitable device gives only one state obji with a probability equal to |αi|2.
Above all, it remains to define this notion of probability.
2 Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
2.1 Consciousness and Multiplicities
Under the previous conditions, equality obj =
k∑
i=1
αiobji means a coexistence of several
states and such expression for the same state obj is not unique. These two levels of
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multiplicity shock our rationality a priori. This is though consistent with our conscious
experience. Our free will allows us to decide between two possibilities, in an arbitrary
way, that is to say, we believe, independently of the physical laws that govern our
universe. If we choose A freely, we might as well have chosen B. Meanwhile, what
does this arbitrary mean, what does the conditional “we might have chosen” mean?
The solution, which we will develop in chapter 7 of the second part, is to consider that
the universe, denoted by univ, after a decision made by an individual is in a state of
coexistence: univ = αunivA + βunivB, where univA (resp. univB) is a state of the
universe in which the individual has chosen A (resp. B). So we have the power to
arbitrarily choose between A and B because in fact we choose both.
After several decisions, the universe can be written univ =
∑
i
αiunivi where univi is a
universe in which the individual’s choices have certain values and where more generally
his consciousness has a certain well-defined content.
According to the second level of multiplicity, this expression of univ is not unique.
It is welcome because, for a second human being, we have univ =
∑
i
α′iuniv
′
i where
univ′i is a universe in which the choices of the latter have certain values and where his
consciousness has a certain content. Thus to each conscious individual corresponds a
certain decomposition of the universe into the multiplicity of his states of consciousness.
This helps to explain how several billion individuals each have a consciousness that
corresponds to a unique experience.
In sum, from the multiplicity of the expressions
∑
i
αiunivi or
∑
i
α′iuniv
′
i, we only
access the one we are and, within this expression, from the multiplicity of the terms
univi, we only access the term corresponding to our consciousness as we experience it.
2.2 Consciousness and Unconsciousness
What is consciousness? We experience it continuously and intimately, however, we
know almost nothing about it. It is even hard to define it.
Among the usual definitions of consciousness, I exclude those that assimilate it to
the higher functions of the brain; the faculties of analyzing its sensations, to identify
objects, to think, to know, to decide, to act, to make moral judgments are certainly
related to consciousness, however, they do not constitute its essence as I understand
it.
Here are some definitions gathered from the Internet which come close to the notion
of consciousness that is relevant to me in this article:
• Man’s perception of his own existence and the world around him.
• Immediate knowledge, intuitive or reflexive, that everyone has of his existence
and the outside world.
• Knowledge, intuition or feeling that a subject possesses about himself, his states
and his actions.
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• Organization of the psyche which, by providing knowledge of its states, its acts
and their moral value, enables to feel to exist, to be present to oneself.
• Intuition by which man acquires at any moment an immediate and direct knowl-
edge, more or less complete and clear, of his existence, his states and his acts.
These different definitions disagree about the nature of consciousness. Is it a psychic
representation, a perception, an immediate knowledge, an intuition, a feeling?
However, all these definitions agree on the content of consciousness, which is twofold;
consciousness contains information about the universe as well as a strong sense of self
existence and of the rest of the world.
Let us arbitrarily split the universe into two parts, which we call also arbitrarily the
mind and the environment, and suppose that the state of the universe at the moment
t can be written as
∑
i
αimindi ⊗ envi, the terms being pairwise orthogonal, i.e. the
universe is a coexistence of different situations, where the ith situation involves a mind
in the state mindi with an environment in the state envi. If we accept to gather
certain terms, we can assume that if i 6= j, the families (mini, mindj) and (envi, envj)
are linearly independent. Then mindi is the only state of mind that is associated with
envi, so thatmindi contains information about envi. Thusmind in the statemindi has
information about the state of the environment in which he lives. Moreover when the
universe is in the state mindi⊗ envi, the mind does exist in the state mindi, according
to IP1 and IP3.
We thus find a situation that combines existence and information. It could be a first
definition of consciousness. It describes a mind that has an “immediate consciousness”
of its environment. However, if this mind has no memory, this “immediate conscious-
ness” is at once erased by a change of state, as Bergson explains [H.B]: “A consciousness
that would preserve nothing of its past, that would constantly forget itself, should per-
ish or be reborn at every moment: how else to define unconsciousness? When Leibniz
said that matter is an instant mind, did he not declare it insensitive, willy-nilly? All
consciousness is therefore memory - preservation and accumulation of the past in the
present”.
This “immediate consciousness” that any part of the universe actually has in interaction
with its environment is therefore synonymous with unconsciousness. An object could
not experience a consciousness similar to ours without being first a memory.
We must therefore define first of all the notion of memory within the framework of
quantum formalism.
2.3 Memory
To communicate with each other, ants use pheromones; they are odorant molecules
which ants release on their way to inform their congeners, for example of the presence
of food. Let mem be the set of pheromones released by an ant in a certain location.
The wave function of this set of particles is very complex, it evolves with time and
gets entangled with the environment. However, as long as enough of these pheromones
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remain close to the original location, mem constitutes a memory that can be read by
other ants. Formally, this reading is possible as long as mem ∈ M , where M is the
sub-vector space of Hmem containing the states of mem that correspond to the fact
that enough pheromones of mem remain close to the original location.
In this first example, the object mem only serves as memory once.
This is not the case with the abacus. The arrangement of the beads on a 13-wire
abacus allows to store a natural number n less than N = 1013 − 1.
Thus, for every n ∈ {0, . . . , N−1}, there corresponds a sub-vector space Mn of Habacus
which contains all the possible states of the abacus whose beads are displayed according
to an arrangement that encodes n. For the abacus to retain the memory of n, it is
necessary and sufficient that its state remains inMn. This state is however very variable
because the many particles of the abacus vibrate and collide, because the abacus is in
constant interaction with the atmosphere which surrounds it etc.
Thus, on the formal level, a memory is an object mem whose Hilbert space Hmem
has a finite number of sub-vector spaces M1, . . . ,Mn such that, if during a recording
phase, by interaction between env and mem, univ = mem ⊗ env is set in a state
that belongs to the sub-vector space Mi⊗Henv, then the state of univ remains in that
same sub-vector space for a while, ideally as long as mem is not modified by a new
recording. In this case, We say that mem has memorized the event Mi, also denoted
by “mem ∈Mi”.
Of course, during a period when the event mem ∈Mi is memorized, the state of mem
varies in Mi and it gets entangled with the state of the environment. Thus, if at the
moment t, mem keeps in memory the event Mi, the state of the universe is of the form∑
k
αkmemk ⊗ envk, where for all k, memk ∈ Mi. A priori, neither the terms of this
sum, nor the sub-vector spaces Mi are pairwise orthogonal.
The reading of the recorded event “mem ∈ Mi” corresponds to another type of inter-
action that transforms any state of Mi ⊗ Henv into a state of Mi ⊗ Gi: the recorded
event is not erased, the environment takes into account the event mem ∈Mi by setting
itself in Gi. In order to allow the recorded event to be read at any time, the spaces Mi
must remain constant with time. This point will become important thereafter.
Many memories are made of disjoint smaller memories, which I call registers:
mem =
⊗
1≤k≤N
regk.
For example, the previous abacus is the tensor product of its 13 wires, each fitted with
its beads. The different types of computer memories also have such a structure. This
is still the case with the DNA molecule that we will discuss later.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the “memory” spaces of regk are denoted by (Mki )0≤i≤Ik−1.
Thus mem can record events of the form mem ∈
⊗
1≤k≤N
Mkik .
The advantage of such a structure is that one register can be modified without changing
the content of the others.
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2.4 Human Consciousness
In this chapter, I formulate and justify three founding hypotheses on the notion of
conscious observer, in conformity with our condition as human beings.
Materialistic Hypothesis (H1) : A conscious observer is an object of the universe.
The heart of his consciousness is a part of this object, which I call his mind and denote
by mind. The consciousness of the observer at the moment t is equal to the wave
function of his mind at the same instant.
We thus reject any dualism, which assumes that the mind is made up of an immaterial
substance, unable to interact with matter because of its very immateriality. This ab-
sence of interaction between mind and matter requires any dualistic quantum theory
to follow the principle of psychophysical parallelism [J.N, pages 418-420]. The exist-
ing many-minds interpretations are all dualistic, to my knowledge [HD.Z],[B.M],[L.F],
apart from Everett’s original interpretation [H.E.1, paragraph 5], [H.E.2, part IV].
The interpretation presented in this article draws much inspiration from it. It is a
materialistic many-minds interpretation.
Our conviction that we exist, this unique and deep feeling coiled at the heart of our
consciousness, allows us to link H1 and the ontological principle IP1. Indeed, if H1 is
true, then we directly experience the ontological character of our mind’s wave function.
If the laws of physics are identical everywhere and always, we deduce that the wave
function of any object in the universe also possesses the ontological property IP1.
Conversely, IP1=⇒H1, in the sense that IP1 gives any object in the universe a status
of “being”, noble enough to suit the mind of a human being.
All experimental data from neurosciences indicate that the content of our consciousness
depends closely on the activity of some of our neurons. This leads us to a second
hypothesis that specifies the first.
Cerebral Hypothesis (H2): mind is an object of the universe disseminated in some
neurons of the observer’s brain, which I call c-neurons 9.
Despite the feeling of unity that is part of our conscious experience, which I will explain
later by the construction of self-consciousness, a little introspection shows us that the
content of our consciousness can be split into several parts; a conscious experience
contains images and sounds in particular, each image is divided into its colors and
shapes, it also contains feelings about our emotional state and many other components,
which in turn are made up of sub-components.
According to IP3, our mind is therefore a memory which is separable into a tensor
product. Without loss of generality, we can assume that its registers are bits, that
is, by reusing the notations of the previous paragraph, that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Ik = 2. To remind us that these bits are the units of our consciousness, I call them
c-bits. So, mind =
⊗
1≤k≤N
cbk and each cbk can store two different events cbk ∈ Mk0
and cbk ∈ Mk1 .
9“c” for “conscious”.
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The idea of equating the observer to a memory to interpret quantum mechanics was
used by Everett [H.E.1], [H.E.2] as well as by Zurek [W.Z.1], but without relying on a
precise modelling of the notions of memories and observers.
When the c-bit cbk stores one of the two events M
k
i , we saw that its state remains
constantly in Mki , but it can vary over time in M
k
i and become entangled with the
environment. Bergson’s criticism then remains valid: mind is still an “immediate con-
sciousness” that forgets itself unceasingly, that perishes or is reborn at every moment.
It’s still an unconscious memory.
There is one noteworthy exception to this situation, however, when theMki are all one-
dimensional. Then, if you choose in each Mki a unit vector f
k
i , the “memory” states of
mind has the form
⊗
1≤k≤N
fkc(k), where c is a function from {1, . . . , N} to {0, 1}, because
any phase eiθ can be moved into the environment state. This state remains constant
between two recording phases. This implies a discontinuity of consciousness, which we
justify in the next paragraph.
In these conditions, the mind has a stable consciousness which can be further split into
several memorized attributes whose recordings are more or less old, thus ensuring the
“preservation and accumulation of the past in the present”.
I insist on the fact that the constant character of Mki and therefore of f
k
i over time
is a necessary condition to allow the reading of these states at any time. Then the
conscious state of our mind can continually influence its environment. It is a form of
action of the mind on the rest of the universe.
In summary, we have just seen that the human mind satisfies a necessary condition:
mind =
⊗
1≤k≤N
cbk and for all k, cbk behaves like a memory, based on two different
one-dimensional sub-vector spaces Mk0 and M
k
1 .
Under these conditions, we necessarily have, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Mk0⊥Mk1 . In-
deed, the reading of this memory must not change its state, otherwise it is not a
memory and it is essential to allow repeated readings, so it conforms to the following
dynamics: fki ⊗ env −→ fki ⊗ envi, where env0 6= env1 because the environment can
make the distinction between the two states memorized by the k-th c-bit. We can then
adapt the proof on page 20 and show that 〈fk0 |fk1 〉 = 0.
Let C be the set of all functions from {1, . . . , N} to {0, 1} and for all c ∈ C, let mindc be
the state
⊗
1≤k≤N
fkc(k). When he is awake, the state of mind belongs to the orthonormal
family (mindc)c∈C; it is the family of conscious states.
The third chapter will show that by using only observers that satisfy this necessary
condition, we can define the notion of probability and rebuild the usual probabilistic
quantum mechanics.
I do not think it is possible to extend this theory of quantum measurement to any mem-
ory whose spaces Mki would have a dimension larger than 2. Anyway, the observation
of wave function collapse concerns only human beings; they are the only observers who
can testify to their perceptions.
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Even if our notion of coexistence corresponds to Everett’s original view, we depart
from his approach by at least two points: probabilities will not be based on relative
frequencies and we replace the use of decoherence, added to Everett’s theory by many
authors [D.W.2, page 75], [W.Z.2], [F.B, pages 12-18], by the orthogonality of the
different conscious states (cf page 53).
During a recording phase, the mind moves from a state mindc to another state mindd,
where c, d ∈ C. Such a transition cannot be immediate. Indeed, Schro¨dinger equation
implicitly assumes that the state of an object is a differentiable, therefore continuous
function of time. Thus, this transition is achieved by going through variable states
located in10 Hmind\Vect(mindc)c∈C; they are unconscious. Thus a recording phase takes
place between two phases of consciousness. This is a brief period of unconsciousness,
at least for the c-bits modified during the recording. As we have already said, this
approach implies a discontinuous behavior of consciousness which we justify in the
next paragraph.
I summarize these arguments in the form of a third hypothesis about the modelling
of an observer’s consciousness. The whole article can be viewed as a defence of this
hypothesis.
Fundamental Hypothesis (H3) : mind =
N⊗
k=1
cbk, where for every k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
cbk is a memory with exactly two one-dimensional memory spaces M
k
0 and M
k
1 , which
are necessarily orthogonal.
Let fk0 and f
k
1 be unit vectors of M
k
0 and M
k
1 respectively.
• During the waking period, every c-bit cbk memorizes certain characteristics of the
past and present activity of the c-neuron that shelters it; for a duration denoted
by T of about 50 milliseconds, the state of cbk is a constant vector, equal to f
k
0
or fk1 .
Just before the next period of the same duration T , the state of cbk is possibly
updated. In this case, the permutation between the two states fk0 and f
k
1 oc-
curs over a duration denoted by τ of about one millisecond, during which cbk(t)
comes out of Vect(fk0 , f
k
1 ) and, for any δt > 0, cbk(t) and cbk(t + δt) are linearly
independent.
• During periods of unconsciousness, the state of mind at the moment t is a
coexistence of separable states of the form
N⊗
k=1
cbk(t) a priori entangled with the
environment. The linearity principle FP2 allows us to take into account only one
of these states.
We can therefore assume that mind(t) =
N⊗
k=1
cbk(t). We impose that for every k,
cbk(t) takes its values in the orthogonal complement of Vect(f
k
0 , f
k
1 ) and that, for
10Vect(mindc)c∈C is the sub-vector space generated by the family (mindc)c∈C .
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any δt >0, cbk(t + δt) and cbk(t) are linearly independent. So no c-bit in mind
is in a conscious state.
The entanglement with the environment further complicates this dynamic.
This hypothesis deserves some remarks:
⋄ The time indications T = 50ms and τ = 1ms are hypothetical, Their orders of
magnitude only are relevant. The value of T may vary depending on the observer’s
emotional state.
⋄ During the waking period, H3 imposes severe constraints on mind. We propose
further a possibility of biological implementation.
In the second part of this article, we will see that hypothesis H3 is a good foundation
for explaining self-consciousness, as we experience it daily.
⋄ The brain architecture developped in the second part allows us to estimate that one
in 100 neurons is a c-neuron. If we further assume that each c-neuron houses about
twenty c-bits to code its activity, then N is in the order of 2.1010. Thus a conscious
state of mind contains 20 gigabits of information, updated every 50 milliseconds.
⋄ According to our definition of consciousness, for any part I of {1, . . . , N},
⊗
k∈I
cbk is
also conscious. This seems to deny the sense of unity we have of our own consciousness,
which Giulio Tononi calls the integration axiom [G.T]. We will see on page 106 that
the unity of our consciousness is appropriately achieved through self-consciousness.
2.5 Discontinuity of Consciousness
H3 assumes a discontinuous behaviour of consciousness; the conscious mind would
adopt a fixed state for a certain duration and then move to a second state for the same
duration and then continue periodically.
Several scientific observations [S.P, page 1], [R.C.1], [D.P.1], now give favor to theories
according to which consciousness evolves in this way. Indeed, several optical illusions
are difficult to explain without this hypothesis: the phi phenomenon (especially in
color) [H.MH], the flash-lag effect [R.C.1], the continuous wagon wheel illusion [D.P.1]
etc.
Moreover, some neurons are only sensitive to movement (direction and speed) for one
of our senses [D.P.2, pages 278-279]. These neurons are located in specific areas of the
brain. The rare testimonies of individuals accidentally deprived of the cervical area
sensitive to movements in the visual domain plead for the discontinuous character of
consciousness [J.Z]. They describe a visual conscious experience in which the percep-
tion of movement is replaced by the perception of successive static paintings, without
anything between two paintings. The patient studied in [J.Z] lost visual perception
of movement following a stroke, although she retained her other mental and visual
faculties. When she pours tea, she sees only a static image similar to a tea glacier
between the teapot and the cup. She reports her discomfort when she is waiting in a
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room where other people are moving because individuals seem to move immediately
from one place to another, as if by magic.
For certain conscious experiences, such discontinuity is natural: a sensation of fear is
stable during the twentieth of a second and can vary discontinuously, the same is true
for the color of an object, for an imagined drawing, etc.
Yet why does the information seem to scroll continuously in our minds? How to explain
the continuity and fluidity of the music, the movements of the body, the swinging of a
shrub under a light wind?
A solution compatible with H3 is to accept that these sensations of continuity and
fluidity are coded under a static format within each period of consciousness, which
specifies for example the average speed and the average acceleration of certain zones
of the moving objects [H.MH].
Television has the same discontinuity, with 25 or 30 frames per second. Nethertheless
we have the illusion of a continuity between these images, probably built by the brain
to increase the raw reality using these additional encodings.
H3 requires a synchronized update of the values of the different c-bits. Such synchro-
nization is also a hypothesis frequently put forward to explain the binding problem
[AK.S]. It seems necessary but not sufficient. According to H2, this assumes synchro-
nization between the different c-neurons. It is suspected that this type of neuronal
harmonization is essential for brain function [PJ.U]. One known way to achieve such a
mechanism is to connect the c-neurons to a network of synchronized pacemaker neu-
rons. The link between a c-neuron and a pacemaker neuron must be local in order
to neglect the propagation time. Synchronization of the pacemaker neural network is
ensured by electrical synapses [D.P.2, pg 95]. These synapses, minority in the brain, en-
sure a faster transmission of the signal than the chemical synapses and seem especially
used by the brain for synchronization operations [MV.LB], [S.O].
The frequency of renewal of conscious frames, in the range of 20Hz, should not be con-
fused with the dominant global frequency of neuronal activations of the brain, which
differs according to whether the individual concerned is awake, drugged, anaesthetised,
or immersed in one of the different phases of sleep. According to the second part of
this article, it is likely that there is no more than one c-neuron per 100 neurons. Thus,
the frequency induced by H3 participates little in the global frequency, especially since
the update of mind within a c-neuron does not imply that it delivers an action poten-
tial; pacemaker neurons can transmit their tempo to each c-neuron using a dedicated
synapse, which does not necessarily have a decisive influence on the overall electrical
activity of the c-neuron.
According to [S.A.1] and [S.A.2], if we look at the brain at a sufficiently coarse spatial
scale, neural signals are assimilable to waves propagating in a particular network, which
corresponds to the overall organization of the brain. The latter therefore has its own
resonance modes, each vibrating according to its own frequency. The selection by the
brain of the fundamental frequency as well as the main harmonics would essentially
depend on the mean of the excitatory or inhibitory character of the synapses, which
differs precisely according to whether the observer is awake, drugged or asleep.
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2.6 The Mind Experiments Coexistences
Let us consider an individual whose mind is denoted by mind. Let env be the rest of
the universe. At the moment t, the state of the universe has the form
univ(t) =
∑
c∈C
αcmindc ⊗ envc +
∑
i∈I
βimindi ⊗ envi + univ′(t),
where mindc with c ∈ C stands for conscious states of mind and where mindi with
i ∈ I stands for unconscious states, even states where the individual is dead, and where
univ′(t) represents a coexistence of universes in which mind does not exist because at
least one of its particles does not exist. The linearity principle allows us to isolate one
of the terms, for example that of index c0 ∈ C, and to study its evolution independently
of the others, that is, to pretend that the universe is exactly in the state
univ(t) = mindc0 ⊗ envc0 .
Suppose envc0 is a separable state of the environment, so that each particle is given
by a specific wave function: envc0 =
⊗
p∈P
ep, where P is the set of the particles of
the environment and where ep represents the state of the particle p at the moment t.
It is therefore temporarily assumed that there is neither creation nor annihilation of
particles. It is further assumed that the moment t corresponds to the creation of the
conscious state mindc0 , which therefore last until the moment t+ T .
Suppose our individual works in an office. It contains some 1027 molecules, that is to say
one billion of billions of billions of molecules mostly equal to N2 or O2, which I call air
molecules. According to [A.A.1], each air molecule, which moves at an average speed of
about 500m.s−1, collides with about 50 million other air molecules during T = 50ms.
Informally, according to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, the wave function of each
air molecule presents a little indeterminacy of its position and speed, which according
to [A.A.1] leads to uncertainty about the occurrence of a collision with another given
air molecule. Thus, at the moment t + T , several scenarios of collisions exist for a
single molecule, which get entangled with the scenarios of the other molecules, because
they are interdependent. Let Q be the set of the air molecules in the office. Each
molecule q ∈ Q interacts with millions of other molecules of Q during the duration T ,
setting the office atmosphere at the moment t+T in an entangled state
∑
s∈S
βs[
⊗
q∈Q
eq,s],
where S is the set of all possible scenarios between t and t + T . Moreover each term
of the sum gets entangled with the rest of the universe. So, univ(t+ T ) is in the form
univ(t + T ) =
∑
s∈S
βs[
⊗
q∈Q
eq,s] ⊗ env′s ⊗ minds, where env′s is the state of the set of
particles P \Q. Even though the cardinality of S is difficult to estimate, it is likely to
be larger than 2(10
27).
The many-worlds interpretation is often explained by stating that each term
[
⊗
q∈Q
eq,s] ⊗ env′s ⊗ minds is a world in which the scenario s takes place, experienced
by the individual in the state minds. However, we must take into account not only
the molecules of the office but also all the particles of the universe. We then obtain
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univ(t + T ) =
∑
a∈A
γaminda ⊗ enva, where A is the set of all the scenarios of all the
particles, much larger than the set S, and where, for every a ∈ A, enva is a separable
state of the environment of the form enva =
⊗
p∈P
ea,p, for which the state of each particle
is known.
Thus, at each moment, each world would split into a gigantic number of new worlds
each containing an occurrence of our individual, which themselves would immediately
split in the same way.
In this article I propose a different description of our reality; at the moment
t + T , according to H3, our individual updates his state of mind, which is assumed
conscious for the moment, to simplify. The new state mind(t + T ) is one of the 2N
states mindc, where c ∈ C, with N in the order of 2.1010. From mindc0
to mind(t + T ), only some c-bits of the c-neurons whose activity has changed are
modified, so mind(t + T ) belongs to the set of the mindc where c differs only slightly
from c0. Let {mind1, . . . , mindK} be this set. Then K ≪ 22.1010 . It is a very modest
set compared to A, whose cardinality is much larger than 2(1027). Indeed,
2(10
27)
22.1010
= 2(10
27−2.1010), but 1027−2.1010 ≃ 1027. Thus, we will find the same state mindi
for a huge number of scenarios a ∈ A. In practical terms, this means that mind(t+T )
does not depend on the position of any particular air molecule in the office, as long as
the mixture between oxygen and nitrogen is relatively homogeneous.
Then, we can write univ(t+ T ) =
K∑
i=1
mindi ⊗
( ∑
a∈A such that
minda=mindi
γaenva
)
.
Thus, from our individual’s point of view, at the moment t he is in the state of mind
mindc0 , then at the moment t+T he will be in the state mind
i, which depends only on
some information relating to the neuronal activity of his brain. This activity certainly
depends on the evolution of the environment, however, many environments induce the
same state mindi.
And from an external point of view to the individual, the universe is in a coexistence of
states, in each of which the individual experiences a certain conscious state, that corre-
sponds to an environment whose state is δienv
i =
∑
a∈A such that
minda=mindi
γaenva, where ‖envi‖ = 1.
envi is the coexistence of the environments resulting from envc0 that induce in the
observer the state of consciousness mindi.
If we also take into account the unconscious states of the individual, we have 11
univ(t+ T ) =
K∑
i=1
δimind
i⊗ envi+
∑
j∈I
δjmind
j ⊗ envj, where for all j ∈ I, envj is the
state of the environment that leads the mind to a state mindj of unconsciousness or
death.
11without taking into account the states of the universe where one of the particles constituting
mind disintegrated.
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To study the evolution of univi(t+T ) = mind
i⊗envi =
∑
a∈A such that
minda=mindi
γa
δi
mindi⊗enva, we
can again invoke the linearity principle and study the evolution of each mindi ⊗ enva.
As enva =
⊗
p∈P
ea,p, we are back to the situation we were studying at the moment t.
It is however simpler to write that if at the moment t + T , we limit ourselves to the
universe experienced by mind in the state mindi, we have univ = mindi ⊗ envi.
Between t + T and t + 2T , the environment evolves in an extremely complex way,
which induces some changes in the state of mind, but in a less complex way. Let
mind′1, . . . , mind
′
M be the different states of mind accessible bymind from the situation
mindi ⊗ envi at the moment t + T . Then at the moment t + 2T , we have simply
univ(t + 2T ) =
M∑
j=1
α′jmind
′
j ⊗ env′j , where env′j denotes the coexistence of separable
states of the environment that bring mind to the state mind′j at the moment t + 2T .
If we now accept to consider particle creation and annihilation, the state env′j is no
longer a coexistence of separable states at the particle level, meanwhile it remains the
global state of the environment that leads mind to the state mind′j .
Thus this a priori baroque notion of coexistence of states is in fact an omnipresent
banality in the world as we experience it daily. The observer that we are systematically
experiences the coexistence of the multitude of microscopic states of the universe that
are compatible with his own conscious experience.
The atmosphere of the office in which I work does not have the incredible complexity
of billions of billions of molecules which vibrate, rotate and collide but rather the
simplicity of a coexistence of such overdetermined states, which constitutes a sort of
sub-determined average.
Most events that occur several miles from us usually have no impact on our neural
activity, at least as encoded by each c-bit within each c-neuron. If, in a laboratory
of which I have no knowledge, in another country, physicists repeat the Stern-Gerlach
experiment while placing a ( Schro¨dinger’s) cat in a cage provided with a pernicious
mechanism which kills the cat if the silver atom moves upwards and which leaves the
cat alive if the atom moves downwards, then for my mind, the cat will be in a state of
coexistence of these two stories, and this as long as the result of this experiment has
no consequence on the state of my mind.
I conclude this paragraph with two remarks:
⋄ Descriptions using the language of classical physics, notably those that follow in
this article, are always narratives from an internal point of view to an observer, real or
fictional; I say that an object obj is in a classical state F for an observer mind when,
from the point of view of mind, the state of the universe is
univ = mindF ⊗
∑
j
αjobjj ⊗ envj , where for all j, objj ∈ F , F being a sub-vector
space of Hobj .
This implies that the observer’s brain can detect the local event obj ∈ F and then
memorize it in his mind. So, mindF is one of the conscious states mindc where c ∈ C.
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⋄ If we now consider two individuals whose minds are denoted by mind1 and mind2,
limiting ourselves to conscious states to simplify, we can write at the moment t:
univ =
∑
i,j
αi,jmind
1
i ⊗mind2j⊗envi,j . So the universe is a coexistence of states in each
of which mind1 and mind2 have some conscious experience. envi,j is the state of the
environment for which the minds mind1 and mind2 are in the conscious states mind1i
and mind2j . One can write univ =
∑
i
mind1i ⊗
(∑
j
αi,jmind
2
j ⊗ envi,j
)
. Thus, univ
is a coexistence of states in each of which mind1 is consciously experiencing the state
mind1i at the moment t, in which case its environment is
∑
j
αi,jmind
2
j ⊗ envi,j . This
means that, in general, others present themselves to us in the form of a coexistence
of several states of mind, which makes them particularly unpredictable. This social
relationship is symmetrical because univ =
∑
j
mind2j ⊗
(∑
i
αi,jmind
1
i ⊗ envi,j
)
.
2.7 Biological Mind
2.7.1 Eukaryotic Cell
Each c-neuron is an eukaryotic cell, like all cells in our body. It is a solution of
large molecules called proteins, often containing several million atoms, separated from
the external environment by a membrane, itself made of proteins. Each cell, with a
diameter of less than one tenth of a millimeter, has several subcells also separated by
membranes. The nucleus is one of these subcells. It contains 23 pairs of chromosomes,
in the case of human cells [D.R], [P.VG], which together form DNA. Each of these
chromosomes is a macromolecule of about ten billion atoms, consisting of a very long
helicoidal stack of subunits, made up of 4 possible bases: adenine which systematically
matches thymine and cytosine which matches guanine. They are denoted by A, T, C,
and G and each have a few dozen atoms. Each subunit is one of the base pairs AT,
TA, GC or CG, so DNA is a set of 46 words written with this four-letter alphabet that
constitutes the so-called genetic information. The cell can read it to make and regulate
its proteins. In particular a gene is a sequence of consecutive letters directly involved
in the design of a protein; after a complex initialization process involving other parts
of the DNA, one protein separates the two strands of the DNA at the gene location,
then another protein makes a copy of the gene, replacing though the letter T with
uracil, denoted by U. This copy is arn that migrates into the cell, possibly outside the
nucleus, to meet a particular protein assembly called ribosome, which can translate
arn into protein according to a precise code. Each protein is a word whose letters are
chosen among about twenty amino acids, which are molecules of a few tens of atoms. It
fulfils a precise function within the cell, for its nutrition, its transmembrane exchanges,
the regulation of other proteins, its movements, its duplication etc.
The DNA is therefore a memory which the cell can read to plan its operation. Writing in
this memory is very scarce. These are mutations which natural selection then eliminate
or perpetuate.
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Except for a few mutations, genetic information is identical in every cell of an animal
throughout its life. We now know that DNA carries other information, qualified as
epigenetic, which differs from cell to cell and changes over time. This additional in-
formation is only partially transmissible during cell replication and the gametogenesis
process. It allows the cell to adapt to its environment. It explains how cell differenti-
ation takes place within the same animal. This information is essentially built using
two processes which often combine [K.I]:
• A protein, by binding to a segment of DNA, suppresses or enhances the tran-
scription of a certain gene [CW.G].
• A protein adds a methyl group on a cytosine occurrence in DNA or removes
it [PF.C]. This modifies the affinity of other proteins for the part of the DNA
containing this base which also suppresses or enhances the transcription of a
certain gene.
These processes thus make it possible to code at molecular scale certain characteristics
of the environment detected by the cell. For example, an increasing outside tempera-
ture may be detected by a transmembrane protein whose outer part is heat-sensitive,
triggering a series of events within the cell which induce either the binding of a protein
to a particular location in the DNA, or the methylation or demethylation of certain
cytosines in the DNA, or both. These superficial modifications of the DNA are a molec-
ular coding of the temperature rise. They also control the expression of certain genes
which allow the cell to adapt to this change in the environment.
This epigenetic coding therefore also behaves like a memory, which manages the cell
specific information according to the three operations of recording, storing and reading.
It is plausible to assume that c-neurons use these two processes to code certain char-
acteristics of their axonal and synaptic activities, in accordance with mechanisms that
are responsible for long-term synaptic plasticity of neurons [D.P.3, pages 168 and 178].
However, even if this coding is already at the molecular level, here is why in my opinion
it is not compatible with assumptions H2 and H3.
The object mind must remain the same during each waking phase of the individual,
under penalty of disturbances of the consciousness. Moreover, on the scale of the
whole life, to ensure a continuity of the self-consciousness, it can only change very
weakly during the unconscious periods of sleep. These constraints are compatible with
the remarkable fact that neurons are the rare cells whose longevity is equal to that of
the organism, but they impose the same longevity on c-bits of c-neurons. Additionally
it must be possible to maintain each c-bit in the same quantum state for a duration T .
Let us firstly study the process of methylation/demethylation. Particles added to
DNA by methylation are removed during demethylation so they cannot take part in
the physical definition of a c-bit. The cytosine atoms involved have the expected
longevity because they are part of the DNA, so they are rarely renewed by the main-
tenance mechanisms of the DNA. Depending on whether the cytosine is methylated or
demethylated, the wave functions of the electrons and nuclei of its atoms are different,
but in a way too complex to be controlled; for example, the electron orbitals depend
on the entire molecule [C.L, chapter 11], which is here one of the chromosomes in its
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entirety. There is therefore little hope of finding a part of this system whose quantum
state would be compatible with H3.
About the process of binding a protein to DNA, the same problems are encountered;
the lifetime of the protein should be firstly of the same order as the longevity of the
organism, which is rare [BH.T]. When the protein gets the agreed signal, it changes
shape, possibly detaching from the DNA, and these changes affect the expression of
certain genes. Secondly the protein is a very large molecule and the wave functions of
its particles are no more controllable than in the previous process. There might be a
solution, in relation to the protein folding problem; if the protein has two stable folding
structures, each associated with the exact value of an angle between two atomic bonds,
this angle can then constitute a c-bit. One can use [L.L.] as an inspiration to dig this
track.
However, it seems more likely to me that nature has set up a specific process to translate
this molecular coding of the c-neuron activity into a quantum coding compatible with
H3.
2.7.2 C-Proteins and C-Bits
To be absolutely sure of H3, it would be enough to study the quantum state of the
particles which make up neurons and to verify that certain neurons contain certain
particles, of a longevity equal to that of human beings, whose quantum state depends
on the axonal or synaptic activity of the neuron and remains constant over a duration
of about fifty milliseconds. However such cellular exploration does not seem within the
reach of current technologies. We are reduced to imagining a process compatible with
H3, as precisely as possible, to show its plausibility.
Let us specify the problem to be solved; after a certain period of inactivity, a c-neuron
emits a sequence of action potentials along its axon. How to code this event in the
mind? Let us assume that it is encoded at the molecular level in the following way;
the burst of action potentials is detected by proteins denoted by p1 at the beginning of
the axon. They send proteins denoted by p2 into the neuron nucleus, which can find in
the DNA a particular succession of base pairs, that is, a particular word written with
the alphabet {AT, TA, GC, CG}. This word has a unique occurrence in the DNA that
defines a specific location denoted by ℓ, to which proteins p2 converge. They attach a
protein p3 to ℓ. However, when the c-neuron becomes inactive again, the non-renewal
of protein p2 allows p3 to leave the location ℓ. So the presence or absence of p3 in ℓ is
the molecular coding of the axonal activity of the c-neuron.
The study of ion channels [D.P.2, page 69] shows that certain proteins can play with
some particles, guide each of them by means of specific channels on particular sites
at the heart of the protein, and modify the relative positions of these sites under the
activation of such or such signal received by the protein. So this makes it possible to
imagine interesting mechanisms for making quantum states [M.F, page 3]. In addi-
tion, electron spin selection has recently been discovered when electrons pass through
certain helicoidal parts of certain proteins [I.C], [M.K], allowing local control of the
electromagnetic field applied to the protein core. Such proteins can thus implement
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ion trapping techniques sometimes envisaged for the realization of quantum computers
[N.M, pages 309-319].
So next to ℓ, we will assume that such a protein is attached to the DNA, a protein
whose core houses an object made up of a few particles, a protein which can control
the quantum state of that object. Such a protein will be called a c-protein and the
quantum object is then a c-bit, if they really have the following behaviour: If the c-
protein detects that the protein p3 is missing from ℓ, it sets its c-bit in a state f0 during
the next recording phase whose duration is τ . The state f0 is preserved as long as p3
is absent. But as soon as p3 appears in ℓ, the c-protein imposes on its c-bit a state
f1 at the next recording phase, f0 and f1 being orthogonal. Besides, during a deep
sleep phase, the increase in inhibitory neurotransmitter concentrations in the brain is
detected by the c-neuron at its synapses using proteins denoted by p4, that massively
send proteins p5 into the nucleus, which are detected by the c-protein. It then sets
the c-bit in an unconscious state, that is, a state never constant which belongs to the
orthogonal complement of Vect(f0, f1). This is a description that is compatible with
H3, still sketchy though. In chapter 4, by specifying further the functioning of a c-
protein, we analyze the difficulties raised by the implementation of H3 and we propose
solutions.
Using other c-proteins, a c-neuron can encode at the quantum level in the mind other
events which are encoded at the molecular level, such as the more precise form of the
axonal activity period, the history of previous activity period or the activity of certain
synapses.
The lifetime of a c-protein must be longer than one day. The complexity of its functions
undoubtedly excludes a higher longevity. The repair and renewal of c-proteins can be
carried out during periods of unconscious sleep. The particles composing the c-bits
must be carefully preserved during this operation. So, from one day to the next,
it is always the same set of particles which corresponds to mind. However, a low
variability of the object mind must be accepted to take into account learning as well
as the destruction of c-proteins or c-neurons, accidental or due to aging.
A c-bit is not at all protected from entanglement with the environment. On the con-
trary, its state becomes entangled with that of the c-protein which in turn becomes
entangled with the cellular medium. From this point of view, c-bits are fundamentally
different from quantum computer qubits. I do not assume that the observer behaves
like a quantum computer and maintains superpositions of quantum states which are
not entangled with the environment. I thus depart from certain theories currently in
vogue [S.H] and [M.F] which seem though contradicted by the calculations of the very
short time of decoherence in biological systems [M.T].
3 The Notion of Probability
3.1 Idealized Born rule
We start with an idealized situation, which we will make more realistic in the next
paragraph.
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Let us take the situation and the notations from paragraph 1.7.2; we consider an object
obj and an orthonormal family (obji)1≤i≤n of Hobj . It is assumed that an observer is
provided with a device dev such that:
• Before any interaction of dev with obj, the observer systematically sets the
device in a reference state dev0.
• If obj is in the state obji before interaction with dev, then after interaction, obj
is still in the state obji, meanwhile dev has evolved to the state devi. We can
summarize this dynamic by writing: obji ⊗ dev0 −→ obji ⊗ devi.
• The observer’s senses can differentiate a state devi from another state devj when
i 6= j. This means that the device has a macroscopic component that clearly
indicates the state devi.
Ideally, during a quantum measurement, the universe is initially in a separable form:
univ(t0) = mind ⊗ obj ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env, where mind is the state, assumed conscious, of
the observer’s mind and where env is the state of the rest of the universe.
We assume that obj =
n∑
i=1
αiobji. During a first phase, called the premeasurement, the
object becomes entangled with the device and inevitably with the environment, but
not with the observer’s mind, because this first phase takes place within a conscious
period whose duration is T , during which the state of the mind remains constant, or
because the observer does not observe for the moment at all the measuring device. At
the end of this first phase, the state of the universe is
univ(t1) = mind⊗
n∑
i=1
αiobji ⊗ devi(t1)⊗ envi(t1).
Then, during the measurement phase, the observer becomes aware of the result pro-
vided by the device. Each state devi of the device modifies its mind into a state of
consciousness mindi. It is assumed that if i 6= j, mindi 6= mindj , i.e. the observer can
actually read the indication provided by the device. The universe is then in the state
univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
αimindi ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t2)⊗ envi(t2).
Initially, mind⊗
( n∑
i=1
αiobji
)
⊗ dev0 ⊗ env represents a state of the universe in which
different parts exist independently of each other. The object is in a state of coexistence
a priori non-uniform of the various states obji. As we can also write
univ(t0) =
n∑
i=1
αimind⊗ obji ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env, initially, the universe is a coexistence of n
states that will each evolve from the state mind ⊗ obji ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env at the moment
t0 to the state mind ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t1) ⊗ envi(t1) at the moment t1 then to the state
mindi ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t2)⊗ envi(t2)⊗ envi(t2).
After the premeasurement, mind ⊗
n∑
i=1
αiobji ⊗ devi(t1) ⊗ envi(t1) represents a state
where the observer remains independent from the rest of the universe, which is now
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described as a non-uniform coexistence of different scenarios, the ith describing an
object in the state obji, consistent with a device in the state devi and an environment
in the state envi.
We can also write univ(t1) =
n∑
i=1
αimind⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t1)⊗ envi(t1); the universe is a
non-uniform coexistence of different scenarios, the ith describing a universe in which
the object is in the state obji, the device in the state devi and the environment in
the state envi, and where the observer, in the state mind independent of i, has no
awareness of the state of obj.
At the end of the measurement, univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
αimindi ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t2)⊗ envi(t2) is
interpreted in the same way.
Let us now study this measurement process from the point of view of the observer
whose consciousness is rigorously his state of mind; this state is also all the information
available to the observer. Before the measurement, the observer is supposed to know
that he is about to measure the state of obj according to the family (obji)1≤i≤n. After
reading the device, the observer knows the result of the measurement because it is
integrated in the value mindi of his state.
Which of these n observers is he among mind1, . . . , mindn? The question assumes that
the observer is provided with some sort of individuality, identity, soul or other thing
that ensures his uniqueness within the sum for i ranging from 1 to n. In this article, I
suppose that is not the case; The identity of the observer, in that he is aware of being,
is modified by the result obtained, differently in each term. There is a coexistence of
different scenarios, and in each of these scenarios, there is always a single observer,
whose identity and knowledge are specific.
In this context, the probability that the observer experiences the ith result can be
defined in accordance with our intuition; it is the number of observers experiencing the
ith result relative to the total number of observers.
We have seen though that such a count only makes sense in the context of uniform
coexistences, in which each term is present in the same way.
As univ(t0) =
n∑
i=1
αimind⊗ obji ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env, according to IP6, univ(t0) is a uniform
coexistence in which the ratio of states mind⊗ obji ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env to all states is equal
to |αi|2. These states become at the moment t1 mind ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t1)⊗ envi(t1). In
particular, at the moment t1, all states correspond to an observer whose mind is in the
state mind, so we are in the presence of a unique conscious experience of the observer.
Then between t1 and t2, the states
mind ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t1)⊗ envi(t1) become mindi ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t2)⊗ envi(t2). Thus, in
a proportion of |αi|2, at the moment t2, the observer experiences the state mindi, i.e.
he measures the state obji of the object thanks to the device dev. The situation being
reduced to uniform coexistences, we thus have at the moment t0 or t1 a coexistence
of states in which all the observers are in the same state mind, and among these a
proportion of |αi|2 becomes mindi at the moment t2.
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We define the probability, at the moment t0 or t1, that the object will be at the moment
t2 in the state obji, as the number of observers who will experience this reality at the
moment t2 divided by the total number of observers considered. Thus, in our idealized
situation, this probability is equal to |αi|2. We have established Born rule.
This is the exact idea of Brian Greene in his popularization work “the hidden reality”
[B.G, page 314]. It is made coherent thanks to a modelling of the conscious observer,
inside the formalism of quantum mechanics, which we will consolidate in the second
part. It is indeed the definition of the notion of probability that is important here, and
not the derivation of Born rule, because there are already several convincing proofs:
Gleason’s theorem [A.M.G], [R.C.2], the proofs of Zurek [W.Z.1] and Wallace [D.W.2],
[F.B].
So |αi|2 is the probability at the moment t0 or t1, that the observer mind experiences
at the moment t2 a state equal to mindi. As defined, the notion of probability has
a subjective aspect, because it concerns the observer’s state of mind. It is however
objective because its value does not depend on the observer but only on the state
obj =
n∑
i=1
αiobji. As defined, this probability has a clear physical interpretation. It
exists without the need for anyone to evaluate it.
The proof of IP6, adapted to the current situation, uses objects int and env’ that do
not interact with each other nor with mind⊗obj⊗dev⊗env, that is with the entire
universe. In addition, the dimension of Henv′ must be as large as necessary. It means
assuming that there are other universes, independent of ours, or to put it another way,
that we can split our universe into several parts that have never interacted with each
other.
3.2 Generalized Born Rule
Let us recall the three key moments of a measure, in the previous idealized situation:
• Initialization: univ(t0) =
n∑
i=1
αimind ⊗ obji ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env.
• Premeasure: univ(t1) =
n∑
i=1
αimind⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t1)⊗ envi(t1).
• Measure: univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
αimindi ⊗ obji ⊗ devi(t2)⊗ envi(t2).
Between the moments t0 and t2, dev and env interact, so the state of dev ⊗ env a
priori does not remain separable and it is appropriate to replace devi(t1)⊗ envi(t1) by∑
j
βi,jdevi,j(t1)⊗ envi,j(t1), which will be denoted by [dev, env]i(t1).
Between t0 and t1, obj interacts with dev ⊗ env. The fact that dev has correctly
measured obj in the state obji translates into the fact that, for every j, devi,j(t1) ∈ Fi,
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where Fi is a sub-vector space of Hdev characteristic of obji, that is to say into the fact
that [dev, env]i ∈ Fi ⊗Henv. Thus dev⊗ env memorizes that obj = obji in each term
by preserving the physical property “dev ∈ Fi”.
The observer’s brain is the union of mind and part of env. It is assumed that he can
read this property and then set his mind accordingly in the state mindi.
Thus, we replace thereafter the equalities at moments t1 and t2 by :
univ(t1) =
n∑
i=1
αimind ⊗ obji ⊗ [dev, env]i(t1) and
univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
αimindi ⊗ obji ⊗ [dev, env]i(t2).
3.2.1 Variability of the Object State
A totally constant state obji during an interaction is illusory, if a whole mechanism is
not put in place to achieve it, as is the case for the observer’s mind during a phase
of consciousness. For all k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, it is therefore appropriate to replace obji by
obji(tk) in the expression univ(tk).
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by writing obji(t0) = obji,
mind ⊗ obji(t1)⊗ [dev, env]i(t1) = Ut0→t1(mind ⊗ obji ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env) and
mindi ⊗ obji(t2)⊗ [dev, env]i(t2) = Ut0→t2(mind ⊗ obji(t0)⊗ dev0 ⊗ env),
so the orthogonality of the family (obji)1≤i≤n is transmitted to the families
(mind⊗obji(t1)⊗[dev, env]i(t1))1≤i≤n and (mindi⊗obji(t2)⊗[dev, env]i(t2))1≤i≤n. This
still allows the expressions univ(tk) to be interpreted as coexistences and that extends
the validity of the previous arguments to this more general situation.
|αi|2 is still interpreted as the probability at the moment t0 or t1, that at the moment
t2 the observer will subjectively experience the state mindi. However, in the idealized
situation, experiencing this state of consciousness goes hand in hand with the fact that
obj is in the state obji. This is no longer the case. We can no longer say that |αi|2
is the probability that at the moment t2, the observer is in the presence of the object
in the state obji. This is now the probability for the observer to be at the moment t2
in the presence of the object in the state obji(t2), exactly as if at the moment t0, the
observer had already been in the presence of the object in the state obji(t0) = obji,
which would then have evolved to the state obji(t2).
If obji(t2) is completely different from obji, then obji(t2) =
∑
j
βjobjj , with possibly
|βi| far less than 1, so if at the moment t2, the observer makes a second measurement
using the same device, he probably will not find the same result; it is not a repeatable
measurement. For this reason, we prefer to measure objects according to basis (obji)i
such that, if obj is in the state obji at the moment t0, then it will evolve very little
during interaction with the device and with the environment. In this case, |βi|2 remains
very close to 1 and the observer can consider with a good confidence that the state of
the object at the moment t2 is still obji. This is important when the observer makes
these measurements in order to adapt to his environment.
In the most general case, between t1 and t2, the state of obj is again entangled with
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dev⊗ env so that we should write univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
αimindi ⊗ [obj, dev, env]i(t2). Even
if the following arguments generalize to this situation, for the sake of clarity, we will
remain in the idealized case where obji is constant during the measurement process.
3.2.2 Partial Measure
For any θ ∈ R, obji⊗ envi = (eiθobji)⊗ (e−iθenvi), so after the previous idealized mea-
sure, the observer can only assert that the state of obj belongs to the one-dimensional
space Vect(obji). We now turn to more general measures that simply specify a sub-
space of Hobj in which the state of the object is located; rather than starting from an
orthonormal family (obji)i, a family of subspaces E1, . . . , En is given into Hobj , pairwise
orthogonal and such that Hobj =
⊥⊕
1≤i≤n
Ei.
Between t0 and t1, the measuring device conforms to the following dynamics:
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for any x ∈ Ei, x⊗dev0⊗env −→ x⊗[dev, env]i, where [dev, env]i
is a state of dev ⊗ env that memorizes an event of the form “dev ∈ Fi” which then
sets mind in the state mindi at the time t2.
If we denote by pEi the orthogonal projector on Ei and if we define obji as pEi(obj),
then univ(t0) = mind⊗ obj ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env, where obj =
n∑
i=1
obji.
In general ‖obji‖ 6= 1, so to put obj in the form of a coexistence, one must write
obj =
∑
1≤i≤n
such that obji 6=0
αi.
obji
‖obji‖ , where αi denotes ‖obji‖.
The premeasure leads to univ(t1) = mind ⊗
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗ [dev, env]i,
then univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
mindi ⊗ obji ⊗ [dev, env]i(t2).
One can write univ(t1) =
∑
1≤i≤n
such that obji 6=0
αimind⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev, env]i
and univ(t2) =
∑
1≤i≤n
such that obji 6=0
αimindi ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev, env]i(t2).
The orthogonality of the family (obji)i makes it possible to reproduce the arguments
seen in the idealized case. Thus, the probability at moment t0 or t1 that the observer
is at the moment t2 in a state mindi and that the object is in a state belonging to Ei
is equal to |αi|2 = ‖obji‖2 = ‖pEi(obj)‖2. This is the first generalization of the Born
rule.
This kind of measurement, associated with the projector family (pEi)1≤i≤n, is called a
PVM (projection-valued measurement). There are even more general measures, called
POVMs. These can be though interpreted as PVMs applied to an auxiliary object that
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previously interacted with obj [C.A.F, page 15]. We will therefore limit ourselves in
this article to PVMs.
3.2.3 Initial Entanglement of the Device with the Environment
It is illusory in practice to assume that one can set a macroscopic device in a precise
initial quantum state dev0. So let us assume that
univ(t0) = mind ⊗ obj ⊗
∑
k
βkdev
0
k ⊗ envk, where the family (dev0k)k is orthonormal.
We assume again that dev can measure the projector family (pEi)i,
where Hobj =
⊥⊕
1≤i≤n
Ei. With the notations from the previous paragraph,
univ(t0) =
∑
i,k
βkmind⊗ obji ⊗ dev0k ⊗ envk.
After the premeasure, univ(t1) =
∑
i,k
βkmind ⊗ obji ⊗ [dev, env]i,k(t1),
then univ(t2) =
∑
i,k
βkmindi ⊗ obji ⊗ [dev, env]i,k(t2).
Again, using the unitary operators Ut0→t1 and Ut0→t2 ensures that in these sums, the
terms are pairwise orthogonal. So the probability that at the moment t2, the observer
experiences mindi, therefore that he is in the presence of an object whose state belongs
to Ei is equal to
∑
k
|βk|2‖obji‖2 = ‖obji‖2.
Thus without loss of generality, we can keep assuming that the initial state of dev⊗env
is separable and equal to dev0 ⊗ env.
3.2.4 A Richer Consciousness
Between t0 and t2, the transition from the state mind to a state mindi that depends
only on the object belonging to Ei can seem very poor in front of the richness of our
conscious experiences.
Starting again from the initial state univ(t0) = mind⊗ obj ⊗ dev0 ⊗ env, if we accept
that our observer’s mind performs between t0 and t1 measures on other objects, then
univ(t1) has the form univ(t1) =
∑
i,k
βkmindk⊗obji⊗[dev, env]i,k; for every k, the mind
is in the state mindk because he has measured some information in the environment
and on the device.
The family (mindk ⊗ obji)i,k being orthonormal,
we have 1 = ‖univ(t1)‖2 =
∑
i,k
|βk|2‖obji‖2, therefore
∑
k
|βk|2 = 1.
univ(t1) is then the coexistence
∑
i,k
such that obji 6=0
βk‖obji‖univi,k(t1),
where univi,k(t1) = mindk ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev, env]i,k.
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If we fix i and k, if the universe is in the state univi,k(t1) at the time t1 and if other
observer’s measurements between t1 and t2 are taken into account, then the state of
the universe at the time t2 is
univi,k(t2) =
∑
h
γi,k,hmindi,k,h ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev, env]i,k,h(t2). Again, the family
(mindi,k,h)h being orthonormal, we have 1 = ‖univi,k(t2)‖2 =
∑
h
|γi,k,h|2.
Globally, univ(t2) =
∑
i,k,h
βkγi,k,hmindi,k,h ⊗ obji ⊗ [dev, env]i,k,h(t2).
At the moment t0, the observer experiences the unique state mind. The probability
that at the moment t2, he experiences a state of mind according to which obj ∈ Ei is
always by definition the proportion of states of univ(t2) for which the state ofmind is of
the form mindi,k,h, therefore this probability is equal to
∑
k,h
|βkγi,k,h|2‖obji‖2 = ‖obji‖2.
From the observer’s point of view, at the moment t1, he is experiencing one of the state
mindk, so for him, the universe is just univ(t1) = mindk ⊗
∑
i
obji ⊗ [dev, env]i,k and
then univ(t2) =
∑
i,h
γi,k,hmindi,k,h⊗ obji⊗ [dev, env]i,k,h(t2). Thus, from the observer’s
point of view at the moment t1, the probability that he will experience at the moment
t2 a state of mind according to which obj ∈ Ei is still equal to ‖pEi(obj)‖2.
We can verify that the result remains the same if we combine a rich consciousness and
an initial state of the device entangled with the environment.
In sum, to study probabilities in quantum mechanics, we can assume that obji is
constant during the measurement, that the initial state of dev⊗ env is separable and
that the mind simply moves from the single state mind at the moment t0 to a state
mindi at the moment t2 that depends only on the event obj ∈ Ei.
We make these assumptions most often afterwards.
3.2.5 The Problem of the Preferred Basis
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics contains as a sub-problem that of
the basis choice [M.S.1, page 53]; why do we observe obj according to an orthonormal
basis (obji)i of Hobj rather than another, or according to the sum Hobj =
⊥⊕
i
Ei rather
than another?
This problem is solved here by the fact that there is not a single way of writing the
universe in the form of a coexistence, so there is in fact no choice of any basis from a
global point of view, external to any observer.
For a given individual, provided with the orthonormal family of his conscious states
(mindc)c∈C, an object is measured according to the sum Hobj =
⊥⊕
i
Ei and not another,
because dev is sensitive to this sum and because the brain can translate the state of
the device into a state mindc of the mind.
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Let V be the sub-vector space Vect(mindc)c∈C. We can however wonder about the
relevance of working in the particular basis e = (mindc)c∈C of V. Consider a second
orthonormal basis f = (fd)d∈C of V. Let us denote by P = (pd,c)d,c∈C the transition
matrix from f to e.
So for all c ∈ C, mindc =
∑
d∈C
pd,cfd, and for any d ∈ C, fd =
∑
c∈C
pd,cmindc.
Thus, during a T period of consciousness, the conscious state mindc can be written as
a coexistence of the states fd. Moreover, since each vector fd is a linear combination
of vectors mindc with constant coefficients, if the state of mind is fd at the beginning
of a T conscious period, it remains constantly equal to fd during that period. Then,
the universe from our observer’s point of view, during a T conscious period, can also
be written as univ =
∑
d∈C
γdfd ⊗ envd. It is a coexistence of universes in which each
universe contains the observer in the state fd, constant over the duration T . So from
that point of view, there would be one observer for each orthonormal basis of V.
It is likely that an observer according to a basis f other than e does not satisfy the
properties of a conscious memory required by H3 so that such an observer is actually
unconscious. It is likely, but it is better to prove it.
For this purpose, it would be too restrictive to assume that when measuring obj, the
mind is set in a state mindi which depends only on the event obj ∈ Ei. So we keep
using the context of the previous paragraph.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Ci be the set of c ∈ C such that mindc is a possible state of
mind when he experiences the event obj ∈ Ei.
If there was c ∈ Ci ∩ Cj with i 6= j, then the mind in the state mindc would not know
whether the object belongs to Ei or Ej, which is false if we assume that the observer
can measure obj according to the sum Hobj =
⊥⊕
i
Ei.
The family (C1, . . . , Cn) is therefore pairwise disjoint.
With these notations, after the measurement, the universe takes the form of
univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗
∑
c∈Ci
βcmindc ⊗ [dev, env]i,c.
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists c ∈ Ci such that the state of mind is mindc, so
that the mind, according to the basis e, actually experiences the event obj ∈ Ei. The
choice of c among all states of Ci depends on the other measures made by the observer
between t0 and t2, therefore it depends on the different possibilities of evolution of
dev⊗ env.
In the basis f , we can write
univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗
∑
c∈Ci
βc
∑
d∈C
pd,cfd ⊗ [dev, env]i,c
=
∑
d∈C
fd ⊗
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗
∑
c∈Ci
βcpd,c[dev, env]i,c.
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Thus, for the “observer according to the basis f”, the universe at time t2 is in one of
the states univ(t2) = fd ⊗
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗
∑
c∈Ci
βcpd,c[dev, env]i,c.
The observer in the state fd is then entangled with a state of obj⊗dev⊗env which is
generally non-separable. The information retrieved by the mind is no longer just about
the object obj, but globally about obj⊗ dev⊗ env. He has not measured the object
according to the sum Hobj =
⊥⊕
i
Ei, nor any other writing of Hobj alone. Thus, the
observer according to the basis f does not memorize the state of the object. Worse,
he only has access to global information about the entire universe. So the observer
according to the basis f does not have the properties of a consciousness.
To avoid this non-separable situation, for any d ∈ C, into the expression
univ(t2) = fd ⊗
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗
∑
c∈Ci
βcpd,c[dev, env]i,c, the first sum must be reduced to a
single non-zero term, therefore there must exist id ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for all c /∈ Cid,
βcpd,c = 0. We have then univ(t2) = fd⊗objid⊗
∑
c∈Cid
βcpd,c[dev, env]id,c and the observer
according to the basis f indeed measures obj according to the sum Hobj =
⊥⊕
i
Ei.
βc depends on the interaction between the observer and dev⊗ env, so it is reasonable
to assume that βc is non-zero for many initial conditions of dev⊗ env.
Thus, for the observer for the basis f to be conscious, it is necessary that for every
d ∈ C, there exists id ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for every c /∈ Cid, pd,c = 0. Moreover
this must happen for any observed object, so for a large number of families (Ci)1≤i≤n
of parts of C which are pairwise disjoint.
Let us suppose that there exists d0 ∈ C and c1, c2 ∈ C with c1 6= c2, such that pd0,c1 6= 0
and pd0,c2 6= 0.
It is likely that there exists an object obj and a relationship of the formHobj =
⊥⊕
1≤i≤n
Ei
that defines a family (C1, . . . , Cn) of parts of C which is pairwise disjoint and such that
c1 ∈ C1 and c2 ∈ C2.
Then, with d = d0, the measure of obj sets the universe, from the point of view of the
observer according to the basis f , into the state
univ(t2) = fd0⊗
n∑
i=1
obji⊗
∑
c∈Ci
βcpd0,c[dev, env]i,c. The first sum contains at least 2 non-
zero terms, for i = 1 and i = 2. Then the observer according to f does not memorize
the state of the object.
Thus, for an observer according to f to be conscious, it is necessary that for every
d ∈ C, there is a single c(d) ∈ C such that pd,c(d) 6= 0. P being unitary, there is ϕd ∈ R
such that pd,c(d) = e
iϕd . So fd =
∑
c
pd,cmindc = e
−iϕdmindc(d).
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In conclusion, regardless of the phase ϕd and the order of vectors, e is the only basis
according to which the observer is conscious.
3.3 Conditional Probabilities
3.3.1 Non Contextuality
Let (E1, . . . , En) and (F1, . . . , Fk) be two families of subspaces of Hobj such that
Hobj =
⊥⊕
1≤i≤n
Ei =
⊥⊕
1≤j≤k
Fj. If we have two devices, dev1 and dev2 that can premeasure
respectively (E1, . . . , En) and (F1, . . . , Fk), an observer can start with the object in the
state obj and measure it according to either family. The probability that after a mea-
surement using dev1, he experiences that obj ∈ Ei is Prdev1(obj ∈ Ei) = ‖pEi(obj)‖2
and the probability that he experiences, after a measure using dev2, that obj ∈ Fj is
equal to Prdev2(obj ∈ Fj) = ‖pFj(obj)‖2.
In particular, if there is i0, j0 such that Ei0 = Fj0 , then these two probabilities are
equal. So, Prdev1(obj ∈ Ei) does not depend on the device used, nor on the family
(E1, . . . , En), but only on obj and Ei. This is the noncontextuality property of quantum
measurement [C.A.F., page 14].
We can thus denote this probability by Pr(obj ∈ Ei).
3.3.2 The Law of Total Probability
The notations of the previous paragraph are used again.
We denote by Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei) the probability of the event obj ∈ Fj given
that obj ∈ Ei. To define it in a natural way, we assume that the observer performs
two successive measurements, firstly with the device dev1 then with dev2. Then
Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei) is the probability that the observer experiences the event
obj ∈ Fj when the universe before the second measure is restricted to the terms in
which he experiences the event obj ∈ Ei.
More precisely, by denoting t1 and t2 the moments of these two successive measures,
we have univ(t0) = mind⊗ obj ⊗ dev01 ⊗ dev02 ⊗ env, then if we define obji = pEi(obj),
univ(t1) =
∑
1≤i≤n
such that obji 6=0
‖obji‖.mindi ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev1, env]i ⊗ dev
0
2,
and finally, if we define, when obji 6= 0, obji,j = pFj
( obji
‖obji‖
)
,
univ(t2) =
∑
1≤i≤n
such that obji 6=0
‖obji‖.
∑
1≤j≤k
such that obji,j 6=0
‖obji,j‖mindi,j ⊗ obji,j‖obji,j‖ ⊗ [dev1, dev2, env]i,j.
We assume that the states mindi and mindi,j are conscious states and that mindi,j
keeps the memory of the first measure.
We know that the states mindi are pairwise orthogonal. This is fundamental because
it allows us to consider univ(t1) not only as a coexistence of the states
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mindi ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev1, env]i ⊗ dev
0
2, but also, by substituting
obji
‖obji‖
with
∑
1≤j≤k
such that obji,j 6=0
‖obji,j‖. obji,j‖obji,j‖ , as a coexistence of the states
mindi ⊗ obji,j‖obji,j‖ ⊗ [dev1, env]i ⊗ dev
0
2. Each of these states becomes at the moment t2
mindi,j ⊗ obji,j‖obji,j‖ ⊗ [dev1, dev2, env]i,j and once univ(t2) is interpreted as a uniform
coexistence, each of these states is present in a proportion equal to ‖obji‖2‖obji,j‖2.
We deduce that the proportion at the moment t2 of minds who experience the j-th
result for the second measure, i.e. by definition the probability at the moment t0 that
the observer experiences at the moment t2 the event obj ∈ Fj is
Pr(obj ∈ Fj) =
∑
1≤i≤n
such that obji 6=0
‖obji‖2‖obji,j‖2.
Besides, if we fix i in {1, . . . , n}, given that after the first measurement the observer
experiences the event obj ∈ Ei, then obji 6= 0 and the universe reduces for this observer
at the moment t1 to univ(t1) = mindi ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ [dev1, env]i ⊗ dev
0
2. Given that
obj ∈ Ei, we must consider that this is the initial state of the universe when we begin
the second measurement, which therefore leads to
univ(t2) =
∑
1≤j≤k
tq obji,j 6=0
‖obji,j‖mindi,j ⊗ obji,j‖obji,j‖ ⊗ [dev1, dev2, env]i,j .
Thus, at the moment t0, Pr(obj ∈ Fj|obj ∈ Ei) = ‖obji,j‖2.
So, when obji 6=0 for all i, we have shown the law of total probability :
Pr(obj ∈ Fj) =
n∑
i=1
Pr(obj ∈ Ei).P r(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei).
We can also write Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei) = 1‖obji‖2‖pFj(obji)‖
2, so
Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei) =
‖pFj ◦ pEi(obj)‖2
Pr(obj ∈ Ei) .
In general, the numerator cannot be interpreted as a probability because pFj ◦ pEi is
not an orthogonal projector.
3.3.3 Bayes’ Theorem
More specifically, pFj ◦pEi is an orthogonal projector if and only if pFj and pEi commute.
In this case, pFj ◦ pEi is the orthogonal projector on Fj ∩Ei, and the previous formula
becomes Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei) = Pr(obj ∈ Ei ∩ Fj)
Pr(obj ∈ Ei) , which corresponds to the classic
definition of a conditional probability.
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In this case, if we switch the two measures, we get
Pr(obj ∈ Ei|obj ∈ Fj) = Pr(obj ∈ Ei ∩ Fj)
Pr(obj ∈ Fj) . That proves the Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei) = Pr(obj ∈ Ei|obj ∈ Fj).P r(obj ∈ Fj)
Pr(obj ∈ Ei) .
As an example of such a situation, let us assume that obj = obj1 ⊗ obj2.
Let E1 be a subspace of Hobj1 and E2 be a subspace of Hobj2 . Then p1 = pE1 ⊗ IdHobj2
and p2 = IdHobj1 ⊗ pE2 are two orthogonal projectors of Hobj .
Moreover, p1 ◦ p2 = pE1 ⊗ pE2 = p2 ◦ p1.
So we can write Pr(obj1 ∈ E1|obj2 ∈ E2) = Pr(obj1 ∈ E1 and obj2 ∈ E2)
Pr(obj2 ∈ E2) , if we con-
sider that the event obj1 ∈ E1 corresponds more rigorously to obj ∈ E1 ⊗Hobj2 .
3.4 Young’s Double-Slit Experiment and Its Generalization
Let us go back to the situation and notations presented at the beginning of paragraph
3.3.1. Young’s double-slit experiment is a special case of this general situation; obj
is then a particle, obj ∈ E1 if and only if the particle goes through the first slit and
obj ∈ E2 if it goes through the second slit, these n = 2 events being detectable by the
device dev1 when it is activated.
In this case, when the particles are sent one by one, it is observed that they go through
one or the other slit, unpredictably and with the same frequency. The link between
frequency and probability will be established in paragraph 3.6.3, however we could
present it now because it only uses previous knowledge. So, when a particle is sent
towards the slots, it is in the state obj = obj1 + obj2 where obj1 = pE1(obj) and
obj2 = pE2(obj) have the same norm
1√
2
.
The second device can detect the impact position of the particle on the screen located
after the slits. We divide the screen into k small squares called pixels. The event
obj ∈ Fj corresponds to the case where the particle hits the screen in the j-th pixel.
3.4.1 Interference
In this paragraph, only dev2 is activated: we measure only the object according to the
second family (F1, . . . , Fk).
In the particular case of Young’s double-slit experiment, we do not observe through
which slit the particle goes but only the position of its impact on the screen.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we define obji = pEi(obj) and
obji,j = pFj(obji). Then, obj =
n∑
i=1
obji =
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
obji,j .
We assume that obji 6=0 for all i.
pFj(obj) =
n∑
i=1
obji,j , so when we measure obj with dev2, we get
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Pr(obj ∈ Fj) = ‖pFj(obj)‖2 =
n∑
i=1
‖obji,j‖2 +
∑
i1 6=i2
〈obji1,j|obji2,j〉.
As ‖obji,j‖2 = ‖pFj ◦ pEi(obj)‖2 = Pr(obj ∈ Ei).P r(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei), we see that
Pr(obj ∈ Fj) 6=
n∑
i=1
Pr(obj ∈ Ei).P r(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei).
Thus, when dev1 is not used, the law of total probability is wrong.
The experimental verification of this inequality forbids us to interpret the relationship
obj =
n∑
i=1
obji =
n∑
i=1
‖obji‖. obji‖obji‖ as “at the moment t0, the object obj is in only one
of the states
obji
‖obji‖ , with a probability (whatever its definition) equal to ‖obji‖
2”: the
existence of the additional terms 〈obji1,j|obji2,j〉, with i1 6= i2, forces us to accept that
the two components obji1 and obji2 are both present. Thus these terms of interference
indicate that the equality obj =
n∑
i=1
obji must be interpreted as the simultaneous
coexistence of all states
obji
‖obji‖ .
In the case of Young’s double-slit experiment, this means that the particle obj is in a
state of coexistence of two scenarios: obj goes through the first slit for the first scenario
and through the second slit for the second scenario. Both scenarios really exist because
they both take part in the calculation of the probability that the particle hits the screen
on the j-th pixel.
However, the interference between the different states obji does not mean that they
interact with each other. Rather, they coexist independently. Indeed, the initial situa-
tion is univ(t0) =
n∑
i=1
mind⊗ obji⊗dev02⊗ env, if we include dev1 in the environment.
It is a coexistence of the n states mind ⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ dev
0
2 ⊗ env.
We also have univ(t0) =
n∑
i=1
mind⊗
( k∑
j=1
obji,j
)
⊗ dev02 ⊗ env, so that at the moment
t2 when the position on the screen is measured,
univ(t2) =
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
mindj ⊗ obji,j ⊗ [dev2, env]j.
Here, the state of dev2 ⊗ env depends only on j, because the fact that obji,j ∈ Ei is
not pre-measured by any device, by any part of the environment. Only the information
“obji,j ∈ Fj” gets entangled with dev2 and the environment.
Thus, within the initial coexistence of states, the i-th state moved from the state
mind⊗ obji‖obji‖ ⊗ dev
0
2 ⊗ env =
1
‖obji‖
k∑
j=1
mind⊗ obji,j ⊗ dev02 ⊗ env at the moment t0,
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to the state
1
‖obji‖
k∑
j=1
mindj ⊗ obji,j ⊗ [dev2, env]j at the moment t2, independently of
the evolution of the i′-th state for i′ 6= i.
In the case of Young’s double-slit experiment, the interference occurs between the
two scenarios mentioned above, however, we cannot describe them until the end of the
experiment, unless we integrate the observer, the devices and the environment into each
scenario. Then the first scenario, at the end of the experiment, becomes a coexistence
of universes in which the observer measures the particle in position j on the screen
while the particle has gone through the first slit, this last information being neither
entangled with dev2 ⊗ env, nor with the mind. It interferes with the second scenario
because this coexistence of n = 2 scenarios can be written as another coexistence:
univ(t2) =
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
mindj ⊗ obji,j ⊗ [dev2, env]j
=
∑
1≤j≤k
such that αj 6=0
αj .mindj ⊗
( 1
αj
n∑
i=1
obji,j
)
⊗ [dev2, env]j , where αj = ‖
n∑
i=1
obji,j‖.
Thus, the non-unicity of the way the universe can be interpreted as a coexistence plays
a fundamental role in the phenomenon of interference.
Mathematically, the presence of interference comes from the non-nullity of the quantity∑
i1 6=i2
〈obji1,j|obji2,j〉, which in the case of Young’s double-slit experiment, comes down
to 〈obj2,j , obj1,j〉 = 〈pFj(obj2), pFj(obj1)〉. As obj1 ∈ E1 and obj2 ∈ E2 are orthogonal,
the interference phenomenon is based on the non conservation of the orthogonality by
the function uj : x 7−→
pFj(x)
‖pFj(x)‖
.
Besides, for the observer having experienced that the particle is in position j on the
screen (that obj ∈ Fj in the general case), the universe is reduced at the moment t2 to
univ(t2) = mindj ⊗
( 1
αj
n∑
i=1
obji,j
)
⊗ [dev2, env]j = mindj ⊗ uj(obj) ⊗ [dev2, env]j,
whereas at the moment t0, for the same observer, univ(t0) = mind⊗obj⊗dev02⊗env. So
uj is the operator that transforms obj between moments t0 and t2, from the observer’s
point of view12. It is not unitary.
3.4.2 Second Generalization of the Born Rule
In practice, it is difficult to prevent the environment from becoming entangled with
the different scenarios “obj ∈ Ei”. In particular, in the case of Young’s double-slit ex-
periment, the environment is modified, even very slightly, according to the slit through
which the particle goes. To simplify, we idealize the situation by limiting entanglement
with the environment to entanglement between obj and dev1, which we now assume
activated. Under these conditions, at the beginning of the experiment, keeping general
12When pFj (obj) = 0, the observer does not experience mindj in any term of the coexistence, so it
is not necessary to define uj(obj).
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notations, univ(t0) = mind ⊗ obj ⊗ dev01 ⊗ dev02 ⊗ env, then when the particle goes
through the slits, univ(t1) = mind⊗
( n∑
i=1
obji⊗ dev1,i
)
⊗ dev02 ⊗ env. Thus, dev1 per-
forms a premeasurement of the family (E1, . . . , En). However, the observer does not
proceed with the measurement; he does not observe the result given by dev1. After
the measure according to the family (F1, . . . , Fk), we have
univ(t2) =
k∑
j=1
mindj ⊗
( n∑
i=1
obji,j ⊗ dev1,i
)
⊗ [dev2, env]j .
In this new context, the probability at the moment t0 or t1, that the observer expe-
riences mindj at the moment t2, that is, that he experiences the event obj ∈ Fj , is
equal to Pr(obj ∈ Fj) = ‖
n∑
i=1
obji,j ⊗ dev1,i‖2. The calculation of this probability is
always based on its definition in terms of observer proportions. This is the second
generalization of Born rule. We can also write:
Pr(obj ∈ Fj) =
n∑
i=1
‖obji,j‖2 +
∑
i1 6=i2
〈obji1,j|obji2,j〉.〈dev1,i1 |dev1,i2〉. So the interference
terms are now modulated by the quantities 〈dev1,i1 |dev1,i2〉.
3.4.3 Decoherence
In the idealized situation of the previous paragraph, between t0 and t1, the system
obj ⊗ dev1 is isolated from the rest of the universe, then between t1 and t2, dev1
remains isolated while obj interacts with dev2 ⊗ env.
We assume that between t0 and t1, the interaction dynamics between obj and dev1 is
defined by a Hamiltonian of the form Ĥ =
( n∑
i=1
λipEi
)
⊗ Ĥdev1 , where λi 6= λj if i 6= j.
The calculation developed page 20 adapts and shows that, if we start from an initial
state equal to obji ⊗ dev01, where obji ∈ Ei, then after an interaction duration t, the
state of obj⊗ dev1 becomes obji ⊗ dev1,i, with dev1,i = e− it~ λiĤdev1 (dev01).
The decoherence theory [M.S.1] shows that when dev1 is macroscopic, for realistic val-
ues of Ĥdev1 , for all i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i1 6= i2, 〈dev1,i1|dev1,i2〉 tends toward 0 when
t tends toward infinity. Moreover, this convergence is extremely rapid, to the point
that an interaction of less than 10−12 second is generally enough to make the quantity
|〈dev1,i1|dev1,i2〉| indistinguishable from zero, in the context of an experimental estimate
of Pr(obj ∈ Fj) by relative frequencies. This phenomenon is called decoherence. It is
omnipresent at macroscopic scale, even when the Hamiltonian of obj⊗dev1 also takes
into account the intrinsic dynamics of obj and dev1. It is likely that the decoherence
phenomenon is even more pronounced in realistic non-idealized situations.
The subspaces Ei according to which decoherence occurs always consist of states obji
that change very little during an interaction with the environment [M.S.1, page 73].
Thus, the decoherence concerns precisely the families of subspaces (E1, . . . , En) accord-
ing to which human beings tend to measure an object (cf paragraph 3.2.1).
In case of decoherence due to the device dev1, we can write:
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Pr(obj ∈ Fj) ≃
n∑
i=1
‖obji,j‖2 =
n∑
i=1
Pr(obj ∈ Ei) × Pr(obj ∈ Fj |obj ∈ Ei). For
this reason, in the presence of decoherence, which is practically impossible to avoid
when obj and dev1 are both macroscopic, the equality obj =
n∑
i=1
obji seems to have
the statistical interpretation that the object obj is in one of the states
obji
‖obji‖ with a
probability equal to ‖obji‖2.
However, this interpretation is based on an equality that, strictly speaking, is false.
The interference terms remain non-zero, and even very small they continue to forbid
the previous interpretation.
With respect to the calculation of the probabilities relative to a second measurement,
the measurement according to dev1 leads to results that a human being cannot dis-
tinguish from those obtained during a premeasurement according to the same device
dev1 if it is subjected to decoherence. However, these two situations are of a different
nature. Confusing both gives too much theoretical importance to decoherence in my
opinion.
For example, in Everett interpretation as presented by David Wallace [D.W.2], deco-
herence is at the heart of the theory to explain probabilities and the emergence of
several worlds. In this article, on the contrary, the decoherence phenomenon is not
used to justify the notions of coexistence and probability.
3.5 Density Matrix
3.5.1 Pure States
Let us go back to the situation and the notations in paragraph 3.2.2.
Ei often refers to the set of states for which a certain quantity associated with the
object has a well-defined value ui ∈ R ; it is displayed by the device when obj ∈ Ei.
For a certain choice of units, this quantity can for example correspond to its energy,
or to one coordinate of its position or momentum. By construction, ui 6= uj when
i 6= j, so dev can simply give the value ui when obj ∈ Ei. The expectation of the
result returned by the device when obj is in the initial state obj is, by definition,
(2) : E =
n∑
i=1
uiPr(obj ∈ Ei) =
n∑
i=1
ui‖pEi(obj)‖2.
Let U be the unique linear operator of Hobj such that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x ∈ Ei,
U(x) = uix. U is a Hermitian operator which is called the observable of the quantity
associated with (ui)1≤i≤n.
For any vector x of Hobj , we define its “ket”: it is the function |x〉 : α 7−→ αx from C
to Hobj . We also define its “bra”: it is the linear operator 〈x| : y 7−→ 〈x|y〉 from Hobj
to C. So, if x, y ∈ Hobj , the composite function 〈x| ◦ |y〉 is equal to 〈x|y〉IdC, which
we can safely equate with the complex 〈x|y〉, so that 〈x| ◦ |y〉 = 〈x|y〉 . This equality
justifies these notations a posteriori.
Let i be in {1, . . . , n}. pEi being a self-adjoint operator,
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‖pEi(x)‖2 = 〈x|pEi(x)〉 = Tr(〈x| ◦ pEi ◦ |x〉) = Tr(pEi ◦ |x〉 ◦ 〈x|).
So, E = Tr
(( n∑
i=1
uipEi
)
|obj〉〈obj|
)
, then
(3) : E = Tr(Uρ),
where ρ = |obj〉〈obj| is the orthogonal projector on the one-dimensional space
Vect(obj). ρ is also called the density matrix of the state obj.
In particular, when U = pEj , where j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Tr(pEjρ) = ‖pEj(obj)‖2. Thus the
relationship (3) is equivalent to the first generalization of Born rule.
3.5.2 Mixed States
In the situation of the previous paragraph, we say that the state obj is pure, as opposed
to the situation of paragraph 3.4.2 where, before the measurement by dev2, the object
got entangled with a part of the environment, denoted by dev1, which set obj⊗dev1
at the moment t1 in the state X =
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗ dev1,i. In this case, we saw page 24
that obj no longer exists in the universe univ(t1), but that univ(t1) is a coexistence
of universes in each of which obj exists in the state
obji
‖obji‖ . In this case, quantum
mechanics textbooks say that obj is in a mixed state.
With the notations in paragraph 3.4.2, let us associate to dev2 an observable U , defined
by : ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ∀x ∈ Fj , U(x) = ujx, where u1, . . . , uk are pairwise distinct real
numbers. Then the expectation of the result returned by dev2 is
E =
k∑
j=1
uj.P r(obj ∈ Fj) =
k∑
j=1
uj.‖
n∑
i=1
obji,j ⊗ dev1,i‖2.
As obji,j = pFj(obji) and obj =
n∑
i=1
obji, we have
n∑
i=1
obji,j⊗dev1,i = (pFj⊗IdHdev1 )(X).
We have proved that E =
k∑
j=1
uj‖pFj ⊗ IdHdev1 )(X)‖2, that is, if we compare with the
relationship (2), when we measure an object obj according to a family of subspaces
(F1, . . . , Fk) while obj was previously entangled with another object here denoted
by dev1, we actually measure the object obj ⊗ dev1, which is the only that exists,
according to the family (F1 ⊗Hdev1 , . . . , Fk ⊗Hdev1). We can also say that, when one
measures an object obj according to an observable U , whereas obj is firstly entangled
with another object dev1, one actually measures the object obj ⊗ dev1 according to
the observable U ⊗ IdHdev1 .
Onto the set of linear operators of Hobj ⊗Hdev1 , we define the notion of “partial trace
over Hdev1” by the relationship: TrHdev1 (A⊗B) = Tr(B).A.
According to the relationship (3), E = Tr([U ⊗ IdHdev1 ].[|X〉〈X|]),
so thanks to properties of partial trace,
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E = Tr
(
TrHdev1 ([U ⊗ IdHdev1 ].[|X〉〈X|])
)
= Tr
(
U ◦ TrHdev1 (|X〉〈X|)
)
.
Let ρ = TrHdev1 (|X〉〈X|). Then the relationship (3) is still valid.
ρ = TrHdev1 (|X〉〈X|) is called the density matrix of the mixed state obj.
IP1 must not be generalized to a mixed state modelled by its density matrix; When obj
is in a mixed state, it has no existence of its own. The universe though is decomposed
into a coexistence of universes in each of which obj actually exists in a pure state.
Thus, the density matrix of a mixed state is only a mathematical tool, quite practical
because it makes the relationship (3) also equivalent to the second generalization of
the Born rule.
3.5.3 Density Matrix and Decoherence
X =
n∑
i=1
obji ⊗ dev1,i, so
|X〉〈X| =
∑
1≤i1,i2≤n
[|obji1〉 ⊗ |dev1,i1〉] ◦ [〈obji2 | ⊗ 〈dev1,i2|]
=
∑
1≤i1,i2≤n
[|obji1〉 ◦ 〈obji2 |]⊗ [|dev1,i1〉 ◦ 〈dev1,i2 |].
So, according to the partial trace definition,
ρ =
∑
1≤i1,i2≤n
Tr(|dev1,i1〉 ◦ 〈dev1,i2 |) . [|obji1〉 ◦ 〈obji2 |],
yet Tr(|dev1,i1〉 ◦ 〈dev1,i2 |) = Tr(〈dev1,i2| ◦ |dev1,i1〉) = 〈dev1,i2 |dev1,i1〉,
therefore ρ =
n∑
i=1
|obji〉〈obji|+
∑
i1 6=i2
〈dev1,i2 |dev1,i1〉.|obji1〉〈obji2 |.
Let us study the case where Ei are one-dimensional spaces. We choose for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} a unit vector ei in Ei and we denote by e = (e1, . . . , en) the orthonormal
basis of Hobj thus constituted. For any i, there is αi ∈ C such that obji = αiei.
Then the matrix of ρ in the basis e has as i-th diagonal coefficient |αi|2 and as
(i1, i2)-th non-diagonal coefficient αi1αi2〈dev1,i2 |dev1,i1〉. This proves that the deco-
herence phenomenon occurs if and only if the non-diagonal coefficients of the density
matrix are approximately zero.
3.6 Probabilities and Frequencies
3.6.1 Non-Repeatable Events
The notion of probability as defined in this article also applies to non-repeatable events.
For example, for the observer I am now at time t0 in the statemind, the probability that
it will rain tomorrow at time t1 is equal to |α|2 if univ(t0) = mind⊗ (α.env1+β.env2),
where env1 is the coexistence of all the states of the environment at the moment t0
which will give at the moment t1 a universe where it rains. At time t1, we have
univ(t1) = α
∑
i
βimind1,i ⊗ env1,i + β
∑
i
γimind2,i ⊗ env2,i,
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with 1 =
∑
i
|βi|2 =
∑
i
|γi|2, where env1,i is a raining environment with the occurrence
of some other events whose the observer is conscious. Starting from a single observer
at the moment t0, who can be seen as a coexistence of as many identical observers as
necessary, the proportion of those who will experience rain is well |α|2.
Thus, for non-reproducible events, the calculation of probabilities is sometimes accessi-
ble thanks to quantum mechanics, however we then have no experimental way to verify
this theoretical result.
3.6.2 Weak Law of Large Numbers
Fortunately, this is not the case for reproducible events; next I am proving that the
probability of such an event is indeed approximated by its relative frequency of occur-
rence. It has been pointed out in paragraph 1.1.2 that an experiment is never rigorously
reproducible. Often the object is even changed from one experiment to another. To
reproduce the measurement of the object obj under the conditions of paragraph 3.2.2,
we thus assume we have N objects objk. For any k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we assume that objk
is premeasurable by a device dev (independent of k only to simplify) according to a
family of subspaces (Eki )1≤i≤n such that Hobjk =
⊥⊕
1≤i≤n
Eki .
Initially, we have univ(t0) = mind ⊗
( ⊗
1≤k≤N
objk
)
⊗ dev0 ⊗ env.
We assume that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the quantity ‖pEki (objk)‖2 can be approximated
by ‖pEi(obj)‖2 = pi. This is in fact the only condition required to consider objk as a
good reproduction of obj. This considerably extends the notion of reproducible event.
Let objki = pEki (obj
k). So,
⊗
1≤k≤N
objk =
⊗
1≤k≤N
n∑
i=1
objki . This tensor product of N sums
can be written as a sum of tensor products, where each term is obtained by choosing
in each sum objk one of its terms objkg(k), with g(k) ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then forming their
tensor product. So, if F({1, . . . , N}, {1, . . . , n}) denotes the set of the functions from
{1, . . . , N} to {1, . . . , n}, we get (4) :
⊗
1≤k≤N
objk =
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k).
Between t0 and t1, the N objects are premeasured, at the same time or in any order,
while the observer does not read the result (again for simplicity only).
So, univ(t1) = mind ⊗
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
⊗ [dev, env]g.
It is assumed for simplicity, that the device only provides the observer with the relative
frequency of the event objk ∈ Eki0 , where i0 is given in {1, . . . , n}.
When the N objects are in the state
⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k), this frequency is equal to
h
N
, where
h is the cardinality of {k ∈ {1, . . . , N}/g(k) = i0}.
If A is a set, its cardinality will be denoted by #A.
Then, after measurement, we can write the following relationship:
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(5) : univ(t2) =
∑
f∈{ h
N
/h∈{0,...,N}}
mindf ⊗
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
such that h=#{k∈{1,...,N}/g(k)=i0}
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
⊗ [dev, env]g.
I fix ε > 0. We want to calculate the probability that the relative frequency f of the
event “objk ∈ Eki0” differs from pi0 by more than ε in absolute value. It is by definition,
among all the minds initially in the same state mind, the proportion of those who
experience a frequency f such that |f − pi0 | ≥ ε. This probability is well defined, even
if the mind in the state mindf does not know the value of pi0 .
Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) =
∑
f∈{ h
N
/h∈{0,...,N}}
such that |f−pi0
|≥ε
‖
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
such that h=#{k∈{1,...,N}/g(k)=i0}
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
‖2
=
∑
f∈{ h
N
/h∈{0,...,N}}
such that |f−pi0
|≥ε
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
such that h=#{k∈{1,...,N}/g(k)=i0}
n∏
k=1
pg(k).
To obtain once exactly all the functions g in F({1, . . . , N}, {1, . . . , n}}) such that
h = #{k ∈ {1, . . . , N}/g(k) = i0}, we start by choosing the part A of {1, . . . , N}
of cardinality h whose elements are mapped by g onto i0, then we complete g on
A = {1, . . . , N} \ A by any function from A to {1, . . . , n} \ {i0}. So,
Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) =
∑
h∈{0,...,N}
such that | h
N
−pi0
|≥ε
∑
A⊂{1,...,N}
such that #A=h
∑
g∈F(A,{1,...,n}\{i0})
phi0
∏
k∈A
pg(k).
The argument used to get the relationship (4) shows that∑
g∈F(A,{1,...,n}\{i0})
∏
k∈A
pg(k) =
∏
k∈A
∑
i∈{1,...,n}\{i0}
pi = (1− pi0)N−h, so
Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) =
∑
h∈{0,...,N}
such that | h
N
−pi0
|≥ε
(
N
h
)
phi0(1− pi0)N−h.
This result was expected. Indeed, we have shown that(
N
h
)
phi0(1 − pi0)N−h = ‖
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
such that h=#{k∈{1,...,N}/g(k)=i0}
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
‖2, yet that last ex-
pression represents the probability that the event “objk ∈ Eki0” occurs exactly h times,
among N trials that do not interact with each other, given that each of these events
occurs with a probability pi0 . We have therefore just proved, into quantum formalism,
that the number of successes of N independent Bernoulli trials, whose probability of
success is pi0 , is a random variable whose distribution is binomial with parameters N
and pi0. We can now write:
Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) ≤
∑
h∈{0,...,N}
such that | h
N
−pi0
|≥ε
( h
N
− pi0)2
ε2
(
N
h
)
phi0(1− pi0)N−h
≤
N∑
h=0
( h
N
− pi0)2
ε2
(
N
h
)
phi0(1− pi0)N−h.
If P is a real polynomial, we define its Bernstein polynomial:
BN(P )(X) =
N∑
h=0
(
N
h
)
P (
h
N
)Xh(1 −X)N−h. So, Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) ≤
1
ε2
BN (Q)(pi0)
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with Q = (X − pi0)2 = X2 − 2pi0X + p2i0 . We have
X(1−X)
N
B′N(P ) =
N∑
h=0
(
N
h
)
P (
h
N
)Xh(1−X)N−hh(1−X)− (N − h)X
N
= BN (XP )−XBN (P ),
so BN(XP ) =
X(1−X)
N
B′N (P ) +XBN(P ).
As BN(1) = 1, BN(X) = X , then BN(X
2) = X2(1− 1
N
) +
X
N
.
Thus, BN (Q)(pi0) =
1
N
pi0(1− pi0).
So we have shown that Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) ≤
1
Nε2
.
Notably, Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) tends toward 0 when N tends toward +∞ 13.
On the mathematical level the arguments used are well known. This amounts to
proving, within quantum formalism, a version of the weak law of large numbers.
3.6.3 Confidence Interval
In the context of this article, this result is interpreted as follows; in the coexistence
univ(t2) =
∑
f∈{ h
N
/h∈{0,...,N}}
mindf ⊗
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
such that h=#{k∈{1,...,N}/g(k)=i0}
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
⊗ [dev, env]g,
once reduced to a uniform coexistence that allows counting, if we consider the propor-
tion of states in which the mind experiences a frequency value f that differs from pi0
by more than ε in absolute value, this proportion can be made as small as we want by
setting N large enough. The observer at the moment t2 can then with some confidence
consider that the value f he has measured is a good approximation of pi0 .
To define this new notion of confidence, we consider a more general situation. At the
moment t0, we reduce the universe to the term that is experienced by an observer in a
state of consciousness mind : univ(t0) = mind⊗ env.
At a later moment t2, the observer’s mind and the environment are entangled:
univ(t2) =
∑
k∈K
αkmindk ⊗ envk. In each term, the observer has made measurements
on the environment, thus retrieving some information.
If A is a subset of K, the probability that the observer experiences a state of mind
mindk such that k ∈ A is Pr(k ∈ A) =
∑
k∈A
|αk|2.
It is assumed that the set A is not known to the observer. This is the case in the previous
situation, where A = {f ∈ { h
N
/h ∈ {0, . . . , N}}/|f − pi0 | < ε} with a probability pi0
that the observer does not know and is trying to evaluate.
Let d be in [0.1]. It is assumed that Pr(k ∈ A) ≥ d. Then among all the observers
initially in the state mind, the proportion of those who at the moment t2 experience a
value k such that k ∈ A is greater than d. If the observer knows that Pr(k ∈ A) ≥ d,
he is entitled to claim that he is at the moment t2 in a state of mind mindk such
13This is even an exponential convergence, because one can show that Pr(|f − pi0 | ≥ ε) ≤ 2e−2ε
2N
[A.A.2, page 6].
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that k ∈ A, “with a confidence level d”, according to a terminology used in statistics,
therefore at the moment t2 he is entitled to say that “k ∈ A, with a confidence level
d”.
If we go back on the approximation of pi0 from the frequency f , by choosing N such
that
1
Nε2
≤ 0, 05, the observer at the moment t2 can claim that |f − pi0| < ε with a
confidence level equal to 95%, so that pi0 ∈ [f − ε, f + ε], with the same confidence
level; since the observer knows the value of f , he thus obtains a confidence interval for
pi0 . Of course pi0 might not be in that interval. For example, if a player rolls a 6-sided
dice 50 times and gets 24 times the result 6, he can confidently claim that the dice is
crooked and that the probability that the result is 6 on each roll is close to 1
2
. Then he
takes the risk of making a wrong decision because it is not impossible, with a straight
dice, to get 24 times the result 6.
3.6.4 Temptation of Frequentism
Variations of the calculation in paragraph 3.6.2 are sometimes used to justify a fre-
quentist definition of probabilities in quantum mechanics. Peter Mittelstaedt [P.M,
pages 48-57 and 125-129] developed it extensively and it is mentioned by Brian Greene
[B.G page 465]. However any argument to show that the relative frequency is equal to
pi0 when N tends towards infinity comes up against the meaning of taking the limit.
Since the value N = +∞ is not accessible to human beings, if N is the number of
experiments performed, we have in fact to show that, when N is large, the frequency
f approaches properly pi0 . So any demonstration of this kind amounts to neglecting,
when N is large, the terms of the relationship (5) page 62 for which f is too far from
pi0 , that is for which |f − pi0 | ≥ ε, where ε is chosen as small as we want. So we would
have to neglect the vector
VN =
∑
f∈{ h
N
/h∈{0,...,N}}
such that |f−pi0
|≥ε
mindf ⊗
∑
g∈F({1,...,N},{1,...,n})
such that h=#{k∈{1,...,N}/g(k)=i0}
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
⊗ [dev, env]g, when N is
large, on the pretext that its norm tends towards 0. Nethertheless there is no reason
to neglect these terms into the coexistence. They contain conscious states of mind, for
which precisely the frequency differs from the probability; the existence of these terms
bans a frequentist definition.
Moreover, considering that certain terms of a coexistence do not exist as soon as their
norm is below a certain threshold η > 0 leads to a contradiction ; Indeed, in the
coexistence (5), the norm of each term mindf ⊗
[ ⊗
1≤k≤N
objkg(k)
]
⊗ [dev, env]g is equal to√ ∏
1≤k≤N
pg(k), which is lower than p
N/2, where p = max
1≤i≤n
pi. In general, p < 1, so when
N is large enough, the norm of each term involved in the coexistence (5) is less than
η. Then none of these terms would exist and the universe as a whole would not exist.
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4 Making a C-bit
In this chapter, we further detail a possibility of biological implementation of c-bits, as
described on page 43. This highlights some practical difficulties raised by H3 and we
see how to overcome them.
4.1 Two Spin 12 Particles
Let us denote by cb the c-bit we wish to build. If Hcb was infinite-dimensional, the
conscious states f0 and f1 would be part of a basis (fi)i∈I with I uncountable, according
to Hilbert space completeness [D.M, page 133]. We cannot see how the c-protein could
then control the state of cb with the infinite precision required to select f0 or f1 among
(fi)i∈I . In order to impose Hcb as being finite-dimensional, we are going to use spin of
particles.
If pa is a spin 1
2
particle, for example an electron, we can write pa = p ⊗ s, where p
is the position of the particle and s is its spin. If (f0, f1) denotes an orthonormal basis
of Hs, then the general form of the wave function of pa is a function
pa : x 7−→ p0(x)f0 + p1(x)f1 from R3 to Hs such that
1 = ‖pa‖2 = ∫
x
|p0(x)|2dx+
∫
x
|p1(x)|2dx. Thus pa = p0 ⊗ f0 + p1 ⊗ f1.
If we take now two discernible spin 1
2
particles pa1 and pa2, whose positions are denoted
by p1 and p2 and whose spins are denoted by s1 and s2,
we have Hpa1⊗pa2 = [Hp1 ⊗Hp2 ]⊗ [Hs1 ⊗Hs2 ].
Yet according to Clebsch-Gordan theorem [C.L.1, page 242], [J.H.1, page 131], if for
any integer or half-integer j, Dj denotes the unitary irreducible (2j + 1)-dimensional
representation of the group SU(2), then Dj1 ⊗Dj2 =
⊥⊕
|j1−j2|≤j≤j1+j2
Dj, so we have
14
Hs1 ⊗Hs2 = D11
2
⊗D21
2
= D0
⊥⊕ D1.
Let (f0.0) be an orthonormal basis of D0 and (f1,j)0≤j≤2 an orthonormal basis of D1.
Then the wave function of these two particles is a function from (R3)2 to D0
⊥⊕ D1 of
the form : ϕ : x = (x1, x2) 7−→ p0,0(x)f0,0 + p1,0(x)f1,0 + p1,1(x)f1,1 + p1,2(x)f1,2
such that 1 = ‖ϕ‖2 = ∫
x
[|p0,0(x)|2 + |p1,0(x)|2 + |p1,1(x)|2 + |p1,2(x)|2]dx.
Thus, ϕ = p0,0 ⊗ f0,0 + p1,0 ⊗ f1,0 + p1,1 ⊗ f1,1 + p1,2 ⊗ f1,2.
Suppose temporarily that cb = s1 ⊗ s2 and that the c-protein constantly imposes
rotational movements on its c-bit. Let Rt1→t2 be the rotation thus performed by the
c-bit between t1 and t2. According to [J.H, page 69], Rt1→t2(f0,0) = f0,0 whereas, for all
j ∈ {0.1.2}, Rt1→t2(f1,j) continuously varies over D1. So the state f0.0, called singlet,
behaves like a conscious state and the states in D1, called triplets, are compatible with
unconscious states.
For example, these two particles could be electrons, each bound to a proton to form a
hydrogen atom. When they are separated, if they are subjected to different rotations,
14In the notation Dkj , the exponent k allows us to consider several irreducible representations of
spin j, isomorphic but physically different.
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they become discernible and the state of cb can then be any unit vector of Hcb. On
the contrary, if the c-protein can combine the two hydrogen atoms into a dihydrogen
molecule placed in its fundamental state, then the wave functions of p1 and p2 are equal
to the only molecular orbital available [C.L.1, pages 360 and 384] and the two electrons
become indiscernible : According to Pauli exclusion principle, the wave function of
pa1⊗pa2 is antisymmetric. It imposes a singlet state on the spin of pa1⊗pa2, so with
our notations, cb remains equal to f0.0, as long as the c-protein ensures the cohesion of
the H2 molecule. cb would then be a conscious state.
4.2 Four Spin 12 Particles
This model of c-bit has only one conscious state whereas we need two orthogonal
conscious states. Therefore our final version of c-bit will be built with four discernible
spin 1
2
particles (pai)1≤i≤4. Let pens =
4⊗
i=1
pai.
By adapting the previous notations, pens =
[ 4⊗
i=1
pi
]
⊗
[ 4⊗
i=1
si
]
.
The c-bit now consists of the spins of the four particles: cb =
4⊗
i=1
si.
Thus, Hcb = (D10
⊥⊕ D11)⊗ (D20
⊥⊕ D21).
Using distributivity and Clebsch-Gordan theorem, we get
Hcb = D30
⊥⊕ D31
⊥⊕ D41
⊥⊕ (D11 ⊗D21) = D30
⊥⊕ D31
⊥⊕ D41
⊥⊕ D40
⊥⊕ D51
⊥⊕ D2.
By renaming D30 = F0, D
4
0 = F1, D
3
1 = F2, D
4
1 = F3, D
5
1 = F4 and D2 = F5, we get
Hcb =
⊥⊕
0≤i≤5
Fi where F0 and F1 are one-dimensional, F2, F3 and F4 are 3-dimensional
and F5 is 5-dimensional. For any i ∈ {0, . . . , 5}, let (fi,j)0≤j≤ji be an orthonormal basis
of Fi, where ji =
 0 if i ∈ {0, 1}2 if i ∈ {2, 3, 4}
4 if i = 5
. Thus, the wave function of pens has the
following form: ϕ : x = (xk)1≤k≤4 7−→
∑
0≤i≤5
0≤j≤ji
pi,j(x)fi,j from (R
3)4 to Hcb,
such that 1 = ‖ϕ‖2 =
∫
x
∑
0≤i≤5
0≤j≤ji
|pi,j(x)|2dx. So, ϕ =
∑
0≤i≤5
0≤j≤ji
pi,j ⊗ fi,j.
For all i, j, let αi,j =
√∫
x
|pi,j(x)|2dx and if αi,j 6= 0, qi,j = 1
αi,j
pi,j. When αi,j = 0,
we let qi,j be any function from (R
3)4 to C such that
∫
x
|qi,j(x)|2dx = 1. One can
then write that ϕ =
∑
0≤i≤5
0≤j≤ji
αi,jqi,j ⊗ fi,j, where qi,j are position wave functions of the 4
particles system.
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Let G =
⊥⊕
2≤i≤5
Fi, so that Hcb = F0
⊥⊕ F1
⊥⊕ G.
We assume again the c-protein constantly imposes rotational movements on its c-bit.
This time, f0.0 and f1.0 are invariant by the rotation Rt1→t2 and for any state g in G,
Rt1→t2(g) continuously varies over G. We then have two conscious states f0.0 and f1.0
and all states in G behave as unconscious states.
According to H3, the c-protein writing process on a c-bit takes less than τ ≃ 1ms at
the beginning of a conscious period lasting T ≃ 50ms. It consists in setting the c-bit in
one of the two states f0.0 or f1.0, i.e. imposing, according to a mechanism that remains
to be specified, this 4 particles set to be seen by the rest of the universe as a single
spin 0 particle, of a different nature according to whether it is f0.0 or f1.0, until the
c-protein performs a new writing. Then, during the next τ transition period, the four
particles are manipulated independently of each other by the c-protein, which allows
the c-bit state to vary over the entire space Hcb.
4.3 Initialization of a C-bit on a Conscious State
Ideally, the c-protein should be able to set the c-bit exactly in the state f0.0 or f1.0
at the beginning of a conscious period. In this paragraph, we are seeing that this
constraint can be released and it is enough that the c-bit state approximates f0.0 or
f1.0.
Let us start by writing the general state of the universe in a form that takes into account
the presence or absence of mind, consisting of the spinorial part of 4N particles;
univ = βuniv0+γuniv1, where univ0 is a coexistence of states of the universe in which
the 4N particles exist, where univ0 and univ1 are orthogonal, and where univ1 is a
coexistence of states where at least one of these 4N particles does not exist, which
corresponds either to universes in which our observer has never existed, or to universes
in which the mind of our observer has just lost a particle by disintegration (whereas
these particles are very stable) thus where undoubtedly a biological process of repair
is taking place. We have |β|2 + |γ|2 = 1.
univ0 evolves in a subspace of Huniv denoted H′univ which can be decomposed into the
form H′univ = mind⊗pos⊗env, where pos stands for the position of the 4N particles
of mind and where env stands for the universe except for the 4N particles. We have
mind ⊗ pos =
⊗
1≤h≤N
phens, where p
h
ens represents the 4 particles system whose h-th
c-bit is the spinorial part. So, we can write univ0 in the form
(6) : univ0 =
∑
b
βbenvb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
ϕhb , where ϕ
h
b is the wave function of p
h
ens, which
depends by entanglement on the state envb of the environment.
With obvious notations, one can write : (7) : ϕhb =
∑
0≤i≤5
0≤j≤ji
αhi,j,b q
h
i,j,b ⊗ fhi,j.
Let univb = envb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
ϕhb , so that univ0 =
∑
b
βbunivb.
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Let us order the couples (i, j) according to the lexicographical order from the smallest,
(0, 0), to the largest, (5, 4), and denote them in that order r(0), . . . , r(15).
So univb = envb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
15∑
k=0
αhr(k),b q
h
r(k),b ⊗ fhr(k).
The argument used to get the relationship (4) page 62 shows that
univb = envb ⊗
∑
a∈F({1,...,N},{0,...,15})
⊗
1≤h≤N
αhr(a(h)),b q
h
r(a(h)),b ⊗ fhr(a(h)). So,
univ0 =
∑
b
∑
a∈F({1,...,N},{0,...,15})
βb
[ N∏
h=1
αhr(a(h)),b
]
.
[ ⊗
1≤h≤N
fhr(a(h))
]
⊗
[
envb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
qhr(a(h)),b
]
.
Then,
(8) : univ0 =
∑
a∈F({1,...,N},{0,...,15})
minda ⊗
∑
b
βb
[ N∏
h=1
αhr(a(h)),b
]
⊗
[
envb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
qhr(a(h)),b
]
,
where minda =
⊗
1≤h≤N
fhr(a(h)). This is the most general expression of the state of the
universe, according to mind.
Let us now examine how the mind moves from a conscious state to a new one. Let c
be a function from {1, . . . , N} to {0, 1}. The conscious state of mind corresponding
to c is mindc =
⊗
1≤h≤N
fhc(h),0. Thus, for mind in the conscious state mindc, during a
conscious period from the moment t0 to the moment t0 + T , the universe is reduced to
the terms for which the 4N particles of its mind exist, and where for any h ∈ {1, . . . , N},
r(a(h)) = (c(h), 0). So for t ∈ [t0, t0 + T ], the universe at the moment t according to
mind in the state mindc is
univ(t) = mindc⊗
∑
b
δβb
[ N∏
h=1
αhc(h),0,b
]
⊗
[
envb(t)⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
qhc(h),0,b(t)
]
= mindc⊗env′c(t)
where δ is a normalizing factor ensuring that ‖univ(t)‖ = 1.
env′c is a coexistence of environments that will each lead the brain to a particular
pattern of neural activity, when t > t0 + T , and the c-bits of the mind to a particular
state. The principle of linearity allows us to replace env′c by the coexistence of the only
environments that will seek, by the transmission of an adequate signal to the c-proteins,
to lead the mind towards a given conscious state, defined by a second function d from
{1, . . . , N} to {0, 1}. This reduction resulted in univ = mindc ⊗ env′d; at the end of
the conscious period corresponding to mindc, under the influence of env
′
d, for every
h ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the h-th c-protein will attempt to set its c-bit in the state fhd(h),0, a
priori only when d(h) 6= c(h).
The transition from fhc(h),0 to f
h
d(h),0 is made during the next τ transition period, while
cbh evolves into intermediate states belonging to Hcbh \ (F h0 ⊕ F h1 ), which vary under
the effect of the rotation imposed on the c-bit, and are therefore unconscious. At the
atomic scale, a millisecond is a long time, during which many events can occur locally
and become entangled between them. So, at the end of the transition between the
two conscious states, the universe is in a general state univ = βuniv0 + γuniv1, using
the previous notations; univ1 represents the coexistence of the states of the universe
in which, whereas a millisecond before, the 4N particles of mind existed, at least one
of them spontaneously disintegrated. The scarcity of such an event translates into the
fact that γ has a very small modulus. Ideally, we take γ = 0, and more realistically,
we assume that |γ| < 10−20.
Now let us focus on univ0, which at the moment t1 = t0 + T + τ is in the form (8).
Ideally, each c-protein manages to set its c-bit exactly in the desired state fhd(h),0 at
the moment t1. According to the relationships (6) and (7), this amounts to assuming
that after the unconscious transition period, for all b and for all h ∈ {1, . . . , N},
ϕhb = q
h
d(h),0,b ⊗ fhd(h),0. So, ideally,
univ(t1) = mindd ⊗
∑
b
βb.
[
envb(t1) ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
qhd(h),0,b(t1)
]
= mindd ⊗ env′d(t1), which
then evolves when t ∈ [t1, t1 + T ] in the form univ(t) = mindd ⊗ env′d(t), where mindd
remains constant, independent of t.
More realistically, at the moment t1, the h-th c-protein only manages to set its c-bit in
a state very close to fhd(h),0. According to the relationships (6) and (7), this amounts to
assuming that after the unconscious transition period, for all h ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for
all b, |αhd(h),0,b| > 1− ε, where ε is small enough.
Specifically, we will assume that ε ≤ 10−20.
Then univ(t1) = βuniv0(t1) + γuniv1 with univ0(t1) = univd+ univ
′
d, where according
to (8) univd =
∑
b
βb
[ N∏
h=1
αhd(h),0,b
]
mindd ⊗
[
envb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
qhd(h),0,b
]
= mindd ⊗ env′′d and
univ′d =
∑
a∈F({1,...,N},{0,...,15}
such that r◦a 6=[h7−→(d(h),0)]
minda ⊗
∑
b
βb
[ N∏
h=1
αhr(a(h)),b
]
.envb ⊗
⊗
1≤h≤N
qhr(a(h)),b.
univd and univ
′
d are orthogonal because, for all states minda involved in univ
′
d, mindd
and minda are orthogonal.
Since N is in the order of 20 billion, the entanglement between the 4N particles of
the mind and the environment induces a decoherence phenomenon which allows us to
affirm that the family (envb)b is approximately orthonormal, this approximation being
of very high quality. So according to (6),
∑
b
|βb|2 ≃ 1 and
1 ≥ ‖env′′d‖2 ≃
∑
b
|βb|2
N∏
h=1
|αhd(h),0,b|2 ≥
∑
b
|βb|2(1− ε)2N ≃ (1− ε)2N ≃ 1− 2Nε,
therefore ‖env′′d‖2 ∈ [1− 4.10−10, 1].
Let η = ‖env′′d‖. Thus univ(t1) = βη.mindd ⊗ env +
√
1− (βη)2.univ′, where univ′
and env are unit vectors and where univ′ and mindd ⊗ env are orthogonal.
univ(t1) is thus a coexistence of universes among which the proportion of universes
where mind is conscious and in the state of consciousness mindd is equal to |βη|2,
with |βη|2 ≥ (1− 10−40)(1− 4.10−10) ≃ 1− 4.10−10.
The probability being always defined in terms of proportions, with the choices we have
made for orders of magnitude, we have just shown that, for a mind in a conscious
state mindc between t0 and t0 + T , given that his environment should lead him at the
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moment t1 = t0 + T + τ to the state of consciousness mindd, the probability that his
c-proteins dysfunction and lead him to another state (probably unconscious) is less
than 4.10−10. If this happens, during T = 50ms, the mind is unconscious or conscious
of a fact unrelated to mindd, which corresponds to a slight disorder of consciousness.
This compares with the number L of periods of consciousness that a human being
experiences over a lifetime: L is in the order of 4.1010. Thus, the average number of
such disorders of consciousness over the entire existence of a human being is in the
order of 16.
4.4 Constancy of a Conscious State
We have seen that the state of the universe according to mind in the state mindc, at a
moment t0 that begins a period of consciousness, is of the form univ(t0) = mindc⊗env.
env is a coexistence of environments, for most of which, between t0 and t0 + T , for
all h ∈ {1, . . . , N}, phens is actually seen as a single spin 0 particle, whose spinorial
state remains constant and equal to fhc(h),0. Meanwhile for other environments of this
coexistence, in much rarer proportions, that is not the case. So, at the moment t0+T ,
the universe is a coexistence of several universes, for most of which the state of mind
has remained constant and equal to mindc between t0 and t0 + T , and where for some
rare universes, a dysfunction has occurred for at least one of the N c-bits. It is a second
source of consciousness disorders.
In conclusion, to consider that H3 is well verified is to ignore universes, negligible
in proportion, in which an error occurred when initializing the value of a c-bit at the
beginning of a conscious period, or in which the conscious state did not remain constant
for the required T duration.
Born rule is valid under the assumption that the observer’s mind will not experience
consciousness disorders. To guarantee this rationality condition, probability is evalu-
ated by taking into account only universes in which, during all periods of consciousness
required for the measurement, all c-bits have remained constant and have been posi-
tioned on a correct conscious state at the beginning of the conscious phase. This is a
somewhat particular form of conditional probability because it concerns the observer.
It is though consistent with the natural definition of conditional probabilities presented
page 53.
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Part II
The Observer and
Self-Consciousness
In the first part of this paper, we have summarized the formalism of quantum mechanics
without probability into three formal principles FP1, FP2 and FP3. We have provided
an interpretation in six principles IP1 to IP6, based on the notion of coexistence.
Within this framework, we have then modelled the conscious observer by making three
hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, which we have justified. This allowed us to define the
notion of probability and then to prove and explain the usual properties of quantum
mechanics and probabilities.
This approach sheds a particular light on the philosophical notions of existence, uni-
verse and mind; the universe exists in a single pure quantum state, but there are many
ways to write it in the form univ = mind⊗ env.
Then, the relationship univ =
∑
i
mindi ⊗ envi describes a coexistence of universes
whose i-th is in the state mindi ⊗ envi, where mind and env both exist in the states
mindi and envi. Whenmind satisfies hypothesis H1,H2 and H3, we can more precisely
write the state of the universe as proposed page 37:
univ(t) =
∑
c∈C
αcmindc ⊗ envc +
∑
i∈I
βimindi ⊗ envi + univ′(t). This mind goes from
a period of consciousness corresponding to one of the terms mindc ⊗ envc to a new
period of consciousness of the form mindd ⊗ envd. This corresponds to an egocentric
reading of the universe. When awakened, the mind is at every moment a particular
conscious state.
The goal of this second part is to show that, if the mind is surrounded by an adequate
neuronal structure, its experience as we have just described it, corresponds effectively to
our daily conscious experience, charged with our sensations, imaginations, emotions,
decisions and especially with a new notion, the self-consciousness, which unifies the
whole and which makes sense.
It is therefore a matter of developing a model, both quantum and neuronal, of the
highest cognitive functions of the mind that explains human consciousness. Current
neuroscience knowledge is unfortunately far from providing such a model. This is why
I limit the goal to the construction of a plausible model which is coherent with the
contemporary advances in neurosciences. Beyond these advances it will be summary
and speculative. I will define the concepts of q-neurons, BAM, imaginary maps, mo-
tor, emotional and attentional maps, parallel maps to the motor map and decision
algorithms. We have to keep in mind that these are fictions invented to build our
model, even when for stylistic ease I use these concepts as if they were real. They help
to clarify the role of the random component of neuron behaviour in the formation of
self-consciousness.
72
1 Neurons
1.1 Threshold Automaton
The biological neuron, like any eukaryotic cell, is incredibly complex and diverse and
communicates in many chemical ways [D.P.3]. Nevertheless, if we simplify at the
extreme and study only the electrical signal transmission, a neuron has inputs, its
synapses, and an output, the axon, which then ramifies into several branches containing
a signal of the same intensity, which reach the synapses of other neurons.
Consider a neuron with n synapses. If its j-th synapse receives an electrical signal of
intensity sj ∈ R, it transmits the signal sjej to the neuron; ej is called the synaptic
efficiency. When positive, the synapse is called excitatory. Otherwise, the synapse is
called inhibitory. These different synaptic contributions are summed at the trigger zone
of the neuron, located at the beginning of the axon to form the signal x =
∑
j
sjej.
The neuron then emits an action potential p if and only if x is greater than a threshold
s, characteristic of the neuron [D.P.3, page 103]. In turn, this action potential is
propagated along the axon to some synapses of other neurons.
For some neurons, called sensory, it is appropriate to add to x electrical signals resulting
from the interaction of the neuron with the external environment. We also distinguish
motor neurons whose axons are plugged into a muscle to control its contraction.
The number n of synapses, their synaptic efficiencies ej as well as the threshold s of the
neuron evolve according to the reception by the neuron of various chemical or electrical
signals. This simplified neuron is also called a threshold automaton [JP.N, page 10].
To further simplify, we assume that the action potential is p =1 and the resting poten-
tial is p = 0.
In these conditions, if we choose ej = 1 for all j and s = 1, the neuron emits if and
only if at least one of the sj is 1, so that the neuron output corresponds to the logical
function “or” applied to the inputs. We then say it is an “or” neuron. Similarly, if we
choose ej = 1 for all j and s equal to the number of synapses, the neuron emits if and
only if all sj are equal to 1. We say it is an “and” neuron.
1.2 Stochastic Neuron
For threshold automaton, with previous notations, p = S0(x), where S0 (Figure 1) is
the threshold function, equal to 0 when x < s and 1 when x ≥ s. In order to incorporate
some randomness into neuron behaviour, a common model [E.D, pages 35-40] uses a
C∞ increasing function S (Figure 2) whose codomain is [0, 1], which approximates S0
by requiring that S(x) be close to 0 when x ≤ s − ε and close to 1 when x ≥ s + ε,
where ε is a given parameter close to 0. The neuron is now stochastic: it emits an
action potential p = 1 with a probability S(x), in the sense that if we denote by neu
the given neuron and env the rest of the universe, there is a coexistence of several
scenarios, some leading to the emission of an action potential, others not;
univ(t2) =
∑
i
αineui,emits ⊗ envi +
∑
j
βjneuj,silent ⊗ envj , with S(x) =
∑
i
|αi|2.
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In fact, S(x) is only interpreted as a probability if this decomposition of univ(t2) into
a sum of two terms is measured by a mind, included in env.
1
s
p
x
S0
figure 1
1
firing
probability
x
S
figure 2
ss−ε s+ε
1
s s′
P0
firing
probability
x
S
figure 3
It is often assumed [JP.N, page 16] that the information conveyed by a neuron is
contained in the frequency of its action potentials, which is on average proportional
to the probability S(x). Then S(x) represents an approximate value of the signal
generated by the neuron. The derivable character of the output S(x) as a function of
the inputs sj enhances the field of available mathematical tools, which is why this model
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is used in artificial intelligence, notably in the backpropagation algorithm [J.H.2, pages
75-81]. However, from a biological point of view, such coding is not very economical,
so it does not explain the remarkable speed of reaction of the brain to the stimuli it
receives. It is likely that different kinds of neural coding are used in the brain15; even
though the intensity of a muscular contraction depends essentially on the frequency
of firing of the associated motor neuron, we will see in paragraph 3.1 that certain
synaptic efficiencies evolve according to the time interval between two action potentials.
Under these conditions, the winning neural coding is the common denominator of these
different codes, which considers that the instant of each action potential of each neuron
carries information.
1.3 Q-Neurons
In chapters 6 and 7, I give an important role to the random part of the neural signal
in the construction of the ego, when this part is explicitly measured by the mind. To
highlight the use of this randomness, even though in reality stochastic neurons are
enough, we will assume that the population of neurons consists only of two distinct
species: deterministic neurons, modelled by threshold automata, and q-neurons16, that
are simplified stochastic neurons, for which the S function has the following form
(Figure 3): it is defined using two thresholds s and s′ such that 0 ≤ s < s′ and using
a number P0 ∈ [0, 1] which will play the role of a probability:
• When x < s, S(x) =0. That means that if the sum of neuron inputs weighted
by synaptic efficiencies is less than the threshold s, then definitely the neuron
remains inactive.
• When s ≤ x < s′, S(x) = P0. This is the case where the neuron explicitly
exhibits random behaviour.
• When x ≥ s′, S(x) = 1. So, in this case, the neuron emits with certainty.
It is then easy for the neurons upstream of a q-neuron to impose on it a random
behaviour.
When x ∈ [s, s′[, to ensure that the q-neuron fires with the probability P0, we can
imagine the following coin toss scenario: near the trigger zone, two different protein
species pa and pb are attached to the cell membrane. At a moment t0, they rush towards
the DNA inside the nucleus. The pa and pb proteins can only bind to a single site ℓ
in DNA. If a pa protein does this, it triggers a cascade of intracellular reactions that
induce such a polarization in the trigger zone that the q-neuron will emit an action
potential as soon as we have x ≥ s. On the contrary, in the case where it is a pb protein
that manages to bind to ℓ, a similar process imposes this time the condition x ≥ s′ for
the q-neuron activation. When the event “x ∈ [s, s′[” occurs at the trigger zone, it is
handled by the previous coin toss and a new coin toss is initiated. To speed up the
15See Wikipedia’s well-documented article entitled “neural coding”.
16“q” for “quantum”.
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working rhythm of a q-neuron, we can imagine that several pairs of different protein
species (pa,i, pb,i) make coin tosses.
Let us study one of them more precisely; the position of each protein, in the agitated
intracellular medium, is a chaotic parameter whose wave function rapidly extends over
a large region of space and thus becomes entangled with the environment in the form
of a coexistence of positions. So between the initialization of the coin toss and the
arrival of one of the proteins on the site ℓ, the universe has became a superposition
of a multitude of scenarios concerning these proteins; at the end of this process, the
universe is in the state mind⊗
(∑
i
αi[pa wins]i ⊗ envi +
∑
j
βj[pb wins]j ⊗ envj
)
.
We insist that P0 can only be interpreted as a probability if this decomposition into a
sum of two terms is measured by a mind. Then when x ∈ [s, s′[, the firing probability
is P0 =
∑
i
|αi|2.
By modifying the relative concentrations of the pa and pb proteins on the cell membrane,
one can regulate this probability. A retroactive control of the q-neuron is thus possible,
for example according to the hormonal response of the organism to the consequences
of the “decision” taken by the q-neuron.
If the mind then measures the possible activation of the q-neuron in random mode, the
state of the universe becomes
(mind[pa wins] ⊗
∑
i
αi[pa wins]i ⊗ envi) + (mind[pb wins] ⊗
∑
j
βj [pb wins]j ⊗ envj).
In this case, P0 becomes a probability for mind, but we will see later how such a
random process is sometimes perceived by the mind as a “self” decision, i.e. a decision
whose cause is a “self” that assumes full responsibility.
So, after c-neuron, the random component of neural behaviour, whose concept of
q-neuron is a caricature, is the second ingredient allowing the construction of self-
consciousness. It places the notion of quantum measurement at the heart of the human
decision-making structure. Quantum measurement is no longer confined to sophisti-
cated experiments by physicists, it becomes an integral part of human psychology.
Using a q-neuron, it is simple to build a neural device behaving as an “xor” (Figure
4). If the thresholds and the synaptic efficiencies are chosen correctly, the following
behaviour will occur: as long as axon 1 is inactive, the q-neuron remains inactive and
nothing happens, whereas when axon 1 becomes active, it induces a random behaviour
in the q-neuron. Thus, with a certain probability P0, the q-neuron fires and with a
probability 1 − P0 it remains silent. When it fires, its axon triggers action 1 and at
the same time activates the inhibitory synapse of the classic neuron, preventing the
trigger of action 2. When the q-neuron is inactive, axon 1 activates the classic neuron,
because it is not inhibited by the synapse receiving the q-neuron signal, which triggers
action 2, without action 1 being triggered.
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classic
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figure 4 : “xor” (the black arrows).
The red arrows may be used to override this ”xor”.
2 Sensory Maps
2.1 The Different Senses
The neurosciences count several sensory systems for the human body [D.P.2]:
• The vision;
• The auditory system;
• the chemical senses :
– the taste;
– the olfactory system;
– the trigemal system, for the perception of irritating or noxious molecules;
• the vestibular system (inner ear), for the perception of the overall position of the
body and its movements;
• the somatic sensory system which has several subsystems:
– the sense of touch, for the perception at every point of the body surface of
temperature, pressure and vibration.;
– proprioception, to perceive the tension of muscles, tendons and joints;
– pain, which is a sense in its own right.
Each system independently has a range of specific sensory receptors, nerve wiring to
the brain, and specific processing areas in the brain.
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2.2 Cortical Maps
In these areas, the raw information provided by one of the senses is filtered to extract
the important components. In the primary visual cortex, some neurons are activated
only when, in a specific region of the visual space, a small line segment oriented in a
specific direction is present [D.P.3, page 266]. If one changes slightly the region or if
one modifies a little the inclination of the line segment, these neurons become inactive,
while other neurons are activated, close to the first ones in the cortex. The set of these
different neurons form what is called a cortical map [JA.B], which in our example only
takes into account the raw visual information for the presence of line segments and, in
case of presence, for their locations and orientations.
Thus, a cortical map is a network of neurons sensitive to a limited number k of sensory
parameters denoted p = (p1, . . . , pk) where k ≤ 5. Each neuron n on the map is
activated only when the value of p is within a small domain denoted Dn, called the
receptive field of the neuron. If n and n′ are two physically distant neurons on the
network, then Dn ∩Dn′ = ∅.
There are a multitude of such cortical maps, which filter according to the position, the
direction, the presence of a particular pattern, the speed of movement, the intensity
of the luminosity, the color, by combining these various criteria by two, three or even
more. It is valid for every sensory system.
The simplest cortical maps, directly linked to sensory receptors, are created during
fetal development likely using a genetically programmed process based on chemoaffinity
[D.P.3, page 519].
These primary maps provide new parameters that feed secondary maps, which feed
other maps in a hierarchical structure.
Knowledge about the development, organization and use of these maps is growing,
however, we currently lack definitive and comprehensive answers.
Some of these maps are probably formed through a process of self-organization analo-
gous to Kohonen’s maps [E.D], [JP.N], [J.H.2], to ensure that the detail level used to
describe information is correlated with its frequency of occurrence.
On the other hand, the Hmax model and its refinements [M.R], [C.L.2] explain how,
starting from primary sensory maps, it is possible to construct secondary maps that
can recognize a certain conjunction of parameters (recognition of a square shape for
example) independently of other parameters (position and size of the square). By car-
icaturing, the presence of a square corresponds to the existence of 4 correctly arranged
line segments, therefore if each of these segments is coded by the activation of a neu-
ron, by connecting these four neurons to an “and” neuron, the latter will be activated
only in the presence of the square. Thus “and” neurons make it possible to recognize
superimpositions of patterns, which leads to more sophisticated patterns. Moreover, if
we connect to an “or” neuron all the neurons responding to the presence of a square,
whatever its size and position, the “or” neuron will fire in the presence of a square,
independently of its position and size.
Thus, when one goes up in the hierarchy of cortical maps, the criterion recognized by
the map increases in complexity as well as in invariance; at the top of the pyramid, in
the visual cortex, one undoubtedly finds neurons sensitive to the presence of a smile
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on a face, independently of the size, the orientation, the luninosity etc..
3 Hebbian Learning
3.1 Synaptic Plasticity
Consider a synapse s between a presynaptic neuron n0 and a postsynaptic neuron n1.
The efficiency w of the synapse evolves according to the activity of the neurons n0
and n1 as well as the activity of the neighbouring synapses. This synaptic plasticity
follows different rules depending on the neurotransmitters used by s and its neighboring
synapses and depending on the characteristics of n0 and n1.
We limit ourselves to the rule that seems to be the most common, guessed by Donald
Hebb as early as 1949 [D.H], refined by actual synapse experiments [G.B]; w is increased
when an axon activity of n0 in s is followed after less than 40 ms by the emission of an
action potential in the axon of n1. On the contrary, w is decreased when an activity of
n0 in s occurs less than 40 ms after a firing of n1. This decrease is however less strong
than the previous increase, so if the synapse s tends to be active at the same time as
the neuron n1, within a window of ±10ms, on average, w will increase.
The increase is temporary if the simultaneity is only occasional, nethertheless, if it
occurs more often it becomes permanent for several hours, even several days, or even all
life, by binding particular proteins at specific sites of the n1 DNA in order to modify the
regulation of genetic transcription, thus the production capacities of certain proteins.
The latter can even induce the creation of a new synapse close to s, still from the
neuron n0 to the neuron n1.
3.2 Hopfield Networks
In artificial intelligence, to build a Hopfield network [JP.N], [J.H] we start from N
neurons which are zero threshold automata, and connect each of these neurons to all
the others. Let ni be the ith neuron and let wi,j be the efficiency of the synapse linking
ni to nj . Initially, we require wi,j = 0; The synapses are silent, which is biologically
plausible [D.P.3, page 175].
A network configuration is given by a N -uple ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN) ∈ {0, 1}N , where ξi
represents the axonal activity of the neuron ni.
During a first phase, called learning, we present to the network p configurations
ξ1, . . . , ξp, where p is less than N
4 lnN
[JP.N, page 41]. During this phase, the synap-
tic efficiencies wi,j are modified according to the Hebbian rule, somewhat idealized as
follows: after the presentation of the k-th configuration, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, wi,j
is incremented by λ(2ξki − 1)(2ξkj − 1), where λ is a strictly positive constant that
corresponds to the network learning speed. This guarantees symmetry: wi,j = wj,i.
In a second phase, called network use, the synaptic efficiencies are no longer modified.
We present the network with some arbitrary configuration ξ then we let this network
of threshold automata work for a few iterations. One shows [JP.N, pages 34-41] that
it then converges to one of the ξk, a priori the closest to ξ. So the network works like
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an associative memory; if we submit to the network a configuration close to one of the
ξk, it recognizes ξk in the sense that it adopts this configuration.
If we modify the learning rule somewhat to make it more realistic, or if we remove
some connections between the N neurons, the network continues to behave like an
associative memory, at the cost of less storage capacity [JP.N, page 49]. Thus Hopfield
networks can be considered as an idealization of certain strongly and symmetrically
wired biological neural networks, which we still call by extension Hopfield networks.
Hopfield networks have in particular a content-addressable memory behaviour; by
equating a configuration with the set of neurons in the network that are active for
that configuration, if we present part of one of the configurations ξk to the network,
it converges to ξk, that is, it can retrieve the entire example ξk from one of its parts.
Of course, if we use a common part of two configurations ξk, the network has to make
a choice, and in practice, with a non-idealized network, it can also make convergence
errors: to err is human.
In practice, the learning and use phases are often mixed: the network learns as it is
used. This requires that the learning rule is counterbalanced by a forgetting rule, which
systematically decreases the absolute value of synaptic efficiencies with each iteration
at a greater or lesser speed. When this speed and λ are large, the Hopfield network is
a short-term memory that forgets very quickly while it can learn every example from
its first appearance. On the contrary, when the speeds of forgetting and learning are
low, the Hopfield network is a long-term memory, which forgets only after several days
or several months, and in return learns only the examples that are repeated several
times.
3.3 Single Sensory Objects
For a human sense, the vision for example, let us consider all of its high-level cortical
maps. Let us assume that the presence of your coffee cup in your vision field is encoded
by the activation of some neurons on some of these maps. We also assume that the
outputs of these maps are the inputs of a highly connected network of neurons, whose
synaptic efficiencies are initially arbitrary. This is a rather low hypothesis because we
only assume the existence of a multitude of highly connected neurons with no initial
organization, some of which having synapses that receive signals from the neurons of
these maps.
Then this network will behave like a Hopfield network and learn the most commonly
encountered objects in your vision field. Your cup of coffee in particular corresponds
to a configuration learned by this network. If now your cup is half hidden by a water
bottle, the Hopfield network still recognizes the cup by reproducing the corresponding
complete configuration after a few iterations. Your brain produces augmented reality
on a daily basis.
It can be envisaged that several Hopfield networks are connected in this way to the
upper vision maps, with different learning and forgetting speeds, in order to memorize
visual objects in the more or less long term. It is the same for all other senses.
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3.4 Bidirectional Associative Memories
This is a variant of Hopfield networks, also developed within the framework of artificial
intelligence [B.K]. This variant only uses the Hebbian rule, so it is still plausible to
assume that brain contains similar mechanisms.
A BAM (Bidirectional Associative Memory) is made up of two layers of null threshold
neurons, denoted by E and S. Let m1, . . . , mN be the neurons of the layer E and
n1, . . . , nP those of the layer S. Each neuron in one layer is connected to all the
neurons in the other layer, and there is no connection between neurons in the same
layer. Let wi,j be the efficiency of the synapse joining ni to mj and w
′
j,i the efficiency
of the reverse synapse joining mj to ni.
A network configuration is now given by a couple (A,B),
where A = (A1, . . . , AN ) ∈ {0, 1}N represents the activity of the E layer and
where B = (B1, . . . , BP ) ∈ {0, 1}P corresponds to the S layer.
During the learning phase, the network is presented with m configurations (Ak, Bk),
with m < min(N,P ). The synaptic efficiencies, initially null, are modified according
to the Hebbian rule; for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and j ∈ {1, . . . , P}, the presentation of the
k-th configuration increments wi,j by λ(2A
k
i − 1)(2Bkj − 1) and increments w′j,i by the
same value.
Then, during the use phase, if we present to the network a configuration (A,B), it is
proved that it converges in a few iterations towards one of the learned configurations
(Ak, Bk), close to (A,B).
In particular, if we present to the network a configuration of the form (Ak, B), where
B is arbitrary, and where Ak is part of the examples learned, the network converges to
(Ak, Bk). Conversely a configuration of the form (A,Bk) leads to (Ak, Bk). Thus the
network behaves like a hetero-associative memory, which can associate the Ak pattern
with the Bk pattern.
3.5 Multisensory Objects
For each sense, we have associated Hopfield networks which can record single-sensory
objects on different time scales. For each of the p senses of a human being, let us pick
one of these networks, denoted by Hi, where i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let us assume that the
axon of each neuron of Hi is connected to a new neuron. Let H
′
i be the set of these
new neurons and suppose they are not connected between them. They thus constitute
an output layer of the network Hi. We assume that a neural device guarantees that
Hi delivers its result at H
′
i only once convergence is reached.
When i 6= j, we assume that H ′i and H ′j are the two layers of a BAM.
The vision of a cup often occurs at the same time as the hearing of the word “cup”, so
if Hi corresponds to the vision and Hj to the hearing, the BAM linking H
′
i and H
′
j can
learn the couple (A,B), where A is the activity of Hi, transmitted to H
′
i, generated by
the vision of a cup, even partial, and where B is the activity of Hj , transmitted to H
′
j,
generated by the hearing of the word “cup”, even with low noise. Once the learning
is completed, the mere sight of a cup will induce the imagination of hearing the word
“cup” and vice versa.
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The cup thus becomes a multisensory object, and its evocation according to one sense
induces the corresponding imaginations according to the other senses17.
Thus, when a neural activity is induced in H ′j by an H
′
i and not by the j-th sense maps,
it is an imagined fact. For this reason, thereafter, H ′j will be called an imaginary map
of the j-th sense.
We assume that the higher level cortical maps are made of c-neurons. Their c-bits
thus bring to the mind the experience directly produced by the senses. We also assume
that the networks H ′j are made of c-neurons, while the networks Hj are made of classic
neurons. Then the c-bits of an imaginary map of the j-th sense bring to the mind,
on the one hand an augmented reality perceived by the j-th sense, consistent with the
c-bits of high-level cortical maps of the same sense, and on the other hand imagined
facts, relative to the j-th sense, from a real sensation produced by another sense.
The conscious experience generated for example by the vision of the coffee cup is
reproduced identically with each vision of the cup. When this vision is only imagined
after hearing the word “cup”, it is also reproduced identically into the imaginary visual
map, though without the presence of the corresponding activity pattern in the upper
cortical visual maps.
Each imaginary map is connected to other imaginary maps by BAM, so by transitivity,
a first real perception can induce multiple imaginary facts. It already looks like an
automatic sequence of thoughts.
3.6 Libet Experiments
In summary, each sensory system transmits information to the brain that is processed
and stored in cortical maps. If they are low level, they are not made of c-neurons
and therefore do not participate directly in conscious sensations. Conversely, we are
conscious of the information contained in high-level cortical maps and imaginary maps.
C-neurons are threshold automata with c-bits. With the notations in paragraph 1.1,
inside a c-neuron, x is compared at each moment with s at its trigger zone, located at
the beginning of the axon; when x ≥ s, the c-neuron emits an action potential whose
duration is of the order of 5 ms. According to the scenario described on page 42, for
this action potential to participate in consciousness, that is, for it to be encoded in the
c-bit configuration of the c-neuron, one has to wait for a p2 protein to travel from the
trigger zone to the position ℓ of the DNA inside the nucleus. A p2 protein is therefore
a motor protein [T.D.2], or it is carried by a motor protein. At best, such a protein, for
example a dynein, moves along microtubules at a speed18 of 6.10−6m.s−1. The size of a
neuron varies between 5 and 120 micrometers. However, we can suppose that c-neurons
have an eccentric nucleus, located near the trigger zone, which is rather common in
neurons of an adult brain. If the distance between the nucleus and the trigger zone is
in the order of 2µm, the time required for the protein to enter the nucleus is in the
17This is not systematic however because according to paragraph 6.5, it depends on how the atten-
tion is directed.
18see http://book.bionumbers.org/how-fast-do-molecular-motors-move-on-cytoskeletal-filaments/
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order of 300 ms. If we assume that the diameter of the nucleus is in the order of 2µm,
the coding of the activation of an action potential in the c-bits will be done with a
delay in the order of 500ms.
Such a delay corresponds to the experimental observations of Benjamin Libet [B.L]; by
applying electrical stimulations directly in the cortex of consenting patients while they
were undergoing surgery in the brain, Benjamin Libet observed that stimulations only
reached the subject’s consciousness after a duration of 500 milliseconds.
He also observed that a stimulation lasting less than 500 ms never reached conscious-
ness. The transport of the p2 protein towards the nucleus then towards the c-protein
should therefore be conditioned by the continuation of the emission of action potentials
over 500 ms; one can imagine that the motor protein moves only if it evolves in an
environment where the electric potential x is higher than the threshold s. Then, as
soon as x < s, the emission of action potentials stops and, for the same reason, the
progression of the p2 protein is stopped. So when the event “x ≥ s” occurs for less than
500ms, the p2 protein does not have time to reach the site ℓ and the action potentials
are not encoded in the c-bits, so they do not participate in the observer’s consciousness.
Consequently, the information contained in the c-bits does not fully reflect the axonal
activity of the c-neurons. Moreover, some c-bits may code only the activity of one
synapse of the c-neuron, so conversely, the action potentials delivered or not by the
c-neurons do not fully reflect the conscious experience of the observer.
A brief cutaneous stimulation of about ten milliseconds accesses the consciousness
though, because it generates a sequence of activities in the brain lasting more than 500
ms, but it is coded in the mind with a delay of some 500 ms.
In another experiment [B.L, page 95], Benjamin Libet sends an electrical stimulation
directly into the sensory cortex for more than 500 ms starting at a moment t0. At
the moment t0 + 200ms, he sends a cutaneous stimulation of about ten milliseconds.
The cortical stimulation accesses consciousness at the instant t0 + 500ms and the
cutaneous stimulation at the instant t0 + 700ms. Yet the subject claims to be aware
of the cutaneous stimulation before the cortical stimulation, precisely at the moment
t0 + 200ms when it was initialized. This remains true even if we replace 200 ms by
a duration t1 lower than 500ms. When t1 = 500ms, the two events are perceived as
simultaneous and when t1 > 500ms, the chronological order is restored.
The hypothesis H3 makes it possible to solve this paradox; during each period of
consciousness, the mind remains in a constant quantum state during a duration T
of the order of 50 ms. It is therefore necessary that this state of mind encodes the
state of the environment not only spatially, but also temporally. The coding of each
conscious elementary event therefore includes temporal information: start time, end
time, speed, etc. It is then possible to imagine processes of time correction which consist
in modifying this information. Here, the time label of the cutaneous stimulation would
be decremented by 500ms compared to that of the cortical stimulation. More generally,
it is assumed that any real stimulation, i.e. coming from the primary sensory maps,
is temporally labelled according to the approximate time of arrival of the signal in
the primary maps, whereas signals deprived of such origin are by default temporally
labelled according to the actual time. According to this mechanism, between
t0+500ms and t0+700ms, 4 conscious frames are produced which include the cortical
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stimulation but not the cutaneous stimulation, then beyond t0 + 700ms, the conscious
frames contain the cortical stimulation, temporally labeled by t0 + 500ms and the
cutaneous stimulation labeled by t0+200ms, therefore the second stimulation appears
to consciousness as a former event than the first stimulation. These new conscious
frames prevail when the patient testifies.
4 Skeletal Muscle Contractions
Each motor neuron, located in the spinal cord or the brain stem, sends its axon onto
a few fibers of one of our 570 muscles. The firing of the motor neuron induces the
contraction of fibers that triggers skeletal movement.
An elementary movement, such as bending an arm, requires a complex and coordinated
sequence of contractions of the muscles involved. It is largely controlled without brain
intervention, by local neural circuits, again in the spinal cord or the brain stem, which
cause motor neurons and certain sensory neurons to interact. Thus, the main functions
of the motor cortex are movement planning, initiation, coordination and precise control.
Wilder Penfield showed that the motor cortex is organized as a motor map; the excita-
tion of a neuron on this map causes movement in a region of the body, the neighbouring
regions corresponding to neighbouring neurons on the map. If one excites a neuron of
this map, located in the part corresponding to the right arm, while it is close to the part
of the map corresponding to the mouth [D.P.3, page 385], one obtains a movement of
the arm bringing the hand towards the mouth. This map, often noted MM thereafter,
thus provides a set of elementary movements to survive in nature and adapt to it.
We assume that between each imaginary map and the motor map we have a highly
connected network of symmetrically interconnected neurons. By Hebbian learning, this
network can behave like a BAM which thus connects a sensation with a movement when
they are often concomitant. This model is consistent with the approach developed by
Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola in [C.K.].
In particular, before birth, the spontaneous movements (cf paragraph 6.1) of the foetus
make it possible to link the triggering of a movement from MM with the somesthesic
sensations that it generates into the imaginary maps concerned. Later, this learning
allows an adult to connect each of his movements with the full range of corresponding
sensations for each of the senses.
When an individual A observes the hand of a person B grabbing an object, due to
the invariance properties of the high-level sensory maps, the neural activity of the A’s
higher visual maps is similar to what it would be if A grabbed the object himself. The
BAMs to the motor map then induce the same hand movement in A. That explains
our tendency to imitate.
However, we often inhibit this inclination. To model this skill, we replace, for each
neuron n of MM, the scheme n → mn, which symbolizes the fact that the axon of
neuron n is connected to some motor neurons, by the following more complex scheme:
n → n′ → mn
⊤
n′′
, where n′ and n′′ are two more motor cortex neurons. The con-
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nection between n and n′ is an excitatory synapse whereas the connection between
n′′ and n′ is inhibitory. Thus the activation of n′′ will prevent the activation of n′
and therefore the execution of the associated movement, even when n is activated. In
these conditions, the activation of n together with that of n′′ inhibits the movement.
Nethertheless via the BAMs, it triggers the imagination of the sensations related to
the movement. That fits well with what A feels inside when he observes B grabbing
an object.
Thus, when we observe the movements of another person, we feel largely the same
sensations as when we actually perform the same movements and we even activate
some neurons of type n of the motor map, while inhibiting those of type n′, via the
activation of neurons of type n′′. This could explain the origin and usefulness of mirror
neurons [A.K], [G.V].
This model also explains how a baby can imitate facial expressions as early as the
sixth week, whereas at this age he does not have the possibility of studying his face
in a mirror [C.K]. His relatives imitate the baby firstly: when the baby pulls out his
tongue, most often one of his parents does the same, so that the activation in the infant
of the corresponding neurons on the motor map is associated via the BAM with the
vision of a face that pulls out the tongue. Thereafter, baby can imitate her mother
when she pulls out her tongue.
Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola [C.K] show that this model can also explain
the fine coordination of rapid movements; they take the example of a usual succession
of movements: reaching for a biscuit, grasping the biscuit, bringing the biscuit to the
mouth. Let mvti be the i-th of these 3 movements. If at the moment t the neurons
of the motor map involved in mvt1 are activated, this movement is actually performed
at the moment t + 100ms then its perception is recorded in the sensory maps at the
moment t + 200ms. Then at t + 200ms the motor neurons involved in mvt2 already
become active. Thus the BAM associates the perception of mvt1 with the trigger of
mvt2. Indeed, we have seen that the simultaneity that allows synaptic reinforcement
must take place within a time window of 40ms. Similarly, the perception of mvt2
is associated with the trigger of mvt3. After learning, the rapid succession of these 3
movements is programmed into the BAM; the perception of mvt1 triggers via the BAM
mvt2, then the perception of mvt2 triggers mvt3. Thus, the repetition of the sequence
of these 3 movements makes it possible to automate its production.
5 Emotions
The different sensory systems with their cortical and imaginary maps thus closely
interact with the somatic motor system. They form the overall sensory-motor system
of the human being.
Besides, the human body is provided with the visceral nervous system, which automat-
ically controls homeostasis of the organism, in other words its different balances. It
regulates heart rate, gastric secretions, pupil dilation, tears, horripilation, etc. It also
regulates hormone secretions which act in particular on neurotransmitters and thus on
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brain behaviour.
The visceral nervous system works according to a rather limited range of predefined
behaviours that allow it to adapt to external circumstances. Each of these behaviours
can be labelled by an emotion. Thus fear is associated with an acceleration of heartbeat,
shortness of breath, trembling of the legs, contraction of the bowels, etc., i.e. the
mobilization of the body’s resources to face a danger. Besides fear, the most common
emotions are happiness, surprise, anger, sadness, disgust and contempt. Each emotion
has variants; anger can turn into rage or decrease to become annoyance. Different
emotions can also be experienced at the same time. Antonio Damasio [AR.D] also
defines background emotions such as well-being, discomfort, calm or tension, and more
social emotions such as shame, jealousy, pride, etc.
These emotions are triggered by the action on the visceral nervous system of neural
networks in the brain, which I call emotional inducers. Each emotion is, probably
innately, combined with a stereotyped configuration of certain skeletal muscles, which
defines emotional facial expressions and body postures.
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figure 5 :
The sensory-motor loop corresponds to the cycle [1,2,3,4,5,6,1];
Emotional feedback corresponds to the cycle [7,8,9,7];
The arrow 10 controls the creation of emotional facial expressions.
The visceral nervous system has many sensory receptors. They are mostly integrated
into neural loops of unconscious automatic activities. Some information still access the
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consciousness, via a map called emotional, that I suppose made up of c-neurons. In the
mind, the elements of this conscious emotional component are by definition feelings.
The emotional map is connected to the imaginary maps and the motor map by BAMs
(see Figure 5). This explains why the simple fact of forcing oneself to smile generates
a vague feeling of happiness. It also explains our natural empathy for others: their
emotional facial expressions that we perceive in our imaginary maps are translated via
the BAMs into feelings in our emotional map.
The emotional inducers are innately activated by the joint action of certain neurons of
some sensory or imaginary maps. Thus a young bird is frightened by the passage over
the nest of a shape similar to that of a falcon. Emotions can be triggered indirectly,
when a real or imagined event induces from BAM to BAM a certain activity in an
imaginary map, which then activates emotional inducers. The emotional map probably
also acts on the emotional inducers, which generates positive or negative emotional
feedback phenomena.
Figure 5 summarizes our comments about these two sensory-motor and visceral nervous
systems, distinguishing between conscious and unconscious parts.
6 Higher Cognitive Functions
6.1 Spontaneous Actions
Two neural maps are called parallel when they have the same number k of neurons
and, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the i-th neuron on the first map is connected to the i-th
neuron on the second map. The connections all go from the first map to the second, or
they all go from the second to the first, or they are all symmetrical. This symmetric
binary relation over maps is extended by transitivity into an equivalence relation.
We evoked page 84 the use of spontaneous movements to feed the BAMs linking the
motor map and the imaginary maps. To produce such movements, we can imagine that
MM is connected to a parallel map made of q-neurons that I call a q-map, denoted by
qM1. We assume that a neuron d1 is connected to all q-neurons of qM1 (see Figure 6).
d1 collects signals at its synapses from certain sensory, imaginary or emotional maps.
When they activate d1, this neuron in turn activates the q-map so that each of its
q-neurons goes into random mode, with however a rather low activation probability.
This activates a few neurons on the motor map which trigger a structured movement of
several parts of the body, unless the latter is impracticable or dangerous; it is assumed
that an inborn neural device, downstream of the motor map, inhibits the movement in
this case. So human being is indeed able of spontaneous movements.
6.2 Observing His Hand
When an infant studies one of his hands, I propose the following scenario inside his
brain. Firstly the particular posture he adopts is innately recognized by the neuron
d1, which triggers spontaneous movement.
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In Figure 7, the mechanism generating a spontaneous move is reproduced. It corre-
sponds to arrows 1, 2 and 3.
If it is an observed hand movement, then the sensory and imaginary maps of the
somesthesic and visual senses are activated together. We assume that a test neuron
can recognize this configuration using its synapses, correctly connected to the previous
maps (arrow 6).
Let us assume that each neuron n of MM is symmetrically connected to a neuron
n′ of a parallel map denoted HM2 . Suppose the test neuron is also connected to
all the neurons of HM2 and n
′ is activated if an only if n and test are both active.
Thus, when the spontaneous movement does not correspond to a hand movement, HM2
remains inactive, whereas in the opposite case, the activation of MM corresponding
to this movement is copied into the parallel map HM2 (arrows 4 to 7). If now HM2
is a Hopfield network, it can memorize among the spontaneous movements those that
correspond to an observed hand movement.
After this learning phase, for example during a sleep period, let us assume that a
parallel q-map denoted qM2 is connected to HM2 (arrow b) and that a neuron d2 is
connected to all neurons of qM2 (arrow a). So, once our baby wakes up, he can move
on to an active phase, which triggers the neuron d2. Via the arrow a, all q-neurons
of qM2 switch to random mode. They send on HM2 a random signal which in a few
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iterations converges towards one of the memorized movements. This neural activity
pattern is transmitted via the arrow c to the motor map that performs it (arrows d
and e).
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Figure 7
The repeated use of the neuron d2 thus teaches the BAM placed between the imaginary
visual maps and the motor map to associate the movements of the hand with their
vision, if we suppose that our baby continues to observe his hand.
The correct working of this device implies that the arrow c is inhibited during the
learning phase and that the Hopfield network stops learning when the active phase is
switched on.
If we generalize, when HMi is a parallel Hopfield map symmetrically connected to
MM , it can memorize certain movements during a learning phase. So if we add a
neuron di and a q-map qMi, according to the arrangement (d2, qM2, HM2,MM) in
Figure 7, we obtain a device for random generation of the movements stored in HMi.
Figure 8 then shows how to use HMi to select from its stored movements those that
satisfy another test and store them in a second Hopfield map HMj. By adding a
similar device (dj, qMj) to HMj , we can then use HMj as a new random generator of
selected movements. For example, if HMi generates any hand movements, HMj may
only retain those that coincide in the visual maps with movements made by baby’s
relatives and that he had memorized in an imaginary visual map. It could be gripping
movements, particularly interesting because this is how his mother sometimes waved a
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toy in front of him.
By varying the part of the body concerned and the test used, we thus obtain the
construction of several random generators of movements that the child can study and
use at will.
By definition, the decision map is made up of the neurons di as well as other neurons
that will be specified later. The neurons on this map are called decisional neurons.
Assuming BAMs exist between this new map and the other maps, the use phase also
makes it possible to link a movement of a relative’s hand with the decisional neuron
corresponding to the movements of the hand. So when mom moves her hands, baby is
inclined to make a hand movement himself. A communication is setting up.
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figure 8 :
Arrows 1 to 7 : HMj learning phase.
Arrows a to e : HMj use phase.
6.3 Decision Algorithms
Consider a family of decisional neurons (di)1≤i≤k, each provided with a q-map denoted
qMi and a Hopfield map denoted HMi, according to the previous paragraph.
Let us build a first decision algorithm which, if activated at the same time as one
di, imagines a movement chosen in HMi by qMi, scores it positively or negatively
according to a certain criterion, then actually executes it only if the score is positive.
Figure 9 shows this algorithm, where we assume that di = d1. It is assumed that an
upstream device guarantees the impossibility of activating two neurons dj at the same
time. Thus at time 1, only d1 is activated, as well as a1 which is the root neuron of the
decision algorithm.
The description of MM seen on page 84 is reproduced, where for each neuron n of
MM, the connection n → mn from n to some motor neurons is replaced by the more
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complex form
n → n′ → mn
⊤
n′′
. This amounts to adding to MM a map MM ′
parallel to MM , consisting of neurons n′ and a map MM ′′ containing neurons n′′ (see
Figure 9). Let MN be the set of all motor neurons. Thus, when MM ′′ is activated, it
inhibits the map MM ′ which blocks the transmission of theMM activity to the motor
neurons and then to the muscles. In this case, the map MM only activates imaginary
maps via the BAMs.
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• : indicates a neuron of the decision map;
: inhibitory synapse.
In Figure 9, the times 1,2,3,4 correspond to the random generation of a movement of
HM1 and its transmission to the map MM . At the same time, a1 activates a neuron I
that activates MM ′′. Thus, at time 5, access to the motor neurons is blocked. At time
6, MM communicates with the imaginary maps, which eventually generates a certain
emotional situation. The neuron test fires if and only if the emotion is positive, ac-
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cording to a criterion specific to the neuron test. If the emotion is considered negative,
nothing happens because access toMN is still blocked, whereas, if the emotional score
is positive, the neuron test is activated. It inhibits the neuron I and that silences the
map MM ′′. Then the map MM ′ is no longer inhibited and in this case, the initially
selected movement is transmitted to the motor neurons for execution.
This decision algorithm consists only of the three neurons a1, I and test. It is wired
once for all decisional neurons d1, . . . , dk.
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• : indicates a neuron of the decision map;
: inhibitory synapse.
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The second decision algorithm is a little more sophisticated. We admit again that
an upstream device ensures that at most one di is activated. This algorithm then
reactivates di a random number of times. At each iteration, a movement is generated
by HMi, with some consequences in the imaginary maps and then in the emotional
map, which makes it possible to assign a score to the movement. If positive, the
algorithm copy the movement into a Hopfield map denoted HM . After this testing
period, the algorithm randomly selects one of the movements recorded in HM and
actually executes it.
This decision algorithm is closer to our daily behaviours than the previous one; we weigh
different possibilities, we retain only a few, among which we execute one without really
knowing why we chose it. Figure 10 shows the algorithm structure, while restricting
ourselves to k = 2 and assuming again that di = d1. The root neuron of this algorithm
is denoted by a2.
The arrows 1 to 8 are identical to those of the first algorithm. At time 9, if the test
is positive, the Hopfield map HM stores the movement from HM1. Otherwise, in the
absence of synaptic activation from the neuron test, the map HM is not activated by
MM and the movement is not memorized.
The time 10 starts at the same moment as the time 1, however, the neurons “wait
100ms” cause a delay. These neurons, which may even be networks of neurons, pick up
an input signal and output it 100 milliseconds later. Suppose firstly that the q-neuron
qn remains inactive. Then, with a period of 200ms, via 13, the neurons ej all receive
a first synaptic activation. However, only e1 receives a second synaptic activation,
induced by the axonal activity of d1 200ms earlier, while d2 was inactive at the same
time. The thresholds of the neurons ej are such that only e1 is activated, which again
triggers the activation of d1, thus the generation of a movement in HM1, every 200ms.
Via the arrow 15, qn is stimulated every 200ms. This switches on its random behaviour
every 200ms. Now suppose that qn actually becomes active. Then the arrow 16 turns
off the periodic activation of d1 and the arrow 17 activates the neuron d which activates
the q-map qM , which causes HM to randomly pick one of its recorded movements.
The arrows 20 and 21 ensure the muscular achievement of the movement.
The neuron I activates itself because a part of its axon returns to one of its synapses.
Thus, when activated at the time 2, it remains activated indefinitely and continuously
blocks the passage from the motor map to the motor neurons, which ensures that the
movements generated during the test period are only imagined. However, when qn
becomes active, the arrow 17 brings a synaptic inhibitory component to the neuron I,
which extinguishes its activity.
On average, the number of movements selected in HM is equal to n = 1 +
1
P0
, where
P0 is the firing probability of qn. We can consider that P0 is adjusted according to the
emotion of the moment, so that n is about ten in case of serenity and only about 3 or
4 in case of anger or fear.
This decision algorithm consists of about ten neurons and two maps HM and qM
parallel to MM . Like the first algorithm, it is wired once for all decisional neurons
d1, . . . , dk. There is no difficulty to add a neuron dk+1 as well as its maps qMk+1 and
HMk+1 to this second algorithm.
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One can thus imagine multiple such decision algorithms. For each of them, we assume
that its root neuron belongs to the decision map. Possibly other neurons that articulate
the algorithm, such as the neuron d in the second algorithm, also belong to the decision
map.
We can also consider that other decision algorithms control which of the previous root
neurons is activated and therefore which of the previous decision algorithms is used,
and that they also control the choice of the neuron di, so the choice of the library HMi
of movements that is used. For example, by linking the root neurons of several decision
algorithms by “xor” q-neurons (see page 76), we can choose randomly one of them.
6.4 Abilities of the Decision-Making System
6.4.1 Adaptability
The appearance in one imaginary map of an object likely to provide a food, tactile,
financial (and so on) reward induces an emotion of desire, when the high-level sensory
maps do not perceive the object, that is, when it is only imagined. This desire, encoded
in the emotional map, activates a decision algorithm acting on one or more libraries of
movements. If it succeeds in fulfilling this desire, the chosen algorithm is reinforced, by
modifying the probabilities of the q-neurons which led to this choice, and the chosen
movements are reinforced by reproducing them several times in the Hopfield map where
they are memorized, for example during a period of sleep. Conversely, defective choices
are undermined for the future.
The decision-making system thus adapts to its environment. It optimizes rewards and
minimizes punishments.
6.4.2 Learning and Imitation
Thanks to the different BAMs linking his cortical maps, a human being can spot moves
of others that lead to rewards or avoid inconveniences. He memorizes the perceptions
of these moves in his imaginary maps, then learns to reproduce them in his libraries of
movements. For example, by observing his relatives grasp toys, a baby visualizes some
gripping moves and then learns to reproduce them.
6.4.3 Mixing Thought and Impulse
A Hopfield map HMi parallel to the motor map is not only used to generate a random
movement among all those it has memorized; we can consider that some decision
algorithms generate a movement in HMi by providing, at the same time as a random
signal from qMi, the signal present in MM . We have seen that the latter is the sum
of influences from the imaginary maps and that it often contains the move statistically
best adapted to previous actions, i.e. the move that would be done impulsively. By
properly weighting the signal from qMi and the signal fromMM with a correct setting
of the synaptic efficiencies, the movement chosen by HMi is more or less close to the
thoughtless movement contained in MM .
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6.4.4 Creating
One can also consider decision algorithms that imagine, evaluate and then execute not
a single elementary movement, but a succession of such movements selected in several
HMi. In front of a problem requiring the implementation of several moves, chance
can thus provide to the imagination of the observer solutions more or less good, and
sometimes an amazing discovery.
6.4.5 Storing a Succession of Elementary Movements
One can also consider a triple (di, qMi, HMi) which memorizes a succession of k ele-
mentary movements, where 2 ≤ k ≤ 5. When k = 3 for example, qMi and HMi are
composed of 3 layers of maps parallel to MM . This complicates the wiring of learn-
ing phases of HMi and of reading phases of HMi by MM . It is not insurmountable
however.
6.5 Attention
Thereafter, when we refer to a map, without specifying anything else, it may be indif-
ferently a high-level sensory map, an imaginary map, the emotional map, the motor
map, the decision map or finally the attention map that we now define.
In accordance with the neural architecture that we have just set up, a single initial
sensation activates an imaginary map and then using different BAMs activates other
maps. It thus can trigger a decision algorithm with the generation of several imagined
movements which themselves lead to multiple other configurations of activities in the
different maps. So, without an additional mechanism that can inhibit some of these
activities, the maps would most often fall into an incessant buzzing. Among the count-
less information coming from the environment, they would not succeed in filtering the
relevant information, notably for the survival of the organism.
To avoid such overheating, we assume that for any region of any map, all neurons in
the region receive a synaptic inhibitory contribution from one single neuron. So the
activation of this neuron cancels most of the activities in that region; attention is then
diverted from that region.
We also assume the existence of a second neuron that provides an exciting synaptic
contribution to all neurons in the same region. It focuses attention on this region.
The set of these new neurons constitutes by definition the attention map.
An attentional inhibitor neuron must not, however, prevent emergency signals from
activating certain neurons in certain maps, which is in fact the mark of the emergency.
In this case, it is likely that the attention map detects the emergency and in turn
stimulates the region where the emergency came from to better manage it. Figure 11
shows one way to implement such a mechanism; ni is an attentional inhibitory neuron
whose region of influence contains the neuron nu (arrow 1). Arrows 2 and 3 indicate
an emergency signal that activates nu despite the inhibition of ni. The neuron nl then
receives two synaptic excitations from ni and nu, which activate nl. Via the arrow 4,
nl inhibits the activity of ni, which removes the inhibition that ni had on nu and on
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the other neurons under its influence. Still via the arrow 4, nl activates the excitatory
neuron ne on the attention map that has the same region of influence as ni. So attention
is now turned to the region containing the neuron nu.
Handling of
the emergency
nu
ne
nl
ni
emergency
2
5
1
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
figure 11
In emergency situations, sensory and imaginary maps can therefore act on the attention
map. It is also controlled by the emotional map because each emotion has its own
pattern of attention.
It is still controlled by the decision map; for example, when a decision algorithm
imagines a movement to which it needs to assign a score, it acts on the attention map
to focus attention on the adapted area of the emotional map and on the areas of the
sensory maps that matter for scoring.
The decision map can also act directly on the attention map, which we denote thereafter
by AM , the same way it acts on MM ; If d is a neuron that can activate a q-map qM
parallel to AM and connected to AM , then the activation of d induces a random
attention profile. By adapting Figures 7 and 8, we can then construct some Hopfield
maps HM parallel to AM which store some attention profiles adapted to certain tasks.
For example, the fundamental exercise of mindfulness meditation is to learn to actively
focus one’s attention on breathing [C.T], [M.L.C, page 40]. According to my modelling,
this learning builds a Hopfield map HM containing several attention profiles; one
profile that privileges the chest muscles and the diaphragm, another that privileges the
breathing rhythm, one profile that focuses on inhalation and exhalation, another that
studies the temperature variations of the nasal air etc. This map HM is associated
with a q-map and a d neuron, which belongs to the decision map. To practice this
meditation exercise is to activate d to trigger one of these attention profiles, then
activate d again relentlessly to change the attention profile.
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6.6 Objects and Their Methods
After extensive learning, an adult has, for each object o in his environment, a decision
neuron do which can generate randomly one of the movements that act on this object,
using the maps qMo and HMo. In object-oriented programming terminology, these
movements are the methods of the object. When the individual feels or imagines
the presence of the object o, the neuron do is stimulated and if the other synaptic
contributions of do allow it, it emits an action potential, which generates a method
acting on the object. At the same time, a decision algorithm is chosen to define the
strategy for using this method. For example, the presence of a door in my vision field
stimulates ddoor, whose methods are “act on the handle to open”, “act on the handle
to close”, “slam the door”, “wait for opening if it is an automatic door” etc.
Let us estimate the number of neurons involved in all the maps qMo and HMo. It is
reasonable to approximate the number of objects associated with such maps by the
number of words an individual uses to talk, taking into account proper names. This
number is between 1000 and 20000 depending on whether the individual is more or
less cultured. Moreover, to manage the 570 skeletal striated muscles, let us assume
that the number of neurons on the motor map is between 2000 and 50000. Then, for
each object, the union of its q-map and Hopfield map contains a number of neurons
between 1.2 104 and 3 105, if we use maps that can code three successive movements
on average. The number of neurons mobilized by all these maps is between 1.2 107
and 6 109, that is between 0.012% and 6% of all the neurons of our brain. So it is not
beyond his capabilities.
6.7 Language
Pronouncing an elementary phoneme of our language is a movement among others. A
baby can learn it by a process similar to that of paragraph 6.2; while he is making
spontaneous gestures, the baby focuses his attention on his auditory map. The device
in Figure 7, with an adapted neuron test, then feeds a Hopfield map HMp with the
different phonemes he pronounces. During the HMp using phase, the BAM linking
MM and the auditory map learns to associate the hearing of a phoneme with its
pronunciation.
Then, when a close relative pronounces a phoneme in front of him, the baby is inclined
to reproduce this phoneme and repeat it many times. This reinforces the phonemes
actually used in the language of his relatives, while the others are gradually forgotten
by HMp.
If in the sentences used to communicate with the baby, a certain phoneme is often
followed by another phoneme, the BAM between MM and the auditory map will asso-
ciate the hearing of the first phoneme with the pronunciation of the second, according
to the process detailed at the end of chapter 4. So when the baby says “mum”, he is
inclined to continue with “my”.
Naming an object is usually one of the methods of that object, which a child can
learn when one shows him the object while distinctly uttering its name. The child
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understands that he is in a learning situation. This activates the root neuron of an
appropriate decision algorithm; the child repeats the name, or simply imagines that he
repeats the name. This inserts successively in MM the phonemes of the name which
are then stored in the Hopfield map of the object.
7 Self-Consciousness
7.1 The Ego
We have already assumed that high level sensory maps, imaginary maps and emotional
maps are made of c-neurons. We now do the same assumption for the decision map.
On the contrary we assume that the motor and attention maps are made of classic
neurons.
So,mind = sense⊗emo⊗dec, where sense is the tensor product of the c-bits on the
sensory and imaginary maps, where emo is the product of the c-bits of the emotional
map and where dec is the tensor product of the c-bits of the decision map.
The state of sense is the set of sensations perceived and imagined by the mind. The
state of emo is the set of feelings experienced by the mind. What is the state of dec?
A decision algorithm acts on q-neurons, often structured in q-maps, to make random
choices, including choices of movements or attention profiles in a Hopfield map. The
neurons that act on the synapses of q-neurons to set them in random mode are part of
the decision map.
A decision algorithm also has a specific strategy for using these different random
choices. Some key neurons in the algorithm are also part of the decision map.
The latter therefore informs, in the context of a decision-making strategy, of the pres-
ence of random choices made by q-neurons and how their results are used for the final
decision.
So there is a difference in nature between the information carried by the state of
sense ⊗ emo and that carried by the state of dec; In the first case, changes in c-bits
are interpreted as consequences, real or only imagined, of changes of objects located
outside or inside the body according to a flow of activity going from these objects to
the c-bits. In the second case, on the contrary, changes of the c-bits of the decision
map inform on the changes that their c-neurons cause downstream. Decisional neurons
are focused on motor and attention neurons; decisional neuron activity is perceived as
a cause of motor and attention neuron activity.
To be more precise, let us take again the example of hand movements. Let us suppose
that we decide at the moment t0 to imagine a hand movement and execute it immedi-
ately. According to our model, a neuron d on the decision map acts on the q-neurons of
a q-map and sets them in random mode at time t1. This random activity of the q-map
is transmitted to a Hopfield map that has memorized some hand movements. After
a few iterations, from the signal provided by the q-map, the Hopfield map converges
to one of the stored movements. According to the algorithm we have chosen, this
movement is transmitted to the motor map for execution. The BAMs directly linking
MM to the imaginary maps provides first the mind at time t2 with the imagination
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of the movement, quickly followed at time t3 by the sensations related to the muscular
actions of the movement. t3 > t2 because these real sensations come from a more com-
plex path than the imagined sensations: precise neuronal shaping of the movement,
muscle activation, activation of the sensory neurons linked to this movement, which
then feed up the sensory maps.
Let us denote mind = mind’ ⊗ D, where D is the tensor product of c-bits of the
c-neuron d. Let us also denote by Q the q-map concerned and env the rest of the
universe. At time t0, from our mind’s point of view
19,
univ(t0) = [mind
′ ⊗Dinactive]⊗Qinactive ⊗ env. Then
univ(t1) = [mind
′ ⊗Dactive]⊗
∑
i
αiQi ⊗ envi,
where the family (Qi)i contains the different possible states of the q-map.
Then, at the moment t2, from our mind’s point of view,
univ(t2) = [mind
′
i⊗Dactive]⊗Qi⊗ envi, where mind′i contains the imagined sensation
of the hand movement. At last, at time t3,
univ(t3) = [mind
′′
i ⊗Dactive]⊗Qi⊗ envi, where mind′′i contains the imagined sensation
followed by the actual sensation of the hand movement.
Thus, the mind perceives the activation of the c-neuron d, then the imagination of a
hand movement, then the sensation of its actual execution. We can decide, using a
suitable decision algorithm, to repeat this experience several times and the chronology
will always be the same; the mark left in dec by the activation of d at the time t1 is
systematically followed by the imagination of a variable movement of one hand then
the sensations of the actual execution of the same movement.
Between the event Dactive that occurs in dec and the sequence of events (mind
′
i, mnid
′′
i )
that occurs in sense ⊗ emo, we find all the characteristics of a causal link:
• the anteriority;
• the necessity, because the presence of Dactive is systematic before a hand move-
ment occurs;
• the specificity, because the event Dactive occurs only before the appearance of a
hand movement.
This is the notion of causality as conceived by David Hume in his “Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding”, that is, causality based on experience and habit.
Thus, from the mind’s point of view, the event Dactive is perceived as the cause of the
events (mind′i, mind
′′
i ). More generally, when an individual uses a decision algorithm,
the state of dec is, from his mind’s point of view, the cause of this algorithm and
its consequences, of which the movement actually decided among the various possible
movements is part. This cause is therefore responsible for the execution of the move-
ment. This approach is consistent with the theory of Daniel M. Wegner presented in
“Pre´cis of The Illusion of Conscious Will” [DM.W].
19According to the linearity principle FP2, we can limit ourselves to such a separable form for
Q⊗ env.
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In short, dec being the cause of the choices made by the brain in the context of a
decision making, this is the ego, the soul, “I”, the self and so on. Thereafter, I thus
replace the notation dec by ego.
7.2 Free Will, Libet and Soon Experiments
7.2.1 Protocol and Modelling of Libet Experiment
After studying the delays of conscious perception, Benjamin Libet conducted exper-
iments concerning free will [B.L, pages 141-157]; he asks a seated subject to flex his
wrist as soon as the subject has decided to, avoiding any pre-planning of his gesture.
The experimenter measures several times:
• the moment S of the wrist flexion is measured with an electrode that can detect
the muscle activity corresponding to flexion.
• The moment P of the beginning of the motor preparation performed by the brain
is evaluated by electrodes applied to the subject’s scalp, near motor or premotor
areas. P therefore indicates the moment when some neurons in these areas fire
to trigger a wrist flexion.
• The moment W when the subject becomes aware of his will to act is evaluated by
asking the subject, during the experiment, to watch a clock indicating the time
with an accuracy better than 50ms. When he becomes aware of his will to act,
the subject must at the same time memorize the clock position.
Note that W is a subjective time, derived from the subject’s conscious experience,
whereas S and P are objective times.
Benjamin Libet obtains on average W = S − 150ms, i.e. the subject becomes aware
of his willingness to act 150ms before his action, and P = W − 350ms which is more
surprising because it means that some neurons on the motor map initiate the flexion
before it is consciously decided. This experience seems to prove that free will is an
illusion, that the decisions of a human being are not decided by him but only by
subliminal parameters that influence him unconsciously.
In the context of our modelling, this experiment can be described at the neural level
by Figure 12. When the subject is informed of the experiment protocol, he places
himself in a learning situation. Using a mechanism similar to that of Figure 8, he can
memorize in a Hopfield map HM a wrist flexion, and even several wrist flexions, more
or less fast. HM is controlled by a q-map and a decisional c-neuron d, so that the
activation of d triggers a wrist flexion according to arrows 7 to 10.
To conform to the experiment protocol, the subject chooses a decision algorithm among
the different algorithms available. Its root neuron is denoted by a. At the beginning of
the experiment, he activates a. As long as the q-neuron qn remains inactive, loop 3-4 is
executed which produces nothing for 50ms. At each iteration of the loop, the q-neuron
is set in random mode. Its firing probability is tuned so that the average waiting time
is about 20 seconds. When the q-neuron finally fires at the moment t, arrow 5 inhibits
loop 3-4 and arrow 6 activates d.
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figure 12 :
• : indicates a neuron of the decision map;
: inhibitory synapse.
7.2.2 Free Will, a Mind’s Point of View
Let us take the notations from page 99, where Q now stands for qn. So at the beginning
of the experiment, univ(t0) = [mind
′ ⊗Dinactive]⊗Qinactive ⊗ env, then after about 30
seconds,
univ(t1) =
∑
i∈I
αi[mind
′
i ⊗Dinactive]⊗
∑
j
βi,jQinactive,i,j ⊗ envi,j
+
∑
i∈J
αi[mind
′
i ⊗Dactive,i]⊗
∑
j
βi,jQactive,i,j ⊗ envi,j :
The first sum represents a coexistence of states of the universe in which qn has not yet
fired. In the second sum, the term containing mind′i ⊗ Dactive,i represents a universe
in which the q-neuron fired at time t = τi, which is encoded in the mind by Dactive,i,
because the activation of qn causes the activation of the c-neuron d. mind′i represents
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the state of the rest of the mind after the wrist flexion.
From the subject’s point of view, mind(t0) = mind
′ ⊗Dinactive is a mind aware of the
start of the experiment thanks to the c-bits of a. Then, in the case where qn fires at the
moment t = τi, after the wrist flexion, mind(t1) = mind
′
i ⊗ Dactive,i. Chronologically,
we will see that the state change of D occurs just before the state changes of mind’
that result from the activation of the motor map by d. So, from the perspective of the
subject’s mind, which only perceives one of the terms at the moment t1, some person
chose, between t0 and t1, that the moment t would be τi. And everything indicates
that that person is ego, of which D is a factor: anteriority, necessity, specificity.
It is a free decision, because the subject is aware that he could just as easily have chosen
another value of t. In fact, this is what happens in the other terms of the second sum
of univ(t1). The feeling of free will is consistent with the fact that the collapse of the
wave function is not real but only perceived by the mind in each term.
7.2.3 Strengthening of Causality
The interpretation to be given toW is delicate. If we apply a cutaneous stimulation to
the subject and ask him to spot the time M indicated by the clock when he becomes
aware of it, he indeed indicates the actual moment of the stimulation [B.L, page 148].
Thus, the timeM is calculated by the brain according to a non detailed mechanism that
memorizes the position of the clock as it is coded by the neuronal activity of the visual
imaginary map, at the moment when the neurons of the sensory map sensitive to the
cutaneous stimulation are activated. When testifying about the time M , the subject
uses this memorized image to construct his report. In reality, according to paragraph
3.6, the subject becomes aware of the cutaneous stimulation at time M + 500ms,
however this conscious event is backdated and has indeed M as time label in the mind.
Nethertheless, I show now that to reinforce the feeling of causality, it is preferable
that the c-bits of d do not backdate its action potential. Under these conditions, the
subjective time W is equal to t + 500ms. It is assumed that the brain performs this
calculation correctly, according to arrows 11 and 12; the action potential of d is delayed
500ms before being used as an input to the mechanism that previously calculated M .
Thus, the decision to flex the wrist is made at the moment t, but the awareness of this
decision by the mind occurs only at the moment W = t+ 500ms (see Figure 13).
t P
150 ms
W
350 ms
S
150 ms
figure 13
The relationship P = W − 350ms can be written P = t + 150ms which restores
a coherent chronology: the neurons of MM are activated only after the decision is
made.
The relationship W = S − 150ms can be written S = P + 500ms: a rather long
delay of 500ms is thus necessary between the activation of the motor map and the
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muscular activity. It corresponds to signal propagation time, motion control and muscle
activation, but it is 5 times slower than the rapid succession of movements studied on
page 85 at the end of the chapter 4. In order to explain this relative slowness of these
thoughtful movements which result from of a decision algorithm, we can provide two
reasons:
• The map HM is part of the motor areas, so its activity is perceived by the
electrodes. Then the moment P corresponds to the beginning of the HM activity,
which takes some time to converge towards one of its learned movements.
• When a movement results from a decision algorithm, one can suppose that a
mechanism of temporization intervenes at the level of the motor map to possibly
allow a counter-decision.
The neural circuit that produces the imagination of the movement is faster because it
uses BAMs that connect the motor map to the imaginary maps. Let us assume that
the flexion is imagined 150ms before being executed and that it still takes 150ms for
the actual movement to be perceived in the sensory maps. Assuming that both the
imagined movement and the actual movement are backdated by 500ms when encoded in
c-bits, their conscious time labels coincide with real time. Then the imagined movement
reaches consciousness with time S−150ms = W and the real movement is consciously
perceived with time S + 150 = W + 300ms. This reinforces the feeling that the ego
is the cause of the decision; the moment he becomes aware of his decision to act, the
mind imagines the movement he is going to make, and then it is realized. Thus, from
the mind’s point of view, the ego has not only decided the moment of the wrist flexion
but has also decided the parameters of this movement, including its speed.
If the awareness of the decision to act had been backdated, one would have obtained
S − 150 = W + 500ms : the movement would consciously be imagined 500ms after
the ego decided to act. The mind would perceive an ego that has decided to act, but
without knowing if the flexion he has decided is more or less rapid, so without knowing
the choices he is supposed to have made.
7.2.4 Soon Experiment
Chun Siong Soon and his colleagues studied a variant of the previous experiment [CS.S].
The seated subjects have two buttons on which they can press, respectively with the
right or left index finger. The subject is asked, whenever he wishes, to decide which
button to press and to execute this action as soon as it is decided, avoiding any pre-
planning of the time and choice of button. The results of the experiment indicate that
the decision is consciously made at the time W = S − 750 on average, but here S
indicates the moment when the button is actually pressed, which probably explains
the delay of some 600ms compared to Libet experiment.
On the neural level, the decision algorithm of the previous experiment can be used
again, the only difference being that the map HM now stores right button pressure
movements and left button pressure movements. Thus, the above explanations remain
valid with this new protocol.
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However, instead of electrodes, the experimenters analyze the subjects’ brains with
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Each region of the brain is analyzed to deter-
mine the extent to which its activity predicts the subject’s decision, using statistical
pattern recognition methods. The authors obtained predictions with a reliability be-
tween 55% and 60%, and that nearly 10 seconds before the subjective time W of the
decision. Such a result seems a priori to invalidate the previous model according to
which decision making is done at the moment t = W − 500ms and give the coup de
grce to the notion of free will.
Nethertheless, in the framework of my model, it is likely that during the 10 seconds
before the decision is made, the subject imagines different ways to press the right or left
button, and that the map HM memorizes these imagined movements. Depending on
whether more right or left index movements are imagined during this period, the result
of the convergence in CM of the random signal provided by the q-map will be more or
less likely to be a right or left index movement. This preliminary brain activity would
explain why statistical techniques can detect bias in the subject’s future decision, as
Eddy Nahmias [E.N] suggests. The reliability of predictions does not exceed 60%, which
is not far from the 50% that one would obtain by making purely random predictions.
They would therefore only be the detection of a bias in the subject’s decision, a bias
introduced into the map HM by a right/left imbalance during a preliminary process of
memorization of the movements. Despite this bias, the decision is actually made when
the neuron d fires.
In the subject’s mind, the moment this decision is made is defined by a change of the
ego state, who is perceived as the cause. The imagination of the decided movement
arrives in the mind at the same time. So the ego seems to be the one who freely decided
which button to press and when to do it.
7.3 Consistence and Inconsistence of the Ego
The conscious perception of the ego is real, thanks to the c-bits of the decision map.
The decisions made by the ego have consequences for the future of the individual and
for the society in which he evolves. These consequences inevitably induce positive
emotions of success or self-confidence, or negative emotions of failure, shame or guilt.
They induce a sense of responsibility that gives the ego a very real consistence.
However, if the ego decides to analyze this consistence, if he wants to clarify his na-
ture, beyond the evidence of his existence as a perception of the mind, beyond the
consequences of his decisions, he becomes inconsistent, unlike other objects perceived
by the mind, which can be analyzed, decomposed, compared, categorized, etc. Indeed,
the ego is never really the cause of a decision, it is only the indication that a decisional
c-neuron has been activated, but this activation itself results from upstream neuronal
activations, conscious or unconscious. Moreover, when he activates q-neurons, he does
not decide what result they produce; indeed, the other possible results are actually re-
alized because, from an external point of view, the universe is a coexistence of universes
and each of the possible decisions is indeed made in one of them.
Still from an external point of view, quantum mechanics is deterministic, so the only
cause of the future is the past. And if we reverse the arrow of time, the future becomes
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the cause of the past. Thus, the notion of causality is no longer relevant. The ego is not
at the origin of the decisions he believes he is making, he is only the indication in the
mind that the mind has made a quantum measurement on some q-neurons. This does
not absolve us of our responsibility; the consequences of our decisions are very real as
well as the emotions they induce and, morally, we are supposed to change our future
behaviors to reduce their negative consequences, therefore we are supposed to have a
plasticity that strengthens the mechanisms that lead to good decisions and weakens
those that lead to bad decisions.
7.4 The Meaning of Conscious Perceptions
By the mere fact of existing, the mind’s perceptions are conscious. Through their
reproducibility, they acquire meaning because this enables them to be associated with
each other in fairly flexible causal relationships. For example, the imagination of the
word “dog” leads to the visualization of a dog. When the ego does not intervene, if
attention is diverted from the decision map, the word “dog” evokes various memories
stored in the imaginary maps and by association, our mind can become aware of the
conversation we had with a neighbor who was walking his dog. When the ego intervenes,
he can decide to widen the class of dogs to that of animals and study what this evokes
to him, he can on the contrary restrict his attention to a particular dog. Thus, through
multiple associations and multiple choices, my brain can explain to the mind what a dog
is, by reference to other notions, which he can just as well explain using other notions.
The mind contains the perception of an ego that actively maintains the network of his
knowledge of the world. By deciding to remember them, to analyze their components,
to compare them, by seeking out analogies, causal links, similarities, generalizations
etc., the ego becomes the owner of this knowledge and acquires in the mind a central
place of conductor.
The fundamental motivation that leads the ego to study his knowledge relentlessly
is the instinct for survival; natural selection has favoured organisms that seek good
control of their environment, to avoid dangers and maximize rewards.
On the neural level, a child’s relatives are associated, in his brain, with objects within
the meaning of paragraph 6.6, equipped with methods that permit him to name his
relatives and communicate with them in multiple ways.
A child also has objects corresponding to each part of his body, which he manages to
aggregate into a single object. This object corresponds to that relative who appears in
the mirror, to his body and to the ego, because each decision of the ego, in definitive,
concern a movement of the body. Thus the ego is personified in an object, one of whose
methods is to say “I”. And each decision of the ego is accompanied by the activation
of this object, which for example induces the imagination of the body or a part of the
body. This object “I” has specific algorithms. In particular, the triggering of a decision
algorithm causes another algorithm to be activated in the object “I” to analyze the
decision and its consequences, which induce a certain emotion.
Thus, the object “I” becomes central in the good functioning of the organism during
the waking periods. It is essentially controled by the judgment of the ego facing his own
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decisions: The emotions generated by these judgments largely control the long-term
behaviour of the individual.
On the sensory level, the ego becomes the owner of the body; it is not only the one
who decides, who judges his decisions, who chooses where to focus his attention, but
also the one who feels. He is the conductor of every perception in the mind.
Objects that represent relatives are also equipped with specific algorithms. One of
them is to imagine what we would do in someone else’s place. The choices we imagine
then are the result of the activation of decisional neurons which induce in the mind the
awareness of “self” as the cause responsible for decisions, but the concomitant presence
of c-bits specific to the algorithm we describe indicate that the cause must be shifted
to others. This is the case for all supposedly sensitive objects. Then, from a single soul
felt in the mind, we switch to a multitude of spiritual entities, which sometimes catch
our full attention.
Moreover, we understand that others evaluate and judge us according to the same
mechanisms, which reinforces the need to pay attention to our ego, to its actions, to
our judgment of its actions as well as to the judgments we assume others make about
our actions.
This is how our soul and those of others become essential objects of our daily life.
Our survival instinct requires us to search for their deep nature in order to better
understand and master them. Nethertheless, if “I” can decide to analyze and dissect
each of my sensory and emotional perceptions, according to the previous paragraph,
I cannot return this capacity of analysis on the heart of the ego, his decision-making
component, whose true nature is beyond my senses. I think that this is the source of a
fundamental dissatisfaction that is related to what Buddhism calls “Dukkha” [W.R].
7.5 Uniqueness of Mind
7.5.1 Parts of the Mind
According to hypothesis H3, mind is the tensor product of N c-bits (c1, . . . , cN).
If J is a subset of {1, . . . , N}, then mindJ =
⊗
i∈J
ci also satisfies the constraints of H3.
So mindJ is also an observer. We would get 2
N observers, which is a lot for one body.
These partial consciousnesses do exist, but they do not have a self-consciousness who
analyses and maintains relentlessly the sense of his perceptions. The existence of such
self-consciousness requires not only that J contain the c-bits of the decisional c-neurons,
but also all the c-bits needed for the perception of the ego as the conductor of a global
network of knowledge of the world.
It is likely that among all the mindJ , mind =
⊗
1≤i≤N
ci is the only mind with a working
self-consciousness.
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7.5.2 Union of Several Minds
Let mind1 and mind2 be the minds of two observers. Let (c1, . . . , cN1) be the c-bits
of mind1 and (cN1+1, . . . , cN1+N2) those of mind
2. So mind1 ⊗mind2 =
⊗
1≤i≤N1+N2
ci
satisfies the constraints of H3. He is also an observer.
However, if we consider a conscious state mind1⊗mind2, it corresponds to the conjunc-
tion of a consciousness state ofmind1 and a consciousness state ofmind2. If we change
the c-bit states of mind2, the consciousness of mind1 is not (immediately) affected.
Similarly, changing the c-bit states of mind1 does not affect the consciousness state of
mind2, so this “united” observer does exist, but he does not have a self-consciousness.
He has two of them, each experimenting the universe independently of the other, in
accordance with the relationships presented at the end of paragraph 2.6 page 40.
More generally, the union of several observers is indeed a consciousness, but it is devoid
of a unified self-consciousness.
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Conclusion
Starting from the principles of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, without an a priori
definition of probabilities, we have developed a particular conception of the latter as
well as the notions of observer, existence and consciousness:
An object exists when it is in a pure state, however such an existence can also be read
as the simultaneous coexistence of several existences which do not interact between
them and which interfere. This is particularly the case of the universe in its entirety,
which can be read as a coexistence of states of the form mindi ⊗ envi, where mindi
is a pure state of a mind and where envi is the coexistence of environments that set
the mind in the state mindi. His consciousness becomes meaningful when his states
are reproducible memories and he has a suitable neural environment. Before such a
mind measures the state of an object, the probability for that object to be after the
measurement in the state obji is defined as the proportion of the number of minds that
will experience the reality obji after the measurement.
However, the assumptions we have imposed on an observer are constraining. Practi-
cally, are they actually implanted in some of our neurons? Theoretically, are they only
possible? Can these assumptions be relaxed in less restrictive forms? The last chapter
of the first part explored these questions but did not exhaust them.
I finish by mentioning a few points that should be addressed or developed.
• The second part provides a too sketchy model of higher cognitive functions and
self-consciousness. It should be developed significantly.
• In particular, the action that the mind exerts on its environment is hardly men-
tioned. According to what mechanisms do c-neurons read the state of their c-bits
and how does this reading intervene in neuronal activity, in decision-making?
What are the selective advantages for the organism provided by c-bits?
• What are the metaphysical consequences of our approach?
• On a more technical level, how our interpretation harmonize with the use of
probabilities in statistical physics, particularly with the notion of entropy? What
does it tell us about irreversibility and the arrow of time?
• What becomes of this article in the framework of a quantum gravity theory?
• Do some unicellular organisms and plants possess a mind in the form of a tensor
product of c-bits? This would allow these brainless organisms to have a form of
consciousness.
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